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



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



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MEMOIRS

OF THE

HISTORY OF FRANCE

DURING THE REIGN OF

NAPOLEON,

DICTATED BY THE EMPEROR

AT SAINT HELENA

TO THE GENERALS WHO SHARED HIS CAPTIVITY;

AND PUBLISHED

FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS

CORRECTED BY HIMSELF.

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ERRATUM.

Page 167, line 11, for *Mantua* read *Ceta*.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE.*

NAPOLEON has commenced his Memoirs with the siege of Toulon. He did not consider his actions previous to that date as belonging to history; but public curiosity requiring information respecting the origin and progressive elevation of a man who has played so grand a part on the theatre of life, it is therefore conceived that some notice of his family, his early years, and the commencement of his distinguished career, will not be misplaced here.

The Bonapartes are of Tuscan origin. In the middle ages they figured as senators of the republics of Florence, San Miniato, Bologna, Sarzana, and Treviso, and as prelates attached to the court of Rome. They were allied to the Medici, the Orsini, and Lomellini families. Several of them were engaged in the public affairs of their native states; whilst others employed themselves in literary pursuits at the period of the revival of letters in Italy. Giuseppe Bonaparte published one of the first regular comedies of that age, entitled *The Widow*; copies of which exist in the libraries of Italy, and in the Royal Library at Paris, where is also preserved the History of the Siege

* This Notice, like the rest of the work, was dictated by Napoleon.

of Rome, by the Constable de Bourbon, of which Nicolo Bonaparte, a Roman prelate, is the author.* This narrative is highly esteemed. In 1797, literary men, whom no coincidence escapes, remarked the circumstance, that since the time of Charlemagne Rome had been twice menaced by great foreign armies; at the head of one of which was the Constable de Bourbon, and at the head of the other, one of the remote descendants of the family of his historian.

When the French Army entered Bologna, the Senate took care to have their *Golden Book* presented to the General-in-chief by Counts Marescalchi and Caprara, to draw his attention to the names of several of his ancestors, inscribed amongst those of the senators who had contributed to the honour of their city.

In the fifteenth century, a younger branch of the Bonaparte family settled in Corsica.† At the time of the campaign of Italy, there was no one left of all

---

* It appears, however, on referring to the work, in the Royal Library at Paris, that this account of the sacking of Rome is written by Jacopo, and not by Nicolo Bonaparte. Jacopo was a contemporary and an ocular witness of the event; his manuscript was printed for the first time at Cologne, in 1756; and the volume contains a genealogy of the Bonapartes, which is carried back to a very remote period, and describes them as one of the most illustrious houses of Tuscany.

This Nicolo Bonaparte, named in the text as the historian, was only the uncle of Jacopo. He is, however, mentioned in the genealogy as a very distinguished scholar, and as having founded the class of Jurisprudence in the University of Pisa.

† Zopf, in his Summary of Universal History, (Precis de l'histoire universelle) 20th edition, says that a scion of the Comnena family, who had claims to the throne of Constantinople, retired into Corsica

the Italian branches, but the Abbé Gregorio Bonaparte, Knight of St. Stephen, and Canon of San Miniato. He was an old man of great respectability and wealth. Napoleon, in his march on Leghorn, stopped at San Miniato, and was received with his whole staff at the house of his relation. During supper, the conversation turned entirely on a Capuchin, a member of the family, who had been beatified a century before; and the canon solicited the interest of the General-in-chief to procure his canonization. This proposal was several times made to the Emperor Napoleon after the concordat; but less importance was attached to these pious honours at Paris than at Rome.

Those who are well acquainted with the Italian language know that it is optional to write *Buona* or *Bona*. The members of the Bonaparte family have used both these modes of orthography indiscriminately: of two brothers it has happened that one has written his name with the *u*, and the other without it. It seems that the suppression of this letter was common in very ancient times: in the church of St. Francis, belonging to the Minor Friars in the town of San Miniato, on the right of the principal altar is a tomb with this inscription:—

---

in 1462, and that several members of that family bore the name of *Calomeros*, which is perfectly identical with that of Bonaparte.

καλὸν μέρος
bona parte.

It may hence be concluded that this name has been Italianized.

We do not believe that this circumstance was ever known to Napoleon.

CLARISSIMO SUAE AETATIS ET PATRIAE VIRO
JOANNI JACOBI MOCCII DE BONAPARTE
QUI OBIIT ANNO M.CCCCXXXXI. DIE XXV.
SEPTEMBRIS NICOLAUS DE BONAPARTE
APOSTOLICAE CAMERAE CLERICUS FECIT
GENITORI BENEMERENTI ET POSTERIS.

The Christian name of *Napoleon* has also been the subject of much discussion. It was usual in the Orsini and Lomellini families, from whom it was adopted by that of Bonaparte. The manner of writing it has been disputed in Italy. Some pretended that it was derived from the Greek, and signified *Lion of the desert;* others that it was derived from the Latin. The correct way of writing it is *Napoleone.* This name is not found in the Roman calendar. From the searches made in the martyrologies at Rome, at the period of the *Concordat,* it appears that Saint Napoleone was a Greek martyr.

Napoleon's great grandfather had three sons, Joseph, Napoleon, and Lucien. The first of these left only one son, whose name was Charles; the second left only a daughter, named Elizabeth, who was married to the head of the Ornano family; the third was a priest, and died in 1791, aged eighty years; he was archdeacon of the chapter of Ajaccio. Charles, who thus became the only heir to his father, was the father of Napoleon. He was educated at Rome and Pisa, where he took his degree of Doctor of Laws. At a very early age he married Letitia Ramolino, a lady of a very good family of the country, descended from that of Colalto of Naples. By her he had five sons and three daughters. Charles Bona-

parte was twenty years of age at the breaking out of the war of 1768; he was a warm friend to Paoli, and a most zealous defender of the independence of his country. The town of Ajaccio being occupied, at the commencement of hostilities, by the French troops, he removed with his family to Corte in the centre of the island. His young wife, then pregnant with Napoleon, followed Paoli's head-quarters and the army of the Corsican patriots, in the campaign of 1769, across the mountains, and resided a long time on the summit of Monte Rotondo, in the parish of Niolo. But her pregnancy advancing, she obtained from Marshal Devaux a safe conduct to return to her house at Ajaccio. Napoleon was born on the 15th of August, being the feast of the Assumption.

Charles Bonaparte followed Paoli, on his retirement, as far as Porto Vecchio, and wished to have embarked with him; but the entreaties of his family, his attachment to his children, and his affection for his young wife, retained him.

The French government appointed provincial states in Corsica, and continued the magistracy of the twelve nobles, who, like the Burgundian deputies, governed the country. Charles Bonaparte, who was very popular in the island, formed part of this magistracy. He was attached as counsellor to the tribunal of Ajaccio; this was an intermediate step for getting into the supreme council of the country. In 1779 the states appointed him deputy for the nobles to Paris. The clergy chose the bishop of Nebbio, and the third estate a Casabianca. Charles Bonaparte took with him his two sons, Joseph and Napoleon, the one aged eleven years, the other ten; he placed the

former in the boarding-school at Autun, and the latter entered the military school at Brienne as a pupil.

Napoleon remained six years at that school. In 1783, Field-marshal the Chevalier Kergariou, inspector of the military schools, selected him to pass the following year to the military school at Paris, to which three of the best scholars, chosen by the inspector, were annually sent from each of the twelve provincial schools. Napoleon remained only eight months at Paris. In the month of August 1785 he was examined by the Academician Laplace, and received the brevet of a second lieutenant of artillery in the regiment of La Fère; he was then sixteen years of age. Phelipeaux, Pecaduc, and Demasis passed at the same examination: they all three emigrated at the commencement of the Revolution. The first defended St. Jean d'Acre, where he evinced much talent, and where he died; the second was a Breton, and attained the rank of major in the Austrian army; the third, who returned to France during the consulate, was appointed administrator of the crown moveables, and chamberlain.

The regiment of La Fère was at Valence, in Dauphiny, where Napoleon kept garrison for the first time. Some commotions having taken place in the town of Lyons, he was sent thither with his battalion. This regiment afterwards passed to Douay in Flanders, and to Auxonne in Burgundy. In 1791 Napoleon was made a captain in the regiment of artillery of Grenoble, then in garrison at Valence, whither he returned. The revolutionary ideas began to prevail. Part of the officers emigrated. Gouvion, Vaubois, Galbo Dufour, and Napoleon, were the four captains who,

having preserved the good opinion of the soldiers, kept them within the limits of order.

Napoleon was in Corsica for six months in 1792. He took the earliest opportunity of waiting on Paoli, with whom his father had been intimate. Paoli received him in a very friendly manner, and did all in his power to retain him, and keep him out of the way of the disturbances with which the mother-country was threatened.

In January and February 1793, Napoleon was intrusted with a counter attack on the North of Sardinia, whilst Admiral Truguet was operating against Cagliari. The expedition not having succeeded, he brought his troops safely back to Bonifacio. This was his first military achievement, and obtained him testimonials of the attachment of the soldiers, and a local reputation.

A few months after, Paoli, against whom an accusation had been decreed by the senate, threw off the mask and revolted. Previously to declaring himself, he communicated his scheme to the young artillery officer, of whom he used frequently to say "You see that youth; he is a man for a Plutarch's biography." But all the persuasions and influence of this venerable old man were unavailing. Napoleon agreed with him that France was in a frightful state, but reminded him that nothing that is violent can last long; and that as he had an immense influence over the inhabitants, and was master of the places of strength and of the troops, he ought to maintain tranquillity in Corsica, and let the fury of the moment pass away in France; that the island ought not to be torn from its natural connexion on account of a momentary disorder; that

it had every thing to lose in such a convulsion; that it belonged, geographically, either to France or Italy; that it never could be English; and that as Italy was not a single undivided power, Corsica ought constantly to remain French. The old general could not controvert all this, but he persisted in his plans. Napoleon quitted the convent of Rostino, where this conference was held, two hours afterwards. Affairs grew worse; Corte openly revolted, bodies of insurgents from all quarters advanced on Ajaccio, where there were no troops of the line or means of resistance proportioned to the attack. The Bonaparte family retired to Nice, and afterwards into Provence; their property was devastated; their house, after being pillaged, was long used as barracks by an English battalion. Napoleon, on reaching Nice, was preparing to join his regiment, when General Dugear, who commanded the artillery of the Army of Italy, required his services, and employed him in the most delicate operations. A few months after, Marseilles revolted; the Marseillese army got possession of Avignon; the communications of the Army of Italy were cut off; there was a want of ammunition; a convoy of powder was intercepted; and the general-in-chief was greatly embarrassed by these circumstances. General Dugear sent Napoleon to the Marseillese insurgents, to try to induce them to let the convoys pass, and at the same time to take all necessary measures to secure and accelerate their passage. He went to Marseilles and Avignon, had interviews with the leaders of the insurgents, convinced them that it was their own interest not to excite the resentment of the Army of Italy, and got the convoys forwarded.

During these proceedings Toulon had surrendered to the English: Napoleon, now a lieutenant-colonel *(chef de bataillon)*, was ordered on service to the siege of Toulon, on the proposal of the committee of artillery. He joined the besieging army on the 12th of September, 1793.

During his residence at Marseilles, when sent to the insurgents, having an opportunity of observing all the weakness and incoherence of their means of resistance, he drew up a little pamphlet, which he published before he left that city. He endeavoured to open the eyes of these frantic people, and predicted that the only result of their revolt would be to furnish a pretext to the men of blood of the day, for sending the principal persons amongst them to the scaffold. This pamphlet produced a powerful effect, and contributed to calm the agitation which prevailed.

MEMOIRS
OF
NAPOLEON.

WAR OF ITALY.

CHAPTER I.

I. Remarks on the state of parties in France in 1793.—II. Circumstances which occasioned the surrender of Toulon to the English.—III. Consequences of the reduction of Toulon by the troops of the Convention. Appointment of Napoleon to the command of the artillery of the Army of Italy.

I.

THE Constituent Assembly went in some respects too far, and in others did too little. It was composed of men endowed with distinguished talents, but devoid of experience. It committed two errors, which might have produced the total ruin of the nation: the first was the establishment of a constitution at variance with the experience of all ages and states, and the mechanism of which was contrived, not for the purpose of strengthening social order and promoting national prosperity,

but of restricting and annulling the public power, which is that of government. Great as this error was, it was less flagrant and had less deplorable consequences than that of persisting in re-establishing Louis XVI. on the throne, after the affair of Varennes. What then ought the Assembly to have done? It ought to have sent commissioners extraordinary to Varennes, not to bring the King back to Paris, but to clear the way for him, and to conduct him safely beyond the frontiers; to have decreed, by virtue of the Constitution, that he had abdicated; proclaimed Louis XVII. King; created a regency, confided the care of the King, during his minority, to a Princess of the House of Condé, and composed the council of regency and the ministry of the principal members of the Constituent Assembly. A government so conformable to principle, and so national, would have found means to remedy the disadvantages of the Constitution; the force of events would soon have led to the adoption of the necessary modifications. It is probable that France would have triumphed over all her enemies, domestic and foreign, and would have experienced neither anarchy nor revolutionary government. By the period of the King's majority, the Revolution would have

been so well rooted, that it might have defied every attack. To act otherwise was intrusting the steering of the vessel, during a most tremendous storm, to a pilot no longer capable of conducting her; it was calling the crew to insurrection and revolt in the name of public safety; it was invoking anarchy.

The royalists formed the right side of the Constituent Assembly; the constitutionals took the left side, placing themselves at the head of the people. But in the Legislative Assembly the constitutionals formed the right side, and the *Girondins* the left. In the Convention, the latter in their turn composed the right side, and the faction called that of the Mountain, formed the left side, directing the popular party. In the Constituent Assembly the constitutionals demanded the expulsion of the troops of the line, proclaiming the principle that the assembly ought to be guarded by the national guard. In the Legislative Assembly they maintained a contrary opinion, and loudly clamoured for troops of the line; but the *Girondins* indignantly rejected the employment of any hired army against the majority of the people. The *Gironde* party, in its turn, claimed the protection of an army of the line against the popular party. Thus did the dif-

ferent parties alternately change their opinions according to circumstances.

The factions of the Gironde and the Mountain were too violent in their mutual animosity. Had they both continued to exist, the proceedings of administration would have been encumbered with so many impediments, that the Republic could not have maintained the contest against the combination of all Europe. The good of the country required the triumph of one of these parties. On the 31st of May, the Gironde fell, and the Mountain thenceforth governed without opposition. The consequence is known: the campaigns of 1793 and 1794 delivered France from foreign invasion.

Would the result have been the same if the Gironde party had gained the day, and the Mountain had been sacrificed on the 31st of May? We think it would not. The Mountain party, although checked, would always have possessed great influence in France, in the popular societies and armies, and would have essentially diminished the energies of the nation, the whole of which were necessary at that crisis. There was undoubtedly more talent in the Gironde than in the Mountain; but the Gironde was composed of more specu-

lative men, with less resolution and decision of will; they would have governed more mildly, and it is probable that under their reign only part of the excesses which the revolutionary government of the Mountain committed, would have taken place. The Gironde prevailed in the towns of Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, Montpellier, Nismes, Bordeaux, and Brest, and in several provinces. The home of the Mountain was the capital, and it was supported by all the Jacobins in France. On the 31st of May it triumphed; twenty-two deputies, the leaders of the Gironde, were proscribed.

II.

Sixty-six departments, filled with indignation, took up arms. The people of Paris, they said, had usurped the national sovereignty. They raised battalions, and began a civil war; but the Mountain being masters of the Convention and supported by the popular societies and the armies, and having the treasury and the assignat plate at their disposal, despised the vain threats of the federalists. The small army which marched on Paris, under the command of Calvados, was defeated by a few squadrons of gens-d'armes. In a few weeks peace was restored throughout the Republic, with the

exception of Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, and a few towns of Languedoc. Lyons, besieged by part of the army of the Alps, and by some battalions of volunteers raised in Burgundy and Auvergne, made a long and brilliant resistance; its national guard had been organized long before, and 3000 refugees from the southern provinces, amongst whom were many ancient officers, had enlisted in it. Marseilles and Toulon brought 6000 national guards into the field; Montpellier and Nismes, 4000. These two divisions were to join at Orange, and to proceed thence to the relief of Lyons. The representatives of the people with the army of the Alps, detached from Grenoble 2000 infantry of the line, 500 Allobrogian horse, and two batteries of artillery, under the command of Colonel Cartaux. This little column descended the left bank of the Rhone, fell in with the van of the Marseillese at Orange, put them to flight, advanced on the bridge of Saint-Esprit, dispersed the van of the force from Nismes, occupied the castle, and having marched on Avignon, drove the Marseillese army from that place on the 16th of July, and forced it to repass the Durance precipitately. Cartaux took possession of Aix on the 20th of August; on the 24th he

attacked the camp of the confederates, which was intrenched and lined with twenty pieces of heavy cannon, forced it, and entered Marseilles, which place was exposed to all the horrors of civil war.

The Sections N^os. 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, had declared for the Mountain, and summoned the municipality to acknowledge the Convention, which proposal had been rejected with indignation. Both parties took up arms. The conflict was still proceeding when the fugitives from the camp of Septem brought the news of the loss of the battle there; at the same moment the Allobrogians seized the gates of Aix. The terrified leaders of the federalists took refuge in Toulon, accompanied by a thousand men.

The entrance of Cartaux into Aix became known at Toulon on the 22d of August. On this intelligence, the Sections set no bounds to their violence; they arrested the representatives of the people, Bayle and Beauvais, who were on a mission there, and confined them in Fort la Malgue; the representatives Freron, Barras, and General Lapoype, fled to Nice, the head-quarters of the Army of Italy. All the authorities at Toulon were compromised, and they had all equally participated in the

revolt; the municipality, the directory of the department, the Intendant of the Navy, most of the persons employed in the arsenal, Vice-Admiral Trogoff, who commanded the squadron, and a great number of the officers, all felt themselves equally guilty, and knowing what enemies they had to deal with, saw no means of safety but treason. They consequently surrendered the squadron, port, arsenal, town and forts to the enemies of France. The squadron, consisting of eighteen sail of the line and several frigates, was at anchor in the roads; although betrayed by its admiral, it remained loyal, and defended itself against the English and Spanish fleets; but, being abandoned by the land forces, and menaced by those very batteries on the coast that ought to have protected it, it yielded. The English and Spanish admirals at first occupied Toulon with 5000 men detached from their crews: they hoisted the white flag, and took possession in the name of the Bourbons. They received reinforcements from Spain, Naples, Piedmont, and Gibraltar; by the end of September the garrison consisted of 14,000 men: 3000 of whom were English, 4000 Neapolitans, 2000 Sardinians, and 5000 Spaniards. They then disarmed the national guard of Toulon,

which had incurred their suspicion, discharged the crews of the French ships, put 5000 Breton and Norman sailors, who caused them some anxiety, on board four French ships of the line, which they fitted up as transports, and sent them to Rochefort and Brest.*

III.

On the 18th of December, at ten o'clock at night, Colonel Cervoni broke down a gate and entered the city at the head of a patrol of 200 men. He traversed the whole town: the deepest silence prevailed. The port was crowded with baggage which the inhabitants had not had time to put on board. A report prevailed that matches were lighted for the purpose of blowing up the powder-magazines; piquets of cannoneers were accordingly sent to secure them. Immediately after, the troops intended to guard the city entered. Excessive confusion prevailed at the naval arsenal, where 8 or 900 galley slaves were making the most strenuous exertions to extinguish the fire. These convicts had rendered the greatest services, having overawed the English officer,

* For the account of the siege of Toulon, see Memoirs, Vol. I. page 9.

Sir Sidney Smith, who had orders to burn the ships and the arsenal, and performed his task very ill. The Republic was indebted to him for all the valuable treasures recovered. Napoleon proceeded to the spot with all the disposable cannoneers and workmen, and succeeded, in the course of a few days, in extinguishing the fire and preserving the arsenal. The loss which the navy had suffered was considerable, but it still retained immense resources; all the magazines were saved except the general one. There were thirty-one ships of war at Toulon at the time of its treacherous surrender: four sail had been employed in carrying 5000 soldiers to Brest and Rochefort; the combined troops burned nine in the roads, they left thirteen dismantled in the basins, and carried off four, one of which was burnt at Leghorn. Fears had been entertained that they would blow up the basin and several of the jetties, but they had not time enough for that purpose. The wrecks of the thirteen ships and frigates which were burnt and sunk in the roads contracted the channel; many attempts were made to remove them in the course of the ten following years; at length, some Neapolitan divers succeeded in getting the whole out, piece by piece, by sawing the

hulls. The army entered Toulon on the 19th, the troops had been seventy-two hours under arms amidst mud and rain; they abandoned themselves, on entering the town, to some excesses; which seemed authorized by the promises made to the soldiers during the siege.

The General-in-Chief restored order by declaring that all effects in Toulon were the property of the army; he had the contents of the private warehouses and the furniture of the deserted houses, collected in central magazines. The Republic afterwards seized the whole, allowing only the gratification of a year's pay to every officer and soldier. The emigration from Toulon was very considerable, the refugees crowded the English, Neapolitan, and Spanish ships, which were consequently obliged to anchor in the roads of Hieres, and to make the emigrants encamp in the isles of Porquerolles and the Levant. It is said that the number of these emigrants amounted to 14,000. Dugommier gave orders to leave the white flag hoisted on all the forts and bastions of the roads, by which means a great number of ships of war and merchantmen bringing men or supplies intended for the enemy were deceived. During the first thirty days suc-

ceeding the taking of the city, vessels richly laden were daily captured. An English frigate, on one occasion, had cast anchor under the great tower, carrying supplies to the amount of several millions; she was considered as taken, and two naval officers in a small boat boarded her accordingly, declaring to the captain that they took possession of the frigate as their prize. The captain clapped them into the hold, cut his cables, and was lucky enough to escape without farther loss. One evening, towards the end of December, the commandant of the artillery being on the quay, about eight o'clock, saw an English skiff come ashore, from which an officer landed, and asked him for Lord Hood's lodgings. This was the captain of a fine brig which brought despatches and announced the approach of reinforcements. The brig was taken, and the despatches read.

The representatives established a revolutionary tribunal, according to the laws of that period; but all the guilty had escaped and followed the enemy; all who had resolved to stay, were conscious of their innocence. Nevertheless this tribunal caused several persons to be arrested, who had been prevented from following the enemy by various accidents,

and caused them to be punished in expiation of their guilt. But eight or ten victims were too few, and a dreadful measure, characteristic of the spirit of that period, was resorted to. It was proclaimed that all those persons who had been employed in the arsenal whilst the English were in possession of the town, were to repair to the *Champ de Mars*, and give in their names; and they were led to believe that it was for the purpose of employing them again. Nearly two hundred persons, head workmen, inferior clerks, and other subalterns went accordingly, in full confidence. Their names were registered; it was proved by their own confession that they had retained their places under the English government, and the revolutionary tribunal, in the open field, immediately sentenced them to death. A battalion of Sans-Culottes and Marseillese, brought expressly for the purpose, shot them. This action requires no comment; but it was the only execution that took place at Toulon; it is false that any persons whatever were killed by grape-shot: neither the commandant of the artillery, nor the cannoneers of the line, would have lent themselves to such an action. It was the cannoneers of the revolutionary army who committed such atrocities at Lyons.

By a decree of the Convention, the name of *Port de la Montagne* was given to the Port of Toulon, and it was ordered that all the public edifices should be demolished, except those deemed necessary for the navy and the public service. This extravagant decree was put in execution, but very tardily; only five or six houses were demolished, and those were rebuilt shortly after. The English squadron remained a month or six weeks in Hieres roads: this created some anxiety; there were no mortars in Toulon capable of throwing projectiles above 1500 toises, and the squadron was anchored 2400 toises from the shore. Had we then had some Villantroys mortars, such as were afterwards used, the squadron would not have been able to anchor in the roads. At length, after blowing up the forts of Porquerolles and Porteros, the enemy proceeded to the roads of Porto-Ferrajo, where they landed a great number of the emigrants from Toulon.

The news of the taking of Toulon, at the moment when it was least expected, produced a wonderful effect in France and throughout Europe. On the 25th of December the Convention ordered a national festival. The taking of Toulon was the signal of the successes

which attended the campaign of 1794. Shortly afterwards the Army of the Rhine retook the lines of Weissemburg, and raised the blockade of Landau. Dugommier, with part of the army, marched for the Eastern Pyrenees, where Doppet was only making blunders. Another part of this army was sent into la Vendée, and many battalions returned to the Army of Italy. Dugommier ordered Napoleon to follow him, but other orders arrived from Paris, directing him first to replace the coasts of the Mediterranean in a state of defence, especially Toulon; and afterwards to proceed to the Army of Italy to command the artillery.

It was at Toulon that Napoleon's reputation commenced. All the generals, representatives, and soldiers, who had heard his opinions given in the different councils, three months before the taking of the place, anticipated the military career he afterwards fulfilled. From that moment he had acquired the confidence of all the soldiers of the Army of Italy. Dugommier wrote to the Committee of Public Safety, soliciting the rank of brigadier-general for him, and using these words "Reward this young "man, and promote him, for, should he be un-"gratefully treated, he would promote him-"self." In the Army of the Pyrenees, Dugom-

mier was continually talking of his commandant of the artillery at Toulon, and impressed a high opinion of him on the minds of all the generals and officers who afterwards went from the Army of Spain to the Army of Italy. Whenever he gained any successes, he used to send couriers from Perpignan to Napoleon at Nice.

CHAPTER II.

SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.

During the years 1792, 1793, 1794, and 1795.

I. Statement of the operations of the Army of Italy from the commencement of the war, during the years 1792 and 1793, to the siege of Toulon.—II. Napoleon directs the army in the campaign of 1794. Taking of Saorgio, Oneglia, the Col di Tende, and all the upper chain of the Alps, (April, 1794).—III. March of the army across Montenotte, (October, 1794).—IV. Maritime expeditions; battle of Noli, (March, 1795).—V. Napoleon appeases several insurrections at Toulon. He quits the Army of Italy and arrives at Paris, (June, 1795).—VI. Kellerman being defeated, rallies in the lines of Borghetto, (July, 1795).—VII. Battle of Loano, (December, 1796.)

I.

THE war of the first coalition began in 1792. General Montesquiou, commanding the army of the South, was intrusted with the defence of the whole frontier from Geneva to Antibes. The campaign opened in September. He marched from his camp at Cessieux to the Isere, and to fort Barreau; and became master of Chambery

and all Savoy in a few weeks. The Piedmontese retired beyond the Alps. Lieutenant-general Anselme, commanding a division of 10,000 men, was ordered to defend the Var, from the camp of Tournoux, near the Col d'Argentiere, to Antibes; Admiral Truguet, with nine ships of war, carrying 2000 soldiers, was cruising between Antibes and Monaco. The Var is a bad line of defence; the French squadron menaced its rear, which decided the court of Turin to order its army to take up a line of defence at the back of the Maritime Alps, supporting the right on the Var and its tributary streams, the centre on Lentosca, and the left on the Roya, before Saorgio. On the 23d of September, General Anselme, being informed by the French admiral that the anchoring of his squadron in line before Nice had determined the enemy to evacuate that place, and that the Piedmontese army had begun its movement, passed the Var at the head of 4000 men, and took possession of Nice, Fort Montalbano and Villa Franca, without experiencing any resistance. The two latter places were in a perfect state of defence, and provided with excellent artillery: their garrisons were made prisoners of war. Anselme had forded the Var; the next day but one the torrent in-

creased, and he remained in Nice eight or ten days separated from the rest of his army. The enemy was ignorant of this circumstance, or knew not how to profit by it. Anselme pushed a vanguard as far as Lascarena, on the road to Turin. The squadron proceeded to Oneglia, a port belonging to the King of Sardinia. The admiral summoned the commandant to surrender, but the bearer of the flag of truce was put to death; the troops landed, and took possession of the city. General Anselme was unable to prevent them from committing some excesses: he was even accused of participating in the disorders of which the city of Nice complained; and was accordingly recalled.

In the beginning of 1793 the government separated the Army of the Alps from the Army of Italy, and gave the command of the latter to General Biron on the 15th of February, 1793. Several actions took place on the heights of Lascarena, Sospello, and Lentosca; each army occupied them in turn; but Sospello at length remained finally in the possession of the French army. The vanguard encamped at Brouis between Sospello and Breglio. On the 11th of April, Biron got possession of Lentosca and the heights as far as Belvedere, taking many prisoners and several pieces of cannon.

Some time after he was called to the command of the Army of La Vendée, and succeeded by General Brunet. The army having received reinforcements now amounted to 30,000 men under arms; which number, with the troops in garrison in Provence, the depôts, and the sick, swelled its regimental returns to 68,000. The enemy were also reinforced by their own levies and a fine Austrian division; they had fortified their position with a great number of batteries and works; their right was supported on the camp of Utelle, their centre in advance of the Col de Raus, and their left before Saorgio, a fortified place which crosses the road from Nice to Turin.

General Brunet was desirous, for good reasons, of gaining possession of all the maritime Alps, driving the enemy beyond the Col di Tende, and placing his army on the summit of the Alps, at the sources of the waters, which would be a much stronger position, and require fewer men to guard it. This plan was very rational, and he had a sufficient force to carry it into effect; but he did not possess the military talents necessary for directing so important an operation. On the 8th of June, 1793, he made a general attack throughout the line. The French soldiers performed all that

it was possible to do; they carried all the positions that could be taken; but the camps of Fourches and Raus, which the enemy occupied, were impregnable. On the 10th of June Brunet obstinately repeated his efforts, by which the Piedmontese army acquired glory, and the flower of the French grenadiers was destroyed. The positions of the Piedmontese were now considered too strong to be forced, and they continued to fortify them. In the month of August the treason of Toulon rendered it necessary to send a detachment from the Army of Italy to besiege that place; but although weakened, the army repulsed all the attempts made by the Piedmontese in the month of October, to enter Provence by passing the Var. One of their divisions, 4000 strong, was defeated and almost destroyed by Dugommier at Gillette, which induced them to resume their positions. Brunet, being unjustly accused of treason, and of favouring the insurrection at Marseilles, was delivered up to the revolutionary tribunal at Paris, and perished on the scaffold.

After the taking of Toulon, Napoleon passed the first two months of 1794 in fortifying and arming the coasts of the Mediterranean; he reached Nice in March, and took the chief

command of the artillery. The army was commanded by General Dumorbion. This general, an old captain of grenadiers, had obtained the ranks of brigadier-general and general of division, in the campaign of 1792 and 1793, in the Army of Italy; he was acquainted with all the positions, and had commanded an attack under Brunet in the month of June. He was sixty years of age, of a clear understanding, personally brave, and tolerably well informed, but a victim to the gout, and constantly in bed; he passed whole months without being able to stir. General Gautier was his quartermaster-general; Deyssantier his mustermaster-general; Haller his paymaster and storekeeper; General Dejar the lieutenant-general of the artillery; Colonel Gassendi director of the park; General Vial commanded the engineers; Generals Macquart, Dallemagne, Massena, &c. commanded the different corps; the head-quarters had been two years at Nice, where there was no appearance of war, it being ten leagues from the advanced posts.

II.

Napoleon spent part of March in visiting the positions occupied by the army, and col-

lecting information respecting the various actions which had taken place in 1792. He remained several days at the camp of Brouis occupied by General Macquart, and convinced himself of the strength of the enemy's positions, and the imprudence of the attacks of the 8th and 12th of June, which had proved disastrous to the army. Amongst mountains there are many positions to be found of great natural strength, which we must take care not to attack. The genius of this kind of warfare consists in occupying camps, either on the flanks or in the rear of those of the enemy, which leave him only the alternative of evacuating his positions without fighting, or of coming out of them to attack you. In mountain-war, he who attacks is always under a disadvantage; even in offensive war, the art consists in engaging only in defensive actions, and in obliging the enemy to attack. The enemy's positions were well connected; the right was supported in a solid manner, but the left not so well; the country was much more practicable on that side. Napoleon, therefore, conceived a plan of operations, which, without engaging the army in difficult affairs, was adapted to put it in possession of the upper chain of the Alps, and to oblige the enemy to

abandon of his own accord the formidable camps of Raus and Fourches. This plan consisted in turning the left of the enemy by passing the Roya, the Nervia, and the Taggia, in occupying Mount Tanardo, Rocca Barbena, and Tanarello, and in cutting off the Saorgio road, the enemy's line of communication behind the hill of Marta.

A great number of privateers were stationed at Oneglia, whence they intercepted the communications between Nice and Genoa, which annoyed the army and greatly impeded the victualling of Provence, then afflicted with a scarcity of provisions. The same operation was adapted to remedy this evil: when the army should be on Monte Grande, it would command the sources of the Tanaro, and the whole valley of Oneglia; that town, as well as Ormea, Garessio, and Loano, would fall into its power; thus this plan of campaign would have three grand results; 1st, to place the defence of the county of Nice in its natural position on the upper ridge of the Alps; 2dly, to station the right in a country where the mountains being much less elevated, would afford greater advantages; and 3dly, to cover a portion of the Riviera di Genoa, and destroy the haunts of the privateers which pre-

vented communication between Genoa, the grand centre of commerce, the army, and Marseilles. There was no reason to fear that the enemy would avail themselves of the detachment which would be made by the French army on its right, in order to act on the offensive; such a movement in a hilly country would only be formidable in proportion to the time that might be lost in striking the decisive blow; for if the troops have gained a few marches on the enemy, they have arrived on his flanks, and then it is too late for him to take the offensive part. In mountain warfare, to oblige the enemy to leave his positions to attack yours, is, as we have already said, the spirit and true method of conducting this kind of war. In fact the positions at the *Cols* of Beolet, Brouis, and Perus, although not, perhaps, so strong as those of the Piedmontese, were nevertheless of great strength. Their numerical superiority would have been useless to them there; and moreover, if these positions had been forced, the enemy, who would have been stopped at the positions of the Col de Braous, Castiglione, and Luceram, might have adopted the plan of attacking the positions of Mount Tanardo and the Tanarello as soon as they had seen them occupied by the French; but these

positions were good in themselves, and we should then return to the same principles of mountain warfare; we should oblige the enemy to attack in this case. Besides, all the French troops remaining at the camp of Brouis, might, by crossing the Roya and Mount Jove, hasten to their assistance; and finally, the operation on the sources of the Tanaro and Ormea was in itself a diversion which would tend to keep the enemy from engaging in difficult and dangerous affairs in the mountains, and induce him to return with his army into the plain to cover the capital.

This plan was laid before a council, at which were present the two popular representatives, commissioners to the army, General Dumorbion, the general of the artillery, General Massena, General Vial of the engineers, and Brigadier-general Rusca, a light-infantry officer, born in these mountains, and particularly acquainted with them. The reputation of the author saved him all long discussions. His predictions concerning Toulon were remembered, and his plan was adopted.

There was one political objection, it was necessary to *borrow* the territory of the Republic of Genoa; but the allies themselves had borrowed it six months before, when

2000 Piedmontese crossed the Genoese territory and embarked at Oneglia for Toulon. They were only to have proceeded in small detachments disarmed, but they had marched in a body, under arms, with drums beating. The catastrophe of the Modeste was also remembered; this frigate had anchored in the port of Genoa, and was moored against the quay. On the 15th of October 1793, three English ships and two frigates anchored in the port; an English seventy-four moored alongside the Modeste. The master civilly requested the officer on the quarter-deck of the frigate to remove a boat which was in the way of the manœuvres of the English ship, which was readily done by the French. Half an hour after, the English captain requested the commander of the Modeste to hoist the white flag, saying, he did not know what the tri-coloured flag was, (the Allies were then masters of Toulon). The French officer answered this insult as honour dictated: but the English had three platforms prepared, which they threw on the frigate and boarded her; at the same time commencing a brisk fire of musquetry from the tops and deck; the crew of the Modeste were unprepared for any attack; part of them threw themselves into the water; the English pur-

sued the fugitives with their boats, killing and wounding them. The rage of the people of Genoa was unbounded; the English agent Drake was hooted and threatened, and incurred some danger, but Doria was doge; the senate made excuses, and the frigate was never restored. The representatives of the people at Marseilles laid an embargo on the Genoese shipping; they expected that the Convention would declare war; but France, and particularly the South, was desolated by famine; the Genoese flag was necessary to supply Provence with provisions; the Convention therefore dissembled, declaring that the whole affair was to be attributed to the weakness of the Genoese, and that the usual relations between the two countries should continue unaltered. It was nevertheless true that the independence and neutrality of this republic had been violated.

On the 6th of April a division of 14,000 men, forming five brigades, passed the Roya, and took possession of the castle of Ventimiglia; one brigade, commanded by Massena, marched on Mount Tanardo, and took up a position there; a second, after having passed the Taggia, took up a position at Monte-Grande; the three others, under the immediate com-

mand of Napoleon, advanced on Oneglia, and overthrew an Austrian division posted on the heights of St. Agatha. The French Brigadier-general Brulé was killed in this affair. The next day the army entered Oneglia, where twelve pieces of cannon were found. The whole population of the town and valley had fled. Twelve more guns were taken near the Col Saint Silvestre; the Piedmontese wished to carry them off to Ormea, but they fell into the hands of the 2d brigade, which debouched by the Col Mezzaluna. The army marched on Ponte di Nave: the remains of the Austrian division were in position there; they were attacked, beaten, and precipitated from the heights of Mount Ariol into the Tanaro; the fortress of Ormea capitulated the same day, with a garrison of 400 men, an armoury of several thousand musquets, and twenty pieces of cannon; a cloth manufactory, the warehouses of which were full, served to clothe the soldiers. The next day, the 18th, the army took possession of Garessio, and established its communications by Mount San Bernardo, and Rocca-Barbena, with Loano, another small town on the sea shore, belonging to the King of Sardinia.

Great alarm prevailed throughout Piedmont;

the enemy, as had been foreseen, hastily evacuated all the sides of the Alps, but he was nevertheless too late, and could not carry off his artillery. From Tanarello, Massena debouched in the rear of Saorgio, thus cutting off the road and the enemy's retreat behind the hill of Marta. Saorgio capitulated on the 29th of April; this fort might have held out longer, as it had considerable quantities of provisions and military stores. On the 8th of May, Massena proceeded by the Col Ardente, to the Col di Tende, whilst General Macquart attacked in front. The attack succeeded. The army now possessed the whole upper chain of the maritime Alps: its right, placed before Ormea, communicated with the Col di Tende by the Col de Termini, and from the Col di Tende occupied the chain of the Alps as far as the Col d'Argentiere, where was the first post of the Army of the Alps. The execution of this plan produced 3 or 4000 prisoners, sixty or seventy pieces of cannon, two fortresses, and the possession of all the high Alps, as far as the first hills of the Apennines. The army thus covered upwards of half the Riviera di Ponente, and though it extended fifteen leagues on its right, its position was thereby strengthened, and required fewer troops to

guard it. Nothing could now impede the coasting trade between Genoa and Provence.

The loss of the army was slight. The fall of Saorgio and of all those grand positions for which so many plans had been formed, and so much blood shed, increased Napoleon's reputation in the army; and public opinion already called him to the chief command.

The train of mountain artillery had been completed. Lieutenant-colonel Faultrier, subdirector of the park, an officer of artificers, had attended to its details: the Piedmontese three-pounders, found in the arsenal of Nice and the places of Ormea and Saorgio, or in the camps abandoned by the enemy, were light enough to be carried on the backs of mules; but this calibre was not sufficient for all occasions. There had been sledge carriages and handspikes made in the Corsican war of 1768, which had been used for the conveyance of the four-pounders that followed the columns; this method was adopted for the eight and twelve-pounders, and the six-inch howitzers. A mountain forge, portable on the backs of mules, was also invented. In the expeditions of Oneglia, Ormea, and Saorgio, a train of artillery of twenty-four guns followed the army in all its operations in the mountains, which

was very useful, especially on account of the moral effect it produced on the troops and the enemy.

But the Piedmontese Army, encamped in the plains and hills at the foot of the Alps, enjoyed the greatest abundance; it was recovering from its fatigues and repairing its losses; and was daily reinforced by the arrival of fresh Austrian battalions: whilst the French armies, encamped on the ridges of the upper chain of the Alps, on a semi-circumference of sixty leagues in extent, between Mont Blanc and the sources of the Tanaro, were perishing through want and sickness. All communication was attended with great difficulty, provisions were scarce and very expensive, the horses suffered, and all the *matériel* of the army was damaged. The hard waters of those elevated regions caused much sickness; the losses which the army suffered every three months in the hospitals, might have supplied the casualties of a great battle; these defensive operations were more burthensome to our finances, and more perilous to the men, than an offensive campaign. Defensive operations in the Alps, in addition to these disadvantages, are attended with others which arise from the topography of the country.

The different corps encamped on these summits cannot assist each other; they are insulated; twenty days are necessary for proceeding from right to left, whilst the army defending Piedmont is in a fine plain, occupies the diameter, and can, in a few days, assemble in force at the point which it is intended to attack. The Committee of Public Safety was desirous that the army should assume the offensive. Napoleon had conferences on this subject at Colmar, with officers from the Army of the Alps: but a difference of opinion prevailed; it was necessary, in the first place, that these two armies should be under one commander-in-chief.

III.

In September an Austrian division assembled on the Bormida, and formed magazines at Dego. An English division was to land at Vado, and the two armies united were to occupy Savona, and force the republic of Genoa, which would be deprived of all communications by sea and land, to declare against France. The roads of Vado had succeeded those of Oneglia, as the resort of the English cruisers and privateers, which inter-

cepted the trade between Genoa and Marseilles. The general of the artillery proposed to occupy the positions of Saint-Jacques, Montenotte, and Vado, whereby the right of the army would be at the gates of Genoa. General Dumorbion set out himself at the head of three divisions, forming 18,000 men, with a train of twenty pieces of mountain artillery; Napoleon directed the army, which debouched by the Col de Bardinetto, and penetrated into Montferrat by the road which runs along the Bormida. He encamped on the 4th of October on the height of Biestro, and on the 5th descended into the plain. He was in hopes of falling on the rear of the Austrian army; but the latter perceived his intention, and operated its retreat on Cairo and Dego; General Cervoni pursued the enemy closely, at the head of the vanguard which he commanded; the cannonade lasted the whole of the evening of the 5th, and had not ceased at ten at night: the Austrian army fell back on Acqui, abandoning its magazines and prisoners, and lost a thousand men.

General Dumorbion had neither orders nor intention to enter Italy; his cavalry was on the Rhone, on account of the scarcity of provisions; in pursuing the enemy he would have

committed an error, and drawn upon himself all the Austrian and Sardinian forces. He contented himself, therefore, with this reconnoissance, fell back by Montenotte and Savona, and took up a position on the heights of Vado, preserving a post in the valley of Savona. The artillery armed the coasts in such a manner as to enable these roads to afford protection to a French squadron; the engineers constructed strong redoubts on the heights of Vado, which communicated by Saint-Jacques, Melogno, Settepani, Bardinetto, and San-Bernardo, with the camps placed on the heights of the Tanaro. This extension of the right of the army weakened its position, but produced many advantages: 1st, it gave the army the command of the whole Riviera di Ponente, and all the coasts, preventing the Austro-Sardinian army from communicating and acting in concert with the English fleets: 2dly, it secured the passage from Genoa to Marseilles, because, as the army commanded all the ports on the coast, it could establish batteries to protect the coasters: 3dly, in this position it had an opportunity of supporting the partisans of France in Genoa, and of anticipating the enemy under the walls of that city, if they should proceed thither, as it

was probable they intended to do. This operation, which baffled the schemes of the enemy and secured the neutrality of Genoa, was speedily known throughout Italy, and excited great alarm. The advanced posts of the army were thus within ten leagues of Genoa, and the reconnoitring parties and couriers sometimes approached within three leagues of that place.

Napoleon spent the rest of the autumn in fortifying the promontories from Vado to the Var with good coast-batteries, in order to protect the passage from Genoa to Nice. In January he passed one night on the Col di Tende, whence, at sun-rise, he surveyed those fine plains which were already the subject of his meditations. *Italiam! Italiam!*

IV.

The French fleets commanded the Mediterranean during the years 1792 and 1793. After the taking of Oneglia, Admiral Truguet anchored in the port of Genoa, where he remained a considerable time, and whence he despatched Rear-admiral Latouche Treville to Naples, with twelve sail of the line. The Port-admiral went to meet this squadron, and offered to allow six ships to enter the port, declaring

that the King could not receive a greater number without a breach of his neutrality. The Rear-admiral took no notice of this, but cast anchor before the windows of the palace, and on the 16th of December 1792, landed Citizen Belleville, who, in the uniform of the national guard, was presented to the King by the Chevalier Acton. He brought a letter from the Admiral, demanding, 1st, that the King should proclaim his neutrality; and, 2dly, that he should disavow the note of his minister at Constantinople, who, in order to induce the Porte to refuse to receive Semonville as Ambassador from France, had indulged in insulting reflections on that nation. He obtained all he required; and the court of Naples thought itself very fortunate in getting so cheaply rid of so disagreeable a visit. In the month of January 1793, Admiral Truguet sailed from Genoa and anchored in the port of Ajaccio in the Island of Corsica; he there put on board 2000 men, troops of the line, whom Paoli, then commanding the 23d military division, placed at his disposal. With these troops he repaired to the Isles of San Pietro, of which he took possession, placed a garrison in the fort, and anchored off Cagliari, the capital of Sardinia, on the 12th of February. At the same time

800 men from Bonifacio, under the command of Colonel Cesar Colonne, and escorted by a corvette, were operating a counter-attack in the North of Sardinia. The Sardinian expedition had been announced for six months; the Sardinians were prepared; they fired upon the flag of truce which the Admiral sent to summon Cagliari. The bombardment commenced, during which the Admiral was at length joined by the convoy carrying the land forces sent from Nice, and which were part of the famous Marseillese phalanx, about 3200 strong. The landing was immediately effected. In the mean time Rear-admiral Latouche Treville joined the squadron with his ten ships. Every thing announced complete success, but nothing could prevent the rout of the Marseillese phalanx. It had at first refused to attack in the day-time, to carry an important position commanding the town. In the night the columns fired on each other; the disorder became extreme; the cry of treason was heard on all sides. General Casabianca entreated the Admiral to re-embark the troops; he was obliged to yield. The squadron had obtained some important advantages by means of the bombardment, but it lost the ship Leopard, which grounded, having approached too close

to the batteries. The expedition having thus failed, the Admiral sent back to Italy the different troops which had been intrusted to him, and contented himself with occupying in considerable force the important harbour of the Isles of San Pietro. War having been declared against England and Spain, he received orders to return into Toulon, and thus to abandon the second object of his expedition, which was to appear before Constantinople, to confirm the alliance of the Porte with France, and to overawe the Russians. The Marseillese troops had been hastily levied, and directed by clubs; they carried terror into every country they landed in, whether friendly or neutral; searching every where for aristocrats and priests, and thirsting for blood and crime. The crews of the squadron were complete, and composed of experienced seamen; but they were constantly assembled in popular societies, engaged in drawing up and signing petitions, and every ship was a scene of the most dreadful anarchy. General Casabianca, who commanded at the landing, was a very brave man; he had distinguised himself in the conquest of Savoy; but he was unaccustomed to commanding in chief; and he had, besides, bad troops under his command, and no staff; he could not possibly

have succeeded. He was the same who afterwards became a senator.

In the month of March 1793, Spain having declared war against France, the combined English and Spanish fleets commanded the Mediterranean, and cruised on the coasts of Genoa and Provence. The treason of Toulon had annihilated the French navy in the Mediterranean. On the retaking of that town, however, eighteen ships and part of the stores were recovered. The Spanish fleet, dissatisfied with the English, returned to its ports; Rear-admiral Martin, with ten ships, sailed from Toulon, and put to sea in 1794; being pursued by an English squadron of superior strength, he anchored in the Gulf of Juan, where the general of the artillery erected some great batteries to protect him. Shortly after, he availed himself of a gale of wind to re-enter Toulon. This squadron was successively increased during the autumn by the armaments which were sent out from the arsenal of Toulon.

In the beginning of 1795, Admiral Hotham, with fifteen men-of-war, five of which were three-deckers, and two Neapolitan, was cruising between Corsica and Italy. Admiral Martin, with a squadron of sixteen men-of-war

and one hundred transports, on board of which were 10,000 men, lay in Toulon roads. There were various opinions respecting the destination of this armament, when the Conventional Letourneur, of La Manche, arrived with extraordinary powers, and made it known that it was the intention of the Committee of Public Safety to occupy Rome, to punish that court for the insults it was daily offering, and to avenge the blood of Basseville. Basseville, a French agent commissioned to the Pope, had displayed the tricoloured cockade, as had the artists of the Roman school who sat at the Academy. A great number of French emigrants, who were in that capital, excited a popular commotion. On the 3d of January 1793 the rabble assailed Basseville's carriage with stones; his coachman turned back and drove him home; the gates were broken down, Basseville received the thrust of a bayonet in the abdomen; he was dragged into the street, in his shirt, holding his bowels in his hands, and at length left on a field-bed in a guard-house, where he expired the next day.

Azara, the Spanish ambassador, who had interfered to protect the French artists, was himself in some danger. This outrage excited general indignation in France; the moment of

revenge had now arrived; a force was to land at the mouth of the Tiber, and to occupy Rome, where it would find numerous partisans. A council of war was held at Toulon to consider of the means of executing this plan. Napoleon was of opinion that this expedition would endanger the Army of Italy, and would itself end disastrously; but that, nevertheless, if it were to be attempted, it would be necessary at the same time to surprise Mount Argentare, Orbitello, and the fortress of Civita Vecchia, and land the army there; he thought that 10,000 men were too small a force to attempt such a *coup de main;* that it was impossible to effect it without cavalry; that it would be requisite to embark at least 1500 horses for light dragoons or hussars, which, with 500 horses for the artillery and staff, would form a considerable addition to the convoy. Scarcely would the army have landed when it would have to engage from 25, to 30,000 Neapolitans, 5000 of whom were good cavalry; it would also have to expect an Austrian division which was coming up from Lombardy; that it could not reckon upon partisans at Rome, because this operation was not calculated to be of long duration; and after avenging the murder of Basseville, and laying the city under contri-

bution, it would be proper to think of embarking again; that were we masters at sea, this operation, undertaken with only 10,000 men, would be hazardous; but that without commanding the sea, it would only be leading this army to certain destruction; that the French squadron ought therefore to put to sea alone, beat the English squadron, and drive it out of the Mediterranean; that the convoy might then sail, and that, after landing the troops, the squadron and convoy might make for Naples, to alarm that court and oblige it to reserve its forces for its own defence. The Representative was dissatisfied with the formal disapprobation which his plans elicited from the General of the artillery, more particularly as all the general officers concurred in it. The naval officers declared that the squadron would be endangered if the convoy should sail whilst an enemy's fleet was cruising in these seas. It was resolved that Admiral Martin should put to sea with the ships of war alone, to give chase to the English.

He sailed on the 1st of March. On arriving near San Fiorenzo, he captured the Berwick, an English seventy-four, which stood out from the roads. The French and English squadrons met on the 8th, in the Channel of

Leghorn; at sight of the enemy Letourneur's courage failed him; he ordered a retreat; the English squadron now gave chase in its turn. On the 13th the two squadrons were off Cape Noli on the Riviera de Genoa; the *Mercure* of seventy-four guns, and the three-decker, the *Sans-Culotte*, separated from the squadron during the night. At daybreak next morning the *Ça Ira* of seventy-four guns, which had been dismasted by running foul of the *Victoire*, fell under the wind; the *Censeur* took her in tow. The two fleets were equal in number, but not in strength; the French squadron of fifteen ships was reduced to thirteen, none of which were three-deckers; the English squadron of thirteen sail had four of three decks. The French squadron continued its retreat, but could not avoid two engagements; the *Censeur* and the *Ça Ira* fought an English three-decker and two seventy-fours. The *Tonnant*, the *Duquesne*, and the *Victoire*, were engaged throughout the day; the rest of the French line did not come into action. The *Censeur* and the *Ça Ira* were captured, after a gallant resistance. The squadron anchored at the Isles of Hyeres, where it was joined by the *Sans-Culotte* and the *Mercure*. The *Ça Ira* sunk in the Spezzia roads; the Illustrious, an

English three-decker, also sunk and was lost, in consequence of the action: thus the loss on each side was two ships. This engagement was the first that took place in the Mediterranean, between the two nations, in this war. If the French squadron had fought in line in the Channel of Leghorn, it is probable that it would have supported the honour of its flag.

But this event was very fortunate for the Republic: if it had proved successful, and the English ships had retired to Gibraltar, the convoy would have sailed. This ill-planned expedition, destitute of any reasonable object, could not have failed to terminate in the most disastrous manner. The troops landed, and marched to Nice, where they were very useful, two months after, in defending that frontier against the attacks of the Austrian General Devins. This armament cost the Treasury some millions, but it did not fail to produce great advantages. The Grand-duke of Tuscany acknowledged the Republic, and sent Count Carletti as ambassador to Paris, whom the Convention received on the 14th of March 1795. The republic of Venice, which had refused to join the coalition, and had received a French agent, was stimulated by the arma-

ment of a French squadron, and sent Quirini, a Venetian noble, as ambassador; his nomination was dated the 14th of March. Genoa was confirmed in her determination of neutrality. The King of Naples had joined the coalition when the English and Spanish squadrons commanded the Mediterranean; he had contributed effectually to the defence of Toulon; but this prince, together with Rome, the King of Sardinia, and the Dukes of Modena and Parma, were destined to yield to the ascendancy of the Republic in the campaign of 1796.

V.

From the 9th of Thermidor, (27th of July, 1794,) the South had been much agitated. The revolutionary tribunal of Marseilles had brought to the scaffold all the principal merchants of that city. The Jacobins, composing the popular society, had still the upper hand; they deplored the ruin of the Mountain faction, and were enraged at the moderate laws which then prevailed; besides, the remains of the party of the Sections, although much weakened by emigration and losses of all kinds, excited disturbances from a violent thirst for vengeance. The population of Tou-

lon, all the artificers belonging to the arsenal, and the crews of the squadron, were attached to the former party, and were inimical to the representatives Mariette and Cambon, whom they accused of being of the party of the *Retracteurs*. Under these circumstances, a French privateer brought into Toulon a Spanish prize, on board of which were about twenty emigrants, most of them of the Chabrillant family. A tumultuous mob assembled at the arsenal and in the streets, and proceeded to the prisons to slaughter these unfortunate persons. The representatives went to the arsenal, and after haranguing the officers of the department in a hall, they addressed the men in the workshops, promising to deliver up the emigrants to an extraordinary commission, and to have them tried within twenty-four hours; but they themselves were suspected, they had no influence over public opinion; their speeches were misinterpreted, a voice called out, "To the *Lanterne* with the protectors of the emigrants!" It was late in the day, and they were just beginning to light the lamps. The uproar became horrible, the crowd outrageous, the guard came up and was repulsed. At this crisis Napoleon recognised amongst the principal rioters several gunners

who had served under him at the siege of Toulon; he mounted a platform, the gunners enforced respect to their general, and obtained silence; he had the good fortune to produce an effect; the representatives got safe out of the arsenal, but the tumult was still greater in the streets. At the gates of the prisons the resistance of the guards began to slacken; he repaired thither, the populace was restrained from violence by his promise that the emigrants should be delivered up and sentenced the following morning. It would have been no easy matter to persuade them of what was perfectly evident, namely, that these emigrants had not infringed the law, as they had not returned voluntarily. During the night he had them put into some artillery waggons, and carried out of the town as a convoy of ammunition; a boat was waiting for them in Hyeres roads, where they embarked and were thus saved. The ferment increased at Toulon, and at length on the 30th of May, the people flew to arms. The mob, declaring itself in a state of insurrection, arrested or put to flight all the representatives in the town. But the latter obtained the ascendancy at Marseilles, and marched against Tou-

lon. The action took place on the heights of Cuges. Victory was inclining towards the people of Toulon, when General Pacthod arrived with a body of troops of the line; in a few days Toulon was subdued. Napoleon had left Provence a month previous to this action.

The committees of government presented the lists of general officers who were to serve in the campaign of 1795. A great number of officers, who had been unemployed from the end of 1792 to that of 1794, were now ordered on service, but there were many generals of artillery who could not be employed. Napoleon, then twenty-five years of age, was the youngest of all; he was entered on the list of generals of infantry, to be employed in the artillery when there should be inspections vacant. He was to quit the Army of Italy, of which Kellerman had just taken the command. He conferred with that general at Marseilles, gave him all the information he could want, and set out for Paris. At Chatillon-sur-Seine, he visited the father of his aide-de-camp Marmont, where he heard the news of the events of the first of Prairial, which induced him to remain there a few days until tranquillity should be restored in the ca-

pital. On reaching Paris he waited on Aubry, a member of the Committee of Public Safety, who had made the report on the military service; observed to him that he had commanded the artillery at the siege of Toulon, and that of the Army of Italy for two years; that he had fortified the coasts of the Mediterranean, and that it was painful to him to leave a corps in which he had served from childhood. The representative objected that there were many generals of artillery, and that he was the youngest, and that when there should be a vacancy he should be employed. But Aubry himself had been a captain of artillery six months before; he had not served in the field since the Revolution, and yet he had placed himself on the list as a general of division and inspector of artillery. A few days after, the Committee of Public Safety despatched orders to Napoleon to proceed to the army of La Vendée to command a brigade of infantry; in answer to which he gave in his resignation. In the mean time Aubry's report had excited many complaints; the officers displaced repaired in crowds to Paris; many were distinguished officers, but the greater part undeserving, and indebted to the clubs for their promotion; all of them, however, finding Napoleon a man of un-

blemished reputation, took care to mention him in their memorials and petitions as an instance of the partiality and injustice of the report.

VI.

Eight days after Napoleon had given in his resignation, and whilst he was waiting for the answer of the Committee of Public Safety, Kellerman got defeated, lost his positions at Saint-Jacques, and wrote that unless he received reinforcements speedily, he should even be obliged to quit Nice. This excited great alarm; the Committee of Public Safety assembled all the deputies who had been with the Army of Italy, in order to obtain information. The latter unanimously nominated Napoleon as the person best acquainted with the positions occupied by the army, and most capable of pointing out the measures proper to be adopted; he received a requisition to attend the Committee, and had several conferences with Sieyes, Doulcet, Pontecoulant, Letourneur, and Jean de Brie. He drew up the instructions which the Committee adopted. He was then by a special decree appointed brigadier-general of artillery, to be specially attached, until farther order, to the direction of the military operations. In this situation he passed the

two or three months previous to the thirteenth of Vendemiaire.

When Kellerman took the command of the Army of Italy, on the 19th of May 1796, the army was in the positions in which Napoleon had placed it in the month of October in the preceding year, after the action of Cairo. These positions were the following: the left, 5000 strong, between the Col d'Argentiere and the Col de Sabion; the centre, commanded by General Macquart, occupied the Col de Sabion, the Col di Tende, Monte Bertrando, and the Tanarelle, being 8000 strong; the right occupied the Col de Termini, the heights of Ormea, the Col San-Bernardo, Bardinetto, Settepani, Melogno, Saint-Jacques, la Madonna, and Vado. It consisted of 25,000 men, commanded by the generals of division Serrurier, Laharpe, and Massena.

The Court of Vienna had been seriously alarmed at the result of the affair of Cairo and the position which the French army had taken up at the end of 1794. This position threatened Genoa, the loss of which place would have opened the road to the Milanese. The Aulic council therefore assembled an army of 30,000 Austrians, under the command of General Devins, for the campaign of 1795, to act

in concert with the Piedmontese army. The English squadron was cruising off Savona and Vado, to second the operations of the Austrian general, who moved his head-quarters successively from Acqui to Dego, and thence manœuvred against the heights of Savona, of which he took possession on the 23d; and thus secured his communications with the English squadron.

General Devins divided his army into three corps, which debouched on the 23d of June. The right, divided into five columns, attacked the left of the French army, from the Col de Termini to the heights of Ormea; the centre marched in three columns, which were subdivided into a great number, and attacked all the positions between Bardinetto and Saint-Jacques; the left attacked the right in the positions of Vado. On the 25th and 26th there was a general and sanguinary conflict. The French army preserved its positions, except the redoubt of Melogno, the Col di Spinardo, and the ridge of Saint-Jacques. By the possession of the redoubt of Melogno, the enemy threatened the centre of the army. This position is only two leagues from Finale on the sea-shore. On the 27th, Kellerman ordered an attack, being convinced of the

importance of retaking this position; but he was unsuccessful. On the 28th he retreated, evacuated Saint-Jacques, Vado, and Finale, and took up a temporary position. At length, on the 7th of July, having received the orders of the Committee of Public Safety, in answer to his couriers of the 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th; he established his army in the position of Borghetto.

Kellerman was a brave soldier, extremely active, and possessed of many good qualities; but he was wholly destitute of the talents necessary for the chief command of an army. Throughout the conduct of this war he was constantly committing errors. The Committee observed to him, "that the army had extended "its line, in 1794, beyond the heights of the "Tanaro, and prolonged its right by Bardi- "netto, Melogno, and Saint-Jacques, only to "prevent the Austrian army from acting in "concert with the English squadron, and to "be in a situation to hasten to the relief of "Genoa, in case the enemy should attack "that city, either by sea, or by the Col de la "Bocchetta; that it did not occupy Vado as "a defensive, but as an offensive position, in "order to be able to debouch on the enemy "if he should present himself in the Riviera;

" that as soon as the Austrians advanced on " Savona, he should have marched to fight " them, to prevent them from getting posses- " sion of that town and intercepting his com- " munications with Genoa; but that since he " had not been able to do so, 1st, he ought " to have evacuated Vado to support his right " on Saint-Jacques; 2dly, when, in conse- " quence of the action of the 25th, the enemy " had gained possession of Melogno and the " ridge of Saint-Jacques, he ought, during the " night, to have profited by the advantage " which General Laharpe had obtained on his " right, by evacuating Vado, and making use " of Laharpe's troops to reinforce his attack " on Saint-Jacques and Melogno, which would " have been crowned with complete success; " 3dly, that when, on the 27th, he had re- " solved to attack Melogno, there was still time " to bring up his right, so as to have made it " take part in this attack, had he profited by " the fresh success which the right had ob- " tained on the 26th over the left of the enemy, " which manœuvre would also have decided " the victory." These despatches, which were written in an authoritative style, created much surprise amongst the officers of the staff; but they soon guessed who had dictated them.

In the Riviera di Ponente there are three lines which cover the county of Nice and bar the river; the right being supported on the sea, and the left on the upper ridge of the mountains. The first of these lines is that of Borghetto, the second that of Monte Grande, the third that of the Taggia; Napoleon had long previously reconnoitred these three lines, accompanied by Adjutant-general Saint-Hilaire, a brave and excellent officer, who afterwards gained the highest renown in a hundred battles, and died a general of division on the field of Essling. The sea forms the *appui* of the right of the line of Borghetto, at the village of Borghetto, one league from Loano, on a hill which commands the whole plain of Leoano; and a great insulated rock forms that of its left. On this rock Massena had a redoubt constructed, to which the army gave the name of Petit Gibraltar, in memory of Fort Margrave at Toulon. It was opposite the Priest's Field; from that spot there is a communication over steep rocks to the heights which command Ormea, Loano, and Rocca Barbena; Monte San Bernardo and Garessio are without this line, and naturally belong to the enemy; but Ormea is covered: this line is extremely strong; its extent is considerable, being five or six leagues;

but it is almost every where unassailable: it can only be attacked by the pass of Sucarello, in which is the castle of that name, which was put in a state of defence. This was an excellent post in battle. In the course of July, August, and September, Devins several times planned an attack on this line; but he never durst seriously carry it into effeet. From Sucarello there is a line terminating at Albenga, passing behind the little rivulet of the Arosoia; this is a good position in case that part of the line between Sucarello and Borghetto should be forced.

The position of Monte Grande, which adjoins the Col di Pizzo and the Col di Mezza Luna, and is supported on the sea behind Saint-Lorenzo, is an inferior line, but nevertheless one of great strength. That which rests its right on the mouth of the Taggia, its centre on Monte Cippo, and its left on Monte Tanardo and the Col Ardente, whence it communicates with the Col di Tende, is not so strong as that of Borghetto, but stronger than that of Monte Grande. The first line covers Oneglia and all the positions of the Riviera, from Oneglia to Borghetto. The second leaves Oneglia and Ormea and all the debouches of the Tanaro uncovered. The third leaves all that part of the Riviera di Ponente, which lies between One-

glia and San Remo uncovered; this line, has the peculiar advantage of being capable of defending San Remo, and in case of being forced thence, of affording an opportunity of evacuating that town and resting on Ospitaletto, between it and Bordeghera, without any deterioration of the line. The enemy may turn the first line by debouching by the valley of the Tanaro, taking possession of Mount Ariol, and then threatening to fall on Monte Grande and Oneglia; but Ormea and Mount Ariol are so near the line that the reserves may serve to defend these positions. It may also be turned by the Col di Tende, but that would be changing the theatre of the war; the enemy could not make so grand a movement without our being informed of it, which would suggest our watching the moment when his troops should be on their march, to attack and destroy those he might leave before the line of Borghetto. The second line, and more particularly the third, have the advantages of not being liable to be turned by the valley of the Tanaro, which is beyond them; of being connected with the Col Ardente, that is to say, as far as the Col di Tende; and that the Col Ardente and the Tanarda not only contribute to the defence of the Col di Tende, but even

when the Col di Tende is forced, take the road leading to Nice, in rear, before it reaches the defile of Saorgio. Considering, therefore, only the defence of the county of Nice, the line of the Taggia would be the best, because all the troops would be concentrated, and at hand to defend the Col di Tende.

The Government considered the command of the Army of Italy beyond the abilities of Kellerman, and in September placed him at the head of the Army of the Alps, intrusting the Army of Italy to General Scherer, who commanded the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees, which had become useless through the peace with Spain. Scherer conducted a reinforcement of two divisions of good troops into Italy. The Austrian army had likewise been reinforced; in the campaign of 1795 it had not fulfilled the hopes of its court; but yet it had obtained important successes. It had taken the position of Saint-Jacques and Vado, and was intercepting Genoa, and in communication with the English squadron.

In the beginning of November the French army still occupied the line of Borghetto with five divisions; that of the left, commanded by General Serrurier, was at Ormea; two more, commanded by Generals Massena and La-

harpe, were at Sucarello and Castel Vecchio; and two, under the command of Generals Augereau and Soret, were opposite Borghetto, forming altogether an active force of between 35 and 36,000 men.

The head-quarters of the Austrian army were at Finale; its right, composed of Piedmontese, was at Garessio; its centre, commanded by Argenteau, at Rocca Barbena; and its left, entirely composed of Austrians, before Loano, where they had constructed a great number of redoubts to defend the plain. Their force in line was 45,000 men; the autumnal maladies caused them, as well as the Piedmontese army, considerable loss. The French army found it very difficult to subsist, and the advanced period of the season made the troops anxious to go into winter-quarters. Scherer resolved to risk a battle which would render his winter-quarters safe, and restore his communications with Genoa, by compelling the enemy to winter beyond the mountains.

VII.

On the twenty-first of November, Massena moved forward in the evening with his division and that of Laharpe; at daybreak he attacked

the centre of the enemy, placed at Rocca Barbena, overthrew them, pursued them vigorously, and drove them into the Bormida, gained possession of Melogno, and concluded the day by bivouacquing with his vanguard on the heights of Saint-Jacques. On the 22d he began skirmishing with the enemy's right at daybreak, and kept the whole Piedmontese army in check; Augereau debouched by Borghetto, attacked the left, and carried all the positions. The enemy retreated precipitately on Finale, whence they continued their retreat on Savona, but saw themselves anticipated by Massena on the heights of Saint-Jacques. Serrurier, who by his able manœuvres had kept in check troops which were double the number of his own, without sustaining any material loss, was reinforced by two brigades in the course of the 23d. On the 24th he made a serious attack in his turn, and drove the Piedmontese army into the intrenched camp of Ceva. The Austrian and Sardinian armies suffered considerably, losing the greater part of their artillery, baggage, and magazines, and 4000 prisoners. The French troops gained immortal glory on this day. The Austrian army abandoned the whole Riviera of Genoa, and went to winter beyond

the Apennines. Both armies retired into winter quarters. The communications of the French were now unimpeded. Their headquarters were again transferred to Nice. Thus ended the year 1795.

CHAPTER III.

THE THIRTEENTH OF VENDEMIAIRE.

I. Constitution of the year III.—II. Additional Laws.—III. The Sections of Paris take up arms in resistance.—IV. Dispositions for the attack and defence of the Tuileries.—V. Action of the 13th of Vendemiaire.—VI. Napoleon commander in chief of the Army of the Interior.—VII. Barras.—VIII. La Reveillere Lepeaux.—IX. Rewbell.—X. Carnot.—XI. Letourneur de la Manche.

I.

The fall of the municipality of the 31st of May, of Danton and Robespierre, led to the overthrow of the revolutionary government. The Convention was afterwards successively governed by factions which never succeeded in acquiring any preponderance; its principles varied every month; a dreadful system of reaction afflicted the interior of the Republic; domains ceased to be saleable, and the credit of the assignats grew daily worse; the armies

were unpaid, requisitions and the maximum alone supplied them with the means of subsistence; the soldier was no longer certain even of bread; the recruiting of the troops, the laws on which subject had been executed with the greatest rigour under the revolutionary government, ceased. The armies still continued to obtain brilliant successes, because they were more numerous than ever, but they suffered daily losses, which there were now no means of repairing.

The foreigners' party, supported by the pretext of the restoration of the Bourbons, increased daily in strength; foreign communications had become more easy; the destruction of the Republic was openly contriving. The Revolution had lost its novelty, it had alienated many persons by affecting their interest; an iron hand had oppressed individuals; many crimes had been committed; they were now eagerly recalled to memory, and popular animadversion was thereby daily excited with increasing violence against those who had governed, held administrative posts, or in any manner whatever participated in the success of the Revolution. Pichegru had sold himself, yet the proselytes of the enemies of the Republic were far from numerous in the

army, which remained faithful to the principles for which it had shed so much of its blood and gained so many victories. All parties were tired of the Convention; it was even tired of its own existence, and at length saw that the safety of the nation, and its own, required that it should fulfil its commission without delay. On the 21st of June 1795 it decreed the constitution known under the name of the Constitution of the year III, which confided the government to five persons called the Directory, and the legislature to two councils called those of the Five Hundred and of the Ancients. This constitution was submitted to the acceptance of the people convoked in primary assemblies.

II.

It was the general opinion that the short duration of the Constitution of 1791 was to be attributed to the law of the Constituent Assembly, which had excluded its members from the legislature. The Convention did not fall into the same error, but annexed to the constitution two additional laws, by which it prescribed that two-thirds of the new legislature should be composed of members of the Convention, and that the electoral assemblies

of the departments should on this occasion only have to nominate one-third of the two councils. These two additional laws were submitted to the acceptance of the people. They excited general dissatisfaction. The partisans of the foreigners saw all their schemes frustrated: they had flattered themselves that the majority of the two councils would be composed of men inimical to the Revolution, or even of those who had suffered by it, and had hoped to accomplish a counter-revolution by means of the legislature itself. This party was at no loss for excellent reasons to disguise the true motives of its discontent. It alleged that the rights of the people were disregarded by the Convention, which, having been empowered only to propose a constitution, was usurping the functions of an electoral body. As to the constitution itself, it was, undoubtedly, preferable to what then existed; and on this point all parties were unanimous. Some, indeed, would have preferred a president to the five directors, others would have desired a more popular council; but in general this new constitution was favourably received. The secret committees, which directed the foreign party, were by no means anxious about forms of government which they did not mean to main-

tain; they studied nothing in the constitution but the means of availing themselves of it to operate the counter-revolution; and whatever tended to wrest authority out of the hands of the Convention and conventionals was conducive to that end.

The forty-eight Sections of Paris assembled, forming forty-eight tribunes, which were immediately occupied by the most violent orators, La Harpe, Serizi, Lacretelle the younger, Vaublanc, and Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely. It required little talent to excite people against the Convention, but several of these orators displayed much.

After the 9th of Thermidor, the city of Paris had organized its national guard; its object had been to get rid of the Jacobins, but it had fallen into the contrary extreme, and the counter-revolutionists formed a considerable number of its members. This national guard consisted of 40,000 men armed and clothed, and participated in all the exasperation of the Sections against the Convention. The Sections having rejected the additional laws, succeeded each other at the bar of the Convention, loudly declaring their opinions. The Convention, however, imagined that all this agitation would subside as soon as the provinces should have

manifested their opinions by the acceptance of the constitution and the additional laws; it erroneously compared this agitation in the capital to the commotions so common in London, or which so often occurred in Rome at the time of the Comitia. On the 23d of September, the Convention proclaimed the acceptance of the constitution and additional laws, by the majority of the primary assemblies of the Republic; but on the following day the Sections of Paris, taking no notice of this acceptance, appointed deputies to form a central assembly of electors, which met at the Odeon.

III.

The Sections of Paris had measured their strength; they despised the weakness of the Convention. This assembly at the Odeon was a committee of insurrection. The Convention awoke from its lethargy, annulled the meeting at the Odeon, declared it illegal, and ordered its committees to dissolve it by force. On the 10th of Vendemiaire the armed power proceeded to the Odeon, and executed this order. A few men collected on the square of the Odeon, indulged in some murmuring and abuse, but offered no resistance. But the decree for closing the Odeon excited the in-

dignation of the Sections. That of Lepelletier, the district house of which was the Convent of the Filles Saint-Thomas, was the most exasperated. The Convention decreed that the place of its sittings should be closed, the meeting dissolved, and the Section disarmed. On the 12th of Vendemiaire (October 3d), at seven or eight o'clock in the evening, General Menou, accompanied by the representatives of the people, Commissioners to the Army of the Interior, proceeded with a numerous body of troops to the place of meeting of the Section Lepelletier, to put the decree of the Convention in execution. The infantry, cavalry, and artillery were all crowded together in the Rue Vivienne, at the extremity of which is the Convent of the Filles Saint-Thomas. The Sectionaries occupied the windows of the houses in this street. Several of their battalions drew up in line in the court-yard of the convent, and the military force which General Menou commanded, found itself compromised. The Committee of the Section had declared themselves a representation of the sovereign people in the exercise of its functions; they refused to obey the orders of the Convention, and after spending an hour in useless conferences, General Menou and the

Commissioners of the Convention withdrew by a sort of capitulation, without having dissolved or disarmed the meeting. The Section, thus victorious, declared itself in permanence; sent deputations to all the other Sections, boasted its success, and urged the measures calculated to ensure the triumph of its resistance. In this manner it prepared for the action of the thirteenth of Vendemiaire.

Napoleon, who had been some months attached to the Committee directing the movements of the armies of the Republic, was at the Feydeau theatre, when he heard of the extraordinary scene that was passing so near him. He felt curious to observe all its circumstances. Seeing the conventional troops repulsed, he hastened to the tribunes of the Convention to witness the effect of this news, and observe the character and colouring which it would receive. The Convention was in the greatest agitation. The representatives deputed to the army, wishing to exculpate themselves; eagerly accused Menou, attributing to treachery what arose from unskilfulness alone. Menou was put under arrest. Different representatives then appeared at the tribune, stating the extent of the danger, the magnitude of which was but too clearly proved by the news

which arrived every moment from the Sections. Every one proposed the general who possessed his confidence to succeed Menou; the Thermidorians proposed Barras, but he was by no means agreeable to the other parties. Those who had been at Toulon with the Army of Italy, and the members of the Committee of Public Safety, who were in daily communication with Napoleon, proposed him as the person most capable of extricating them from their present danger, on account of the promptitude of his *coup-d'œil*, and the energy and moderation of his character. Mariette, who belonged to the party of the Moderates, and was one of the leading members of the Committee of Forty, approved this choice. Napoleon, who was in the crowd and heard all that passed, deliberated for above half an hour on the course he was to adopt. At length he made up his mind, and repaired to the Committee, where he represented in the most forcible manner the impossibility of directing so important an operation while clogged by three representatives, who in fact would exercise all power, and impede all the operations of the general: he added, that he had witnessed the occurrence in the Rue Vivienne; that the commissioners had been most to blame, and had nevertheless

appeared in the Assembly as triumphant accusers. Struck with the truth of this reasoning, but unable to remove the commissioners without a long discussion in the Assembly, the Committee, to conciliate all parties (for it had no time to lose), determined to propose Barras as general-in-chief, appointing Napoleon second in command. Thus they got rid of the three commissioners without giving them any cause of complaint. As soon as Napoleon found himself invested with the command of the forces which were to protect the Assembly, he went to one of the cabinets of the Tuileries, where Menou remained, in order to obtain from him the necessary information respecting the strength and disposition of the troops and the artillery. The army consisted of only 5000 soldiers of all arms; the park was composed of forty pieces of cannon, then parked at the Sablons, and guarded by twenty-five men. It was one o'clock in the morning. The General immediately despatched a major of the 21st chasseurs (Murat), with 300 horse, to the Sablons, to bring off all the artillery to the garden of the Tuileries. Had another moment been lost, he would have been too late. He reached the Sablons at three in the morning, where he fell in with the head of a

column from the Section Lepelletier, which was coming to seize the park; but his troops being cavalry, and the ground a plain, the Sectionaries judged that all resistance was useless; they accordingly retreated, and at five in the morning the forty pieces of cannon entered the Tuileries.

IV.

Between six o'clock and nine, Napoleon placed his artillery at the head of the Pont Louis XVI., the Pont Royal, and the Rue de Rohan, at the Cul de Sac Dauphin, in the Rue Saint-Honoré, at the Pont Tournant, &c. confiding the guarding of them to officers of known fidelity. The matches were lighted, and the little army was distributed at the different posts, or in reserve in the garden and at the Carrousel. The drums beat to arms in every quarter. During this time the battalions of the national guard were posting themselves at the outlets of the different streets, surrounding the palace and the garden of the Tuileries; their drums had the audacity to come and beat the *generale* on the Carrousel and the Place Louis XV. The danger was imminent; 40,000 national guards well armed, and long since organized, were in the field, and highly exas-

perated against the Convention. The troops of the line intrusted with its defence, were few in number, and might easily be led away by the sentiments of the population which surrounded them: in order to increase its forces, the Convention distributed arms to 1500 individuals called the Patriots of 1789; these were men who, after the 9th of Thermidor, had lost their employments and quitted their departments, where they were persecuted by public opinion; they were formed into three battalions, and placed under the command of General Berruyer. These men fought with the most determined valour; their example influenced the troops of the line, and they were mainly instrumental to the success of the day.

A committee of forty members, consisting of the Committees of Public Safety and General Security, directed all the affairs, discussed much, but resolved on nothing; whilst the urgency of the danger increased every moment. Some proposed that the Convention should lay down arms, and receive the Sectionaries as the Roman senators received the Gauls. Others wished the members to withdraw to Cæsar's camp on the heights of Saint-Cloud, there to be joined by the Army of the Coasts of the ocean; and others proposed that depu-

tations should be sent to the forty-eight Sections, to make them various proposals.

During these vain discussions, a man named Lafond debouched on the Pont Neuf, about two o'clock in the afternoon, at the head of three columns, which came from the Section Lepelletier, whilst another column of the same force advanced from the Odeon to meet them. They joined in the place Dauphine. General Cartaux, who was stationed on the Pont Neuf with 400 men and four pieces of cannon, with orders to defend the two sides of the bridge, quitted his post and fell back under the wickets of the Louvre. At the same time a battalion of national guards occupied the Infant's Garden. They called themselves faithful to the Convention, but nevertheless seized this post without orders; on another side, Saint-Roche, the Theatre Français, and the Hotel de Noailles, were occupied in force by the national guard. The Conventional posts were not above twelve or fifteen paces from them. The Sectionaries sent women to corrupt the soldiers; even the leaders presented themselves several times, unarmed, and waving their hats, to fraternize, they said!

V.

The danger rapidly increased. Danican, the general of the Sections, sent a flag of truce to summon the Convention to remove the troops which threatened the people, and to disarm the Terrorists. The bearer traversed the posts, with his eyes bandaged and all the formalities of war, about three o'clock. He was thus introduced into the midst of the Committee of the Forty, amongst whom his threats caused much alarm, but he obtained nothing. Night was coming on; the Sectionaries would have availed themselves of the darkness to climb from house to house to the Tuileries itself, which was closely blockaded. Napoleon had eight hundred musquets, belts, and cartridge-boxes, brought into the hall of the Convention, to arm the members themselves and the clerks, as a corps of reserve. This measure alarmed several of them, who then began to comprehend the extent of the danger. At length, at four o'clock, some musquets were discharged from the Hotel de Noailles, and some balls fell on the steps of the Tuileries, and wounded a woman who was going into the garden. At the same moment Lafond's column debouched by the quay Vol-

taire, marching on the Pont Royal and beating the charge. The batteries then fired; an eight-pounder at the Cul de Sac Dauphin opened the fire and served as a signal. After several discharges Saint-Roche was carried. Lafond's column, taken in front and flank by the artillery placed on the quay even with the wicket of the Louvre, and at the head of the Pont Royal, was routed; the Rue Saint-Honoré, the Rue Saint-Florentin, and the places adjacent, were swept by the guns. About a hundred men attempted to make a stand at the Théâtre de la République, but were dislodged by a few shells. At six o'clock in the evening all was over. A few cannon-shot were heard during the night at a distance; but they were only fired to prevent the barricades, which some of the inhabitants attempted to form with casks. There were near two hundred of the Sectionaries killed or wounded, and almost as many on the side of the Convention; the greater part of the latter fell at the gates of Saint-Roche. Three representatives, Freron, Louvet, and Sieyes, evinced resolution. The Section of the Quinze-Vingts, in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, was the only one that assisted the Convention, to whose aid it sent 250 men: so completely had the late political oscilla-

tions of that body alienated the good will of the people. The Faubourgs, however, although they did not rise in favour of the Convention, did not act against it. The strength of the army of the Convention was 8500 men, including the representatives themselves.

Assemblages still continued to form in the Section Lepelletier. On the morning of the 14th some columns debouched against them by the Boulevards, the Rue de Richelieu, and the Palais Royal; cannon had been placed at the principal avenues; the Sectionaries were speedily dislodged; and the rest of the day was occupied in traversing the city, visiting the rendezvous of the Sections, collecting arms, and reading proclamations; in the evening order was universally restored, and Paris was completely quiet. After this grand event, when the officers of the Army of the Interior were presented to the Convention in a body, Napoleon was appointed by acclamation, Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior, Barras being no longer allowed to combine the title of Representative with military functions. General Menou was delivered up to a council of war; the Committees were desirous of his death. The General-in-chief saved him, by telling the members that if Menou merited

death, the three Representatives, who had directed the operations and parleyed with the Sectionaries, were equally deserving of that punishment; that the Convention had, therefore, only to pass sentence on the three Deputies, and then Menou also might be condemned. The *esprit de corps* prevailed over the voices of the General's enemies: he was acquitted. The Commission condemned several persons to death in contumacy; Vaublanc amongst others. Lafond was the only person executed. This young man had displayed great courage in the action; the head of his column, on the Pont Royal, re-formed thrice, under the fire of grape, before it entirely dispersed. He was an emigrant; it was impossible to save him, although the officers were very desirous to do so; the imprudence of his answers constantly frustrated their good intentions. It is not true that the troops were ordered to fire with powder only at the commencement of the action; that would only have served to embolden the Sectionaries and endanger the troops; but it is true that during the latter part of the action, when success was no longer doubtful, they fired with blank cartridges.

VI.

After the 13th of Vendemiaire, Napoleon had to reform the national guard, which was an object of the greatest importance, as it amounted to no less than 104 battalions. At the same time he organized the guards of the Directory, and reformed those of the Legislative Body. These very circumstances were afterwards amongst the principal causes of his success on the famous 18th of Brumaire. He left such impressions on those corps, that on his return from Egypt, although the Directory had recommended its guards not to render him any military honours, their request was ineffectual, and the soldiers could not be prevented from beating *To the field*, the moment he appeared. The interval of a few months during which he commanded the Army of the Interior, was replete with difficulties and trouble, arising from the installation of a new government, the members of which were divided amongst themselves, and often opposed to the councils; the silent ferment which existed amongst the old Sectionaries, who were still powerful in Paris; the active turbulence of the Jacobins, who used to meet in a patriotic assembly, under the name of the Society

of the Pantheon; the agents of the foreigners who fomented discord in all quarters; and above all, from the horrible famine which at that time desolated the capital. Ten or twelve times, the scanty distributions of bread, which the government usually made every day, failed entirely. An uncommon degree of activity and dexterity was requisite to surmount so many obstacles, and maintain tranquillity in the capital under such unfavourable and afflicting circumstances. The society of the Pantheon daily caused the government increased solicitude; the police was afraid to attack this society openly. The General-in-chief caused the doors of their assembly-rooms to be sealed up. The members stirred no more, as long as he was present; but after his departure, they appeared once more, under the influence of Babœuf, Antonelle, and others, and occasioned the affair of the camp of Grenelle. Napoleon frequently had occasion to harangue the people in the markets, and streets, at the sections, and in the faubourgs; and it is worthy of remark, that of all parts of the capital, the faubourg Saint-Antoine was that which he always found the readiest to listen to reason, and the most susceptible of a generous impulse.

It was whilst he commanded at Paris, that Napoleon became acquainted with Madame de Beauharnais. After the disarming of the Sections, a youth ten or twelve years of age presented himself to the staff, soliciting the return of a sword which had belonged to his father, formerly a general in the service of the Republic. This youth was Eugene de Beauharnais, afterwards Viceroy of Italy. Napoleon, affected by the nature of his petition, and by his juvenile grace, granted his request. Eugene burst into tears when he beheld his father's sword. The General, touched at his sensibility, behaved so kindly to him that Madame de Beauharnais thought herself obliged to wait on him the next day, to thank him for his attention. Every one knows the extreme grace of the Empress Josephine, and her sweet and attractive manners. The acquaintance soon became intimate and tender; and it was not long before they married.

Scherer, who commanded the Army of Italy, was reproached with not having profited by his victory at Loano; his conduct had not given satisfaction. There were many more agents than officers at his head-quarters. He was constantly applying for money to pay his troops, and refit different branches of the ser-

vice, and for horses to replace those which had died for want of forage. The government being unable to supply him with either, gave him dilatory answers, and amused him with vain promises. Scherer perceived this, and gave notice that if any further delay took place, he should be obliged to evacuate the Riviera de Genoa, to return on the Roya, and perhaps to repass the Var. The Directory consulted the General of the Army of the Interior, who presented a memorial on this subject.

A young man of twenty-five could no longer remain at the head of the army of Paris. The reputation of his talents and the confidence reposed in him by the Army of Italy, pointed him out as the only person capable of extricating it from the embarrassing situation in which it was placed. These considerations determined the government to appoint Napoleon General-in-chief of the Army of Italy; he left Paris on the 4th of March 1796. General Hatry, a veteran of sixty, succeeded him in the command of the army of Paris, which had become less important, now that the crisis of the scarcity was over, and the government was established.

VII.

Barras was an officer in the regiment of the Isle of France when the Revolution broke out; he was elected a deputy to the National Convention by his department, that of the Var.

After the 31st of May, he and Freron were nominated commissioners to Provence, the seat of the civil war. On his return to Paris, he joined the Thermidorian party. Being menaced, as well as Tallien, by Robespierre, they united with the remainder of Danton's friends, and brought about the events of the 9th of Thermidor. At the critical moment, the Convention appointed Barras to march to the commune which had risen in favour of Robespierre; he succeeded, and acquired great celebrity by this event. After the fall of Robespierre, the Thermidorians became the men of France. On the 12th of Vendemiaire, at the time of Menou's arrest, the committees, in order to get rid of the three commissioners to the army of the interior, adopted the plan of combining in the person of Barras the powers of the commissioners and those of commandant of that army. But the occasion was too critical for him; he had not seen service. The events of Thermidor and Vendemiaire brought him into

the Directory. He did not possess habits of application, yet he succeeded better than was expected. He was censured for his extravagance, his connexions with contractors, and the fortune he made during the four years he was in office, which he took no pains to conceal, and which greatly contributed to the corruption of the administration at that period. Barras was of tall stature; he sometimes spoke in moments of violent contention, and his voice would then fill the hall. His moral faculties, however, did not allow him to go beyond a few phrases; the passionate manner in which he spoke might have made him pass for a man of resolution. In Fructidor, he with Rewbell and la Reveillere formed the majority against Carnot and Barthelemy. After that day, he was, apparently, the most considerable person in the Directory, but in reality it was Rewbell who managed affairs. After the 13th of Vendemiaire, he always supported in public the character of a warm friend to Napoleon, although they had quarrelled; Napoleon having severely censured the measures which followed the 18th of Fructidor, and especially the law of the 19th. He displayed some dexterity on the 30th of Prairial, year VII, and did not share in the disgrace of his colleagues.

VIII.

La Reveillere Lepaux, deputy to the Convention for Maine and Loire, was one of the seventy-three persons arrested on the 31st of May. He was lame, and of the most disagreeable exterior possible; he was as deformed as Æsop. He wrote tolerably; his mind was of little scope; he was neither accustomed to business, nor skilled in the characters of men; he was alternately governed, according to events, by Carnot and Rewbell. The *Jardin des Plantes* and Theophilanthropy formed his whole occupation; he was constitutionally fanatical, but a warm and sincere patriot, an upright citizen, and a man of good intentions. He entered the Directory poor, and left it so. Nature had only endowed him with the qualities of a subaltern magistrate.

IX.

Rewbell was one of the best advocates of Colmar; he had a considerable portion of the spirit which characterises a good practitioner; he was apt to conceive prejudices against individuals; had little faith in virtue, and carried his patriotism to extremes. Notwithstanding all that has been said about him, he did not accumu-

late wealth in the Directory; he was, indeed, constantly surrounded by contractors, but that was because he was partial to the conversation of active and enterprising men. He enjoyed their flattery, without making them pay for the complaisance he occasionally shewed them. He had a particular animosity against the Germanic system, and the immediate nobility of the empire. He evinced energy in the assemblies, both before and after his magistracy: he was fond of occupation; he had been a member of the Constituent Assembly and of the Convention. When he was commissioner at Mentz, he did not perform what might have been expected of him; he did not oppose the surrender of the place, which might have been longer defended. He had, like most lawyers, a professional dislike to the military, which he could not dissemble.

X.

Carnot entered the service at a very early age, in the engineers. He maintained Montalembert's system in his corps, and passed for an original amongst his comrades. He was a Chevalier de Saint-Louis at the time of the Revolution, in which he engaged with ardour. He was deputed to the Convention, and be-

came a member of the Committee of Public Safety along with Robespierre, Barrere, Couthon, Saint-Just, Billaud Varennes, and Collot d'Herbois. He constantly evinced a violent animosity against the nobles, which occasioned several singular quarrels between him and Robespierre, who latterly protected a great number of them. He was industrious, sincere in all his dealings, guiltless of intrigue, and easy to deceive. He attended Jourdan, as commissioner from the Convention, at the deblockading of Maubeuge, where he rendered important services. When on the Committee of Public Safety, he directed the operations of the war: he was useful in this capacity, without meriting all the praises that were lavished upon him. He had no experience in war; his ideas on every part of the military art were erroneous, not excepting those relating to the attack and defence of fortified places, and the principles of fortification, which he had studied from infancy. He printed works on these subjects which could only be acknowledged by a man destitute of all practical experience in war. He proved himself possessed of moral courage. After Thermidor, when the Convention placed all the members of the Committee of Public Safety under arrest, except

him, he wished to share their fate. This conduct was the more noble, because public opinion was violently hostile to the committee; and because Collot d'Herbois and Billaud Varennes, with whom he wished to be associated, were in fact dreadful characters. He was named a member of the Directory after Vendemiaire; but ever since the 9th of Thermidor, his mind had been agonized by the accusations of public opinion, which attributed to the committee the shedding of all the blood which had flowed on the scaffolds; he felt a desire to please; he suffered himself to be misled by the leaders of the foreign party. He was then exalted to the clouds, but he did not deserve the praises of the enemies of France. He found himself placed in a deceitful position, and was overpowered on the 18th of Fructidor. After the 18th of Brumaire he was recalled and placed in the administration of the war department by the First Consul, in which situation he displayed but moderate talents, and had many disputes with the minister of Finance, and Dufresne, the director of the Treasury, in which he was generally wrong. At length he quitted the ministry, convinced that it could go on no longer for want of money. As a member of the tribunate, he

voted and spoke against the empire; but his conduct, uniformly upright, gave the government no umbrage. The Emperor granted him a pension of 20,000 francs. As long as affairs prospered, he remained silent, and confined himself to his closet; but after the campaign of Russia, at the time of the misfortunes of France, he solicited employment. The city of Antwerp was intrusted to him, where he conducted himself well.

XI.

Letourneur, deputy from the department of la Manche, had been an officer of engineers. It is difficult to account for his having been appointed to the Directory, it could only be through one of those capricious resolutions which great assemblies are liable to. He was a man of little talent, and a petty character. There were a hundred deputies in the Convention superior to him. He was, however, an upright, honest, and well-meaning man.

CHAPTER IV.

DESCRIPTION OF ITALY.

I. Italy.—II. The Alps.—III. The Apennines.—IV. The great plain of Italy.—V. The Valley of the Po, and the Valleys the waters of which fall into the Adriatic, North and South of the Po.—VI. Frontiers of Italy on the land side.—VII. Lines which cover the Valley of the Po.—VIII. Capitals of Italy.—IX. Her maritime resources.—X. Situation of the different powers of Italy in 1796.

I.

Italy is surrounded by the Alps and the sea. Her natural limits are determined with the same precision as those of an island. This country is comprised between the thirty-sixth and forty-sixth degrees of latitude, and the fourth and sixth of longitude from Paris. It naturally divides into three parts, the continental portion, the Peninsula, and the islands. The first of these is separated from the second by the isthmus of Parma. If a semi-circle be traced from Parma, as a centre, to the North of that place, with a radius equal to the distance

from Parma to the mouths of the Var, or those of the Isonzo (sixty leagues) it will give the extent of the higher chain of the Alps, which separates Italy from the rest of the Continent. This semicircle forms the territory of what is called the Continental part, the surface of which is 5000 square leagues. The Peninsula is a trapezium comprehended between the Continental part on the North, the Mediterranean on the West, the Adriatic on the East, and the Ionian sea on the South; the two lateral sides of which are from 200 to 210 leagues in length, and the remaining two sides from 60 to 80 leagues. The surface of this trapezium contains 6000 square leagues. The third part, or the islands, that is to say, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, (which last belongs, in a geographical point of view, to Italy rather than to France,) forms a surface of 4000 square leagues; making the total surface of Italy fifteen thousand leagues. We have here considered the natural limits only, without entering into the political divisions. Savoy, which is beyond the Alps, Dalmatia, and Istria, are therefore not included; whilst the Italian parts of the Swiss Bailiwicks, which are on the Italian side of the Alps, and all that part of the Tyrol, the waters of which fall into the

Adige, and which is on the Italian side of the Brenner, are included. These alterations, however, make little difference. On the East, the Isonzo has been considered as the boundary, although the natural division of the mountains would pass between Laybach and that river, include part of Carniola and Istria, and extend from Fiume to the Adriatic. But at the Isonzo, the Alps decrease in height, and become of less importance.

The frontiers of Italy, towards the continent of Europe, are only 150 leagues in extent; which line is fortified by the strongest barrier that can be opposed to mankind, the highest mountains of Europe, defended by eternal snows and steep rocks. The population of the Continental part is 7,000,000 of souls; that of the Peninsula 8,000,000; and that of the Islands 2,300,000. The total population of Italy amounts to between seventeen and eighteen millions.

The ancients divided Italy into three parts; Cisalpine Gaul, which comprised the whole of the Continental part, and was bounded by the Rubicon on the East, and the Magra on the West: Italy, properly so called, containing Tuscany, the Roman States, and part of the kingdom of Naples: and Magna Græcia, or the

Southern part of the Peninsula. The first part was inhabited by the Gauls; those of Autun having founded Milan 600 years before the Christian era: those of the Loire, Cremona, and Mantua. The second part was inhabited by the Italians, properly so called; and the third by Grecian colonies. In the time of Augustus, the Roman citizens inhabiting Italy were reckoned at 4,600,000.

II.

The Alps, the greatest mountains in Europe, divide Italy from the Continent. There are many passes through them, but a few only are frequented by armies, travellers, and traders. At an elevation of 1400 toises, the last traces of vegetation disappear; at a greater elevation it is with difficulty that man breathes and lives; at a height exceeding 1600 toises are glaciers and mountains of eternal snow, whence rivers issue in all directions, which run into the Po, the Rhone, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Adriatic. The part of the Alps which pours its waters into the Po and the Adriatic belongs to Italy; that part, the streams from which flow into the Rhone, belongs to France; that from which the waters fall into the Rhine and the Danube, to Germany. The Rhone

receives the waters from all the sources of the Alps on the side of France and Switzerland, from the Saint-Gothard to the Col d'Argentiere, and carries them into the Mediterranean. The Cagna and the Arce, which fall into that sea near Hyeres, do not rise in the Alps, but in the hills of Provence. All the waters of the Alps are received by the Durance and its tributary streams, which fall into the Rhone.

Switzerland is entirely within the Alps, between the Rhine, the Rhone, and the Jura; it contains a surface of 2600 leagues covered with great mountains, and full of lakes and valleys, the two principal of which are those of the Aar and the Limma. The waters of Switzerland run into the Rhine or the Rhone; none of them into the Danube. Switzerland is separated from the Valley of the Po by two chains; that which divides the Valley of the Po from the Valley of the Rhone, which is the high chain, and that which separates the latter valley from that of the Rhine.

The waters of the Alps of Cadore, the Julian, and Noric Alps, run into the Danube, either by perpendicular valleys, like those of the Ill, the Lech, the Iser, the Inn, and the Ens, or by transverse valleys; after running parallel with the Danube, they at length fall

into that river, as the Drave and the Muer. Hence the plains of Germany are divided from those of Italy, or the Valley of the Danube from the Valley of the Po, 1st, by the high chains of the Alps which command Italy, and whence flow the waters which on one side run into the Po and the Adriatic, and on the other into the Drave; 2dly, by the chain which divides the Valley of the Drave from that of the Muer; and, 3dly, by the chain which divides the Valley of the Muer from the Valley of the Danube.

All the valleys run perpendicularly from the summit of the Alps into the Po or the Adriatic; and there is no transverse or parallel valley; whence it follows that the Alps on the side of Italy form an amphitheatre which terminates at the higher chain. By guarding the outlets of all these valleys, the whole frontier is guarded. The elevation of the mount which commands the Col di Tende, is 1400 toises; that of Mount Viso 1545 toises; Mount Genevre 1700 toises; the Peak of Gletscherberg on the Saint-Gothard 1900 toises, and Mount Brenner 1250 toises. These summits command the semi-circumference of the high chain of the Alps, and when seen from a short distance, look like giants of ice,

stationed to defend the entrance of this fine country.

The Alps are divided into the Maritime, Cottian, Grecian, Pennine, Rhetian, Cadorian, Cadoric, Noric, and Julian. The Maritime Alps divide the valley of the Po from the sea; forming a second barrier on that side: the Var and the Cottian and Grecian Alps divide Italy from France; the Pennine Alps separate Italy from Switzerland; the Rhetian Alps from the Tyrol; the Cadorian and Julian Alps, from Austria. The Noric Alps are a second line, and command the Drave and the Muer.

The Maritime Alps begin at Mount Ariol, eight leagues from the Mediterranean, near Savona; they run parallel with the sea, and near the shore, as far as the Col d'Argentieres, where the Cottian Alps commence. The county of Nice is situate on their sides towards the sea. Their principal and most frequented passes are the Col Ardente and the Col di Tende. The latter is 897 toises above the level of the sea. The torrents which rush from the Maritime Alps are the Aroscica, which descends from Monte Grande, and falls into the sea near Albenga; the Taggia, which descends from the Col Ardente, and the mouth of which is near San Remo; the

Roya, which descends from the Col di Tende, and ends at Ventimiglia, after a course of twelve leagues; and the Var, which descends from Mont Pelouse, near the Col d'Argentieres, flows in a serpentine direction for twenty-two leagues, and reaches the sea between Nice and Antibes, forming the boundary of France and Italy. The passes of Argentieres, Mount Genevre, and Mount Cenis, are in the Cottian Alps; that of the Little Saint-Bernard is in the Grecian Alps; those of the Great Saint-Bernard, the Simplon, and the Saint-Gothard, in the Pennine Alps; the Splugen and the Brenner in the Rhetian Alps; and Tarvis in the Carnic, also called the Julian Alps.

Mont-Blanc is the most elevated point of these mountains, and overlooks all Europe. From that central point the elevation of the Alps constantly decreases, both towards the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. In the range of mountains commanding Mount Vigo, are the sources of the Var, which falls into the Mediterranean; of the Durance, which falls into the Rhone; and of the Pó, which crosses all the plains of Italy, collecting the waters of this declivity of the Alps, and of part of the Apennines. In the range of mountains which

command the Saint-Gothard, are the sources of the Rhine, the Rhone, the Inn, one of the largest rivers that run into the Danube, and the Ticino, one of the most considerable streams that run into the Po. In the range of mountains commanding Mount Brenner, are the sources of the Adda, which empties itself into the Po, and the Adige, which falls into the Adriatic. Lastly, in the Cadorian Alps, the Piave, Tagliamento, Isonzo, Brenta, and Livenza, arise at the foot of those mountains. The Po, the Rhone, and the Rhine, have each a course of from 120 to 200 leagues; these are very great rivers, in point of depth, breadth, and rapidity; but the Danube, which has a course of 555 leagues, and receives 120 navigable rivers, is the first river in Europe. The Nile in Africa is still more considerable, running 800 leagues.

III.

The Apennines are mountains of the second order, far inferior to the Alps; they cross Italy, and divide the waters which empty themselves into the Adriatic, from those which flow into the Mediterranean. They commence where the Alps terminate, at the hills of Saint-Jacques, near Mount Ariol, the

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last of the Alps. Saint-Jacques and the Col di Cadibona, near Savona, are still lower; so that this point is at once the lowest part, both of the Alps and Apennines. From the first pass, that of Cadibona, the Apennines constantly increase in elevation by a progress inverse to that of the Alps, as far as the centre of Italy. These mountains are divided into the Ligurian, Etruscan, Roman, and Neapolitan Apennines.

The Ligurian Apennines commence at the mountains of Saint-Jacques, at the source of the Bormida, near Savona; and terminate at Mount Saint-Pellegrino on the confines of Tuscany. They extend fifty leagues, and separate the states of Genoa from Montferrat and the Duchy of Parma. The upper ridge is from three to twelve leagues from the sea, and from twelve to twenty from the Po. Mount Saint-Pellegrino rises eight hundred toises above the sea. The waters of the Ligurian Apennines descend on one side into the Mediterranean, by torrents of extreme rapidity, which form a great number of little valleys; and on the other side into the valley of the Po through less rapid streams. The Magra is the most considerable of those which run into the Mediterranean, which it reaches

near Spezia, after a course of twelve leagues. At the time of the campaign of 1796, there was no road along the sea-side practicable for artillery; in order to proceed from Nice to Genoa, it became necessary to transport the pieces on mountain carriages, and, on the opening of the campaign, the different trains had to reach Savona by sea, whence they penetrated into Italy by the Col di Cadibona, which was easily rendered practicable for carriages. There was at that time but one road by which it was possible to proceed from the sea into the interior of Italy, which was that of Genoa, called the Bocchetta road. But in 1812 the road from Nice to Genoa, called the Corniche road, was open for thirty leagues, and afforded an easy communication for carriages between those two cities. The road from Savona to Alessandria, by Cadibona, and that from Spezia to Parma, have opened two other ways from the ports of Savona and Spezia to the Po. Savona is twenty leagues from the Po, Genoa fifteen, and Spezia twenty-four.

The Etruscan Apennines begin at the mountain of Saint-Pellegrino and end at Mount Cornaro; they are thirty leagues in extent; rise gradually, and approach the Adriatic.

Mount Cornaro is ten leagues from Rimini, a port of the Adriatic, and forty leagues from Orbitello, a port of the Mediterranean. These mountains separate Tuscany from the Duchies of Parma and Modena, and from the Legations of Bologna and Romagna. The Arno and the Ombrone are the principal rivers which flow from the tops of these mountains into the Mediterranean. They do not run perpendicularly to the sea, but in a serpentine direction; they are considerable streams; on the other side the waters flow into the Mediterranean in rapid torrents of no great extent of course. At the time of the campaign in Italy, in 1796, there were two roads which crossed the Apennines and formed communications between the Mediterranean and Adriatic: that of Modena, called the Grafignana, came out on Lucca, and crossed Mount Cimone, which is 1000 toises above the level of the sea. In 1812 a road from Florence to Rimini had been marked out, and the works necessary for its construction commenced.

The Roman Apennines begin at Mount Cornaro, and end at Mount Velino; their extent is sixty leagues; they divide the peninsula in the middle between the two seas. Their distance from them never exceeds from twelve

to fifteen leagues, the breadth of the peninsula in that part being thirty. Mount Velino is the most elevated point of the Apennines; it is 1300 toises above the level of the sea. From this point the Apennines decrease in height as far as the extremity of the kingdom of Naples. This mountain is covered with snow throughout the summer. Thus, in the space of 130 leagues, from the Col di Cadibona, the Apennines have progressively risen to a height of 1300 toises. Mount Velino is the culminating and central point of the peninsula of Italy. It is situate eighteen leagues from Rome, and eighteen leagues from Pescara, the opposite point on the Adriatic. The elevation of Mount Saint-Genevre, near Rome, is 675 toises; that of Mount Reticosa is 455. Of the waters of the Roman Apennines running into the Mediterranean, the Tiber is the principal river; it receives forty-two torrents, and it runs fifty leagues. It meanders in a direction parallel to the Apennines, and its source is on the summit of the Etruscan branch of those mountains. The Roman Apennines pour their waters into the Adriatic, through little valleys perpendicular to the sea. There are three roads across the Roman Apennines, forming communications between the Mediterranean

and the Adriatic: 1st, that from Fano to Perugia and Rome; 2dly, that from Ancona to Foligno, Spoleto, and Rome; 3dly, that from Pescara to Terni and Rome.

The Neapolitan or Vesuvian Apennines run for seventy leagues between the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and divide the peninsula almost equally from Mount Velino to Mount Caruso. The elevation of Vesuvius is 584 toises. These mountains gradually decrease in height. The upper ridge of the Neapolitan Apennines passes within fifteen leagues of Naples and eighteen of the Adriatic. The valleys are serpentine; the principal rivers are the Socco and the Volturno. Beyond Mount Caruso, the Apennines divide into two branches. One of them enters Calabria, and the waters from its summits run on one side into the Mediterranean and on the other into the gulf of Tarento. The apex of this chain approaches the Mediterranean, and is lost near Reggio, after having traversed a space of fifty leagues. The other branch entering the countries of Bari and Otranto, divides the waters which run into the Adriatic from those which run into the gulf of Tarento; its course is thirty leagues. All these mountains obey the invariable law, and constantly decrease in height; thus the

upper ridge of the Apennines may be traversed for the space of 280 leagues from Cadibona to the Sicilian sea. This is the outline of the upper ridge of the Apennines, or ridges, which pour their waters into the Mediterranean on one side, and into the Adriatic on the other. Different ramifications spread forth and extend to the two seas, but they are all subordinate to the principal chain.

IV.

The great plain of Northern Italy is comprised between the Alps, the Apennines, and the Adriatic. It is composed of the valley of the Po, and the valleys which open into the Adriatic, North and South of the Po. This plain includes Piedmont, Lombardy, the Duchies of Parma and Modena, the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, and all the States of the Republic of Venice. It is one of the richest in the world, being covered with great and populous cities, and maintaining a population of five or six millions of inhabitants.

The Po, which the Greeks called Eridanus, may be considered as a sea, from the great number of rivers which run into it: on the left bank all those which fall from the ridge of the

Rhetian, Pennine, and Cottian Alps; on the right all those which flow from the Maritime Alps and Ligurian Apennines. At Turin it receives the Doria, which rises in Mount Genevre; at Chivasso the Dora-Baltea, which descends from Mount Saint-Bernard; between Casal and Valenza the Sesia, which rises in the Simplon; at Pavia the Ticino, which springs from Mount Saint-Gothard; between Piacenza and Cremona the Adda, which descends from the Brenner; near Borgo-forte, the Oglio; a little farther, the Mincio. On the right bank it receives the Tanaro, the source of which is in the Col di Tende, and which, before it reaches the vicinity of Bassignana between Valenza and Alessandria, receives the Stura, which descends from the Col d'Argentieres, and the Bormida, which descends from the heights of Bardinetto and Saint-Jacques; above Castel-Nuovo it receives the Scrivia, which descends from the Col de la Borghetta; near Placenza, the Trebia, which rises in the Col di Toriglio, three leagues from Genoa; near Colorno, the Tarro, near Guastalla, the Crostolo, near Mirandola, the Panaro, near Mantua, the Secchia, and near Ferrara, the Reno; the sources of all which rivers are in the Ligurian Alps. The Po enters the Adriatic by seven mouths, ten leagues from Ferrara, ten leagues from

Venice, two leagues from the mouths of the Adige, and eight leagues from Ravenna; it runs 130 or 135 leagues; its width opposite Turin is 130 toises; opposite Placenza two hundred toises; at Borgo-forte three hundred toises; at Ponte de Lagoscuro, opposite Ferrara, six hundred toises. It is raised above the soil, and its fall is one foot in a thousand toises. It is inclosed by dykes which, in some places, are no less than thirty feet in height; and the fine plain which its waters traverse is, like Holland, constantly menaced with submersion. The rivers which enter the Po by the right bank, particularly beyond the Tarro, cause frequent inundations, and occasion a vast number of accidents and disorders, which circumstance gives rise to grand questions in hydraulics, and has rendered the Italian engineers more expert in that science than any other *savans* in Europe. The management of the waters has often occasioned wars between Parma, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara. Whenever the waters of the Po rise rapidly more than three feet above their ordinary level, entire populations hasten to the dykes to assist in their preservation. These alarms often happen two or three times in the year; and sometimes several years elapse without any such occurrence. The tributary streams of

the two banks of the Po differ in this respect, that those of the left bank are rivers, and those of the right torrents; because those of the left bank descend from the Alps, where there are glaciers, and are never dried up; whilst those of the right bank descend from the Apennines, mountains of the second order, with a great slope, whence the waters run rapidly during the rainy season.

The rivers North of the Po, which fall into the Adriatic, are the Adige, which rises at the foot of the Brenner; the Brenta, the source of which is in the last hills of the Alps, on the Trent side; the Piave, the Livenza, and the Tagliamento, which rise in the Cadorian Alps; and, lastly, the Isonzo, the source of which is at the foot of the Col de Tarvis. All these rivers fall into the Adriatic, or into the Lagunes of Venice. The Adige alone remains a river throughout its course, whilst the others are only torrents.

The valleys of the South of the Po comprise successively, from North to South, the Senio, the Ronco, the Savio, and the Luzo or Rubicon, and together constitute the provinces of Romagna. These inconsiderable torrents are fordable nearly throughout the year, except in the season of the great floods; their source

is in the Etruscan Apennines, and they fall into the Adriatic in the vicinities of Fusignano, Ravenna, Faenza, Cesena, and Rimini. All the lakes of the district of Comacchio, on the right bank of the Po, are diversions or filtrations of the Po, the waters of which river spread as far as Ravenna.

V.

France borders on Italy from the mouth of the Var, in the Mediterranean, to the Little Saint-Bernard. From the foot of the Saint-Bernard, on the French side, at the village of Scez, to the valley of Barcelonetta, it is thirty leagues: on the Italian side it is only eighteen, measuring from the valley of Aosta to the valley of the Stura opposite the Col d'Argentieres. But from the Stura it is necessary to clear the upper chain of the Alps in order to descend into the county of Nice and proceed along the left bank of the Var. An army from Italy, which has passed the Var, has entered France; but an army from France, which has passed that river, has not entered Italy; it is only on the acclivities of the Maritime Alps. Until it has cleared the upper ridge of the Alps to descend into Italy, that obstacle remains in full force.

The Var is a torrent which is fordable during part of the year. It runs amongst mountains, where all the roads are impracticable for artillery. An army, therefore, could not enter Italy by way of the Var, except by the lower part of that river, in order to gain possession of Nice in the first instance. In order to render the Var a line of any importance, it would require a fort at the mouth, to close the passage, destroy the fords, or form inundations. After passing the Var, and gaining possession of the county of Nice, the army must, in order to enter Italy, either pass the Col di Tende, or march along the coast as far as Oneglia, to pass the Alps at Ponte di Nave, and reach the Tanaro, or proceed along the sea-side to Savona and Genoa, to pass them at Cadibona and the Bocchetta. The best line that can be taken in order to oppose these plans, is that of the Roya. The right of this line reaches from the Col di Tende to Saorgio; the centre from Saorgio to Briglio; and the left from Briglio to the sea. The fortress of Saorgio and a little fort on the heights of Briglio would serve as an *appui* to this line, and guard the road leading to Tende. Should this line be forced, the Riviera di Genoa affords several others; such as the branches of Monte Grande, which

cover San Remo. But then the Col di Tende would remain without the line, and would require to be defended by the fortress of Coni, and by a corps placed in Piedmont. The fortress of Genoa is important as a point of *appui* to this frontier, and a great sea-port.

If a French army would enter Italy by the Cottian and Grecian Alps, it ought to pass by one of the five *cols*, of Argentieres, elevated 900 toises, of la Croix, Mount Genevre, or Mount Cenis, elevated 1060 toises, or of the Little Saint-Bernard, elevated 1150 toises. If this upper ridge belong to the King of Italy, casemated towers ought to be constructed on the heights to protect the little fortresses defending these passes. From the Col d'Argentieres a French army ought to debouch into the three valleys of the Stura, the Maira, and Blino; from the Col de la Croix into the valleys of Saint-Martin and Pragelato; from the Col du Mont Genevre into the valleys of Pragelato and Suza; from Mount Cenis into the valley of Suza: from the Little Saint-Bernard into the valley of Aosta. The King of Sardinia had the forts of Demonte, Chateau Dauphin, Exilles, Fenestrelles, la Brunette and Bard, which formed a second line, closing all these debouches, just as the fortresses of Coni, Or-

mea, and Ceva closed the debouches of the Maritime Alps. The frontiers of states are either chains of mountains, great rivers, or vast and arid deserts. Thus France is defended by the Rhine, Italy by the chain of the Alps, and Egypt by the deserts of Libya, Nubia and Arabia. Of all these obstacles deserts are undoubtedly the most difficult to pass; mountains are the second class of impediments, and large rivers are only the third.

On the frontiers of Switzerland four principal passes form the communication between the two states; those of Saint-Bernard, at an elevation of 1240 toises; of the Simplon, at 1050 toises; of the Saint-Gothard, 1060 toises, and of the Splugen, 988 toises. The Simplon opens upon the right bank of Lake Maggiore and of the Ticino. From Domo d'Ossola to Lake Maggiore there are several positions which are easily fortified, amongst others the Chateau d'Arona. The Ticino forms a last line against the aggressions of France, as well as against an army debouching by the Simplon; the right is supported on Lake Maggiore and the mountains; the left on the Po and the defiles of Stradella, which communicate uninterruptedly with the Ligurian Apennines. The Ticino is rapid and broad; the bridge of Pavia re-

trenched and well-guarded, and a good fort at the defile of Stradella would cover Italy on the side of France. The pass of the Saint-Gothard is impracticable for artillery. From the Saint-Gothard to the Lake of Lugano, and between Lakes Maggiore and Como, there are many positions which afford good lines, and where a few forts of little expense would have a good effect; indeed there were such formerly. At all events, the command of all the lakes ought to be secured by armed boats. The fourth pass, that of the Splugen, opens into the Valteline, which district, in a geographical sense, undoubtedly appertains to Italy, as its waters belong to the valley of the Pò, to which they flow by the Adda. The Adda forms the Lake of Como; but that lake is surrounded by impracticable rocks, like all the lakes of the Bergomasque and Brescian.

On the Austrian side, Italy borders on the Tyrol, Carinthia, and Carniola; this frontier is at once the weakest and the most extended. On the Tyrolian side is the pass of the Brenner, at an elevation of 730 toises, leading to Trent. From Trent three roads lead into Italy: one on the Chiesa, the Lake of Idro, and Brescia, which the fortress of Rocca d'Anfo completely bars; another runs along

the left bank of the Adige, and opens on Verona, the Adige serving as a line against this debouche; the third runs along the Brenta, and debouches at Bassano, on the left bank of the Brenta. On the Carinthian side is the Col de Tarvis; and lastly, on that of Carniola, is the line of the Isonzo.

In 1796 the Alps were passable for the purpose of entering Italy: 1st, by the road of the Col di Tende, at the debouché of which was the fortress of Coni; 2ndly, by the Col d'Argentieres, but there was no road in that direction practicable for artillery, and the position of the Pas de Suze and Fort Demonte defended the valley of the Stura; 3rdly, from Grenoble and Briançon, by Mount Genevre; but this road was impracticable for artillery, and at its opening into Piedmont were Fenestrelles and Exilles; 4thly, by Savoy, Chambery, and Mount Cenis, but from Lanslebourg to la Novalese the roads were impracticable for waggons, and the valley was closed by the fortresses of Suza and la Brunette; 5thly, the Tarentaise led to the foot of the Little Saint-Bernard; 6thly, the Valais led to the Great Saint-Bernard; but the passage of these two mountains was not practicable for waggons; and Fort Bard, which closed the valley, inter-

cepted the passage into the plain; 7thly, by the Valais there was a road reaching to Brig, where it ceased to be practicable for waggons. The passage of the Simplon was impossible, as were those of the Saint-Gothard and of the Splugen. In 1812 all these fortresses were demolished, that is to say, Coni, la Demonte, la Brunette, Suza, Bard, and Exilles; and four great roads had opened the Alps to all sorts of carriages, which were not even under the necessity of locking the wheels; namely, the roads of the Corniche, Mount Genevre, Mount Cenis, and the Simplon. These roads, which cost so many millions and so many years' labour, are considered as the finest works of this kind which were ever executed by man.

The lines which an Italian or French army ought to take in order to oppose an invasion on the side of Germany, are those which run along the right banks of the rivers which fall into the Adriatic, North of the Po: these lines cover the whole valley of the Po, and thereby close the peninsula, and cover Upper, Middle, and Lower Italy. These are the best lines of defence: those which run along the rivers which fall into the Po, cut the valley of that river, leave Middle and Lower Italy un-

covered, and thereby render it necessary to have two armies to manœuvre on the two banks of the Po.

The lines of defence which cover the valley of the Po, are those of the Isonzo, the Tagliamento, the Livenza, the Piave, the Brenta, and the Adige. The line of the Isonzo covers all Italy, being the boundary of that country. From Tarvis to Caporetto this river runs through impracticable mountains. At Caporetto is the road leading to Udine by way of Cividal. In the third part of this line, from Gorizia to where the Isonzo falls into the sea, are the debouchés of Gradisca, Gorizia, and Monte Falcone. The Venetian fortress of Palma-Nuova contributes to the defence of this line as a depôt and reserve; but this line is turned by the road of the Ponteba, which descends on Osopo and the Tagliamento; it is therefore necessary to occupy a position near Tarvis, by means of a good fortress, to intercept the two roads, that of the Ponteba and that of the Isonzo. The line of the Livenza may be turned by its left at Sacile, in the mountains; the Livenza is not fordable; although narrow, it is marshy. The line of the Piave is defended by the forest of Montello, whence it is covered, as far as the sea, by

impassable morasses; but that river is fordable in many places. To render this line of some importance, it would be necessary to contract the bed of the Piave in such a manner as to render it impossible to ford it in any part, and to contrive means of forming inundations; this line has the advantage of covering Venice. The line of the Brenta, on the left of Bassano, is closed by gorges easy to defend; from Bassano to Brontolo the Brenta is fordable. The high road from Munich to Verona, which crosses the Brenner and the Adige, turns these five lines; so that if the enemy had a corps-d'armée in Bavaria and the Tyrol, he would reach the right bank of the Adige by this route, and would cut off the army occupying one of these lines from Italy.

The Adige is the sixth and last line which covers the valley of the Po; it is incomparably the best. This river is broad, rapid, and deep; and is not fordable in any part: at Verona it is sixty toises wide. But this line leaves the Venetian territory and the city of Venice uncovered. By occupying the lake of Garda with a few gun-boats, and the road of the Chiesa by the fort of Rocca-d'Anfo, the line of the Adige completely covers all the rest of Italy.

The mountains of the Bresciau, Bergomasque, and Milanese countries, are impracticable; the enemy could only penetrate by the Simplon, supposing him master of Switzerland. This line is divided into three parts: the first between the Lake of Garda and the level of Rivoli; the second from Rivoli to Legnago; and the third from Legnago to the sea. The first is defended by the heights of Montebaldo and the position of la Corona: the enemy cannot penetrate thither with artillery; he must gain possession of the level of Rivoli, to be able to receive his artillery, which, in that case, he would cause to descend by the road which runs along the left bank of the Adige. Beyond Roveredo, the forts of Verona and that part of the town which is on the left bank, ought by all means to be occupied as têtes-de-pont. The small fortress of Legnago serves the centre of the line as a tête-de-pont. From Legnago to the sea there are many morasses; by making use of the waters of the Adige, the Brenta, and the Po, a communication may be secured with the fortified place of Venice. By cutting a dyke of the Adige, lower than Porto Legnago, all the ground between that river and the Po may be inundated: their waters may be united

with those of the Molinella; the whole country from Legnago to the sea is then impracticable. By opening the sluice of Castagnaro, the canal called Bianco is filled by the waters of the Adige; this canal falls into the Po; it then forms a second line. In case the enemy has passed the Adige between Castagnaro and the sea, the best way of defending the Adige is to encamp on the left bank, on the heights of Caldero, behind the Alpon, with the right supported on the marshes of Arcole, with two bridges at Ronco, the left supported on some fine heights which it would be easy to intrench in a few weeks; then all that part of the line between Rivoli and Ronco would be covered, and if the enemy would pass the Adige between Arcole and the sea, the defensive army would be in a situation to fall on his rear.

The Mincio is the first line which cuts the valley of the Po: in order to occupy this line, it is necessary to be master of the Lake of Garda and the fortress of Rocca-d'Anfo. The Mincio is a river of inconsiderable breadth, and but a slight obstacle in itself; but, on stopping up all the irrigatory canals which draw off its waters, it ceases to be fordable. The fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua con-

stitute the principal strength of this line. Mantua defends the Serraglio and part of the Mincio as far as the Po. The hills of Monzembano and la Volta on the right bank, command the left bank; those of Salionza and Valeggio on the left bank, command the right bank. A small citadel on the left bank, at the hill of Valeggio, another on the hill of Salionza, the restoration of the small fortress of Goïto, covered by inundations, would render this line pretty good; nevertheless, the army occupying it would be obliged to have a detached corps on the right bank of the Po.

The Oglio is fordable in many places; it has the disadvantage, towards its source and on its left, of approaching the Adda; so that an army placed on the right bank of this river would easily be cut off from Milan, as it frequently happened in the wars of Venice and the Visconti. But if the retreat of this army could be effected by the right bank of the Po, this line might in that case be of some utility. The Adda is occasionally fordable; permanent or field fortifications are necessary at Lecco, Trezzo, Cassano, and Lodi, as well as armed boats on the Lake of Como. The fortress of Pizzighettone supports the lower part of the line: a fortress at Piacenza, with a bridge on

the Po, would complete this line; but in default of such fortress, a second army would be requisite on the right bank of the Po.

The Ticino is a good line; it is a broad, deep, rapid river, but it is necessary to occupy Pavia as a tête-de-pont: a fortress at la Stradella would complete this line, to stop the enemy on the right bank of the Po: for want of such fortress an army is requisite on the right bank of the Po. La Stradella is the narrowest point of the valley of the Po; a fort would entirely close it up. The last hillocks of the Ligurian Apennines abut on this district. The valley is not a cannon-shot in width; the Po runs close to the foot of the hills. The cannon of la Stradella would play on all points; both above and below that place, the valley is two or three leagues in breadth, and a fort like that of la Stradella would not bar it.

VI.

Italy, insulated within its natural limits, separated by the sea and by very lofty mountains from the rest of Europe, seems destined to form a great and powerful nation; but she has a capital defect in her geographical form, which may be regarded as one of the causes of

the calamities she has suffered, and of the parcelling out of this fine country into several independent monarchies or republics: her length is disproportionate to her breadth. If this country had been bounded by Mount Velino; that is to say, if it had extended about as far as Rome, and all that part of its territory which is comprised between Mount Velino and the Ionian sea, including Sicily, had been thrown between Sardinia, Corsica, Genoa, and Tuscany, Italy would have had a centre near every part of her circumference, with an unity of rivers, climate, and local interests. But the three great islands, which form a third of her surface, have insulated interests and positions, and are each under peculiar circumstances; and that part of the Peninsula which is south of Mount Velino, and which forms the kingdom of Naples, is unacquainted with the interests, climate, and wants of the whole of the valley of the Po.

Thus, whilst the Gauls were passing the Cottian Alps, six hundred years before the Christian era, and settling in the valley of the Po, the Greeks were landing on the southern coasts from the Ionian sea, and founding the colonies of the Tarentines and Salentines, of Croto and Sabargte, states which were known

under the generic name of Magna Græcia. Rome subjugated both Gaul and Greece, and reduced all Italy under her command. Several ages after Christ, when the seat of empire was transferred to Constantinople, the barbarians passed the Isonzo and the Adige, and founded several states; the throne of the powerful monarchy of the Lombards was fixed at Pavia. The fleets of Constantinople maintained the imperial sway on the coasts of the southern part. At a later period the Kings of France often penetrated into Italy by the Cottian Alps; and the Emperor of Germany by the Cottian and Rhetian Alps; the Popes opposed these princes to each other, and by that policy maintained themselves in a kind of independence, promoted by the divisions and anarchy that prevailed in the different cities. But although the South of Italy is, by its situation, separated from the North, Italy is one single country; the unity of manners, language, and literature, must, at some future period, more or less remote, at length unite its inhabitants in one single government. The first and essential condition of the existence of this monarchy, must be to become a maritime power, in order to maintain its supremacy over its islands, and to defend its coasts.

There are various opinions respecting the place best adapted to become the capital of Italy. Some point out Venice, because it is of the first importance to Italy to become a maritime power. Venice, protected by its situation from every attack, is the natural depôt of the commerce of the Levant and of Germany: it is, commercially speaking, the nearest point to Turin and Milan; even more so than Genoa; the sea places it near every part of the coasts. Others are led by history and the memorials of antiquity to fix on Rome; these say, that Rome is more central; that it is convenient to the three great islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, as well as to Naples, the seat of the greatest population in Italy; that it is at a proper distance from every point of the assailable frontier; whether the enemy advance by the French, Swiss, or Austrian frontier, Rome is still at a distance of 120 leagues; that, should the frontier of the Alps be forced, Rome is covered by the frontier of the Po, and after that by the frontier of the Apennines; that France and Spain are great maritime powers, whose capitals, nevertheless, are not established in sea-ports; that Rome, near the coasts of the Mediterranean and Adriatic, is in a situation to provide for the

victualling and defence of the frontiers of the Isonzo and Adige from Ancona and Venice, with economy and despatch, by way of the Adriatic; that, by means of the Tiber, Genoa, and Villa Franca, she can take care of the frontier of the Var and the Cottian Alps; that, by means of the Adriatic and Mediterranean, she is favourably situated for harassing the flanks of any army which should pass the Po, and penetrate into the Cottian Alps, without commanding the sea; that the depôts which a great capital contains might be transferred from Rome to Naples and Tarento, to save them from a victorious enemy; and finally, that Rome exists; that she affords more resources for the occasions of a great capital than any city in the world; that she has, moreover, on her side, the magic influence and dignity of her name. It is accordingly our opinion that Rome is unquestionably the capital which the Italians will one day choose.

The population and wealth of Italy would enable her to maintain a military force of 400,000 soldiers, independently of her navy. War in Italy requires less cavalry than in Germany; 30,000 horse would be sufficient for Italy; the artillery ought to be numerous in order to defend the coasts and naval establish-

ments. Horses are scarce in Italy, yet Naples, Tuscany, and Rome, furnish very valuable ones; Albania, Switzerland, Germany, and Africa, ought to supply Italy with horses. The studs which have been sacrificed to the promotion of agriculture and the profit derived from horned cattle ought to be restored. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the different powers of Italy maintained a hundred thousand horses; at that period Tuscany alone had an army of 100,000 men, because the armies never went farther than a few days' march from their respective cities. An army of 400,000 men would be sufficient to enable Italy to furnish three armies of 100,000 men each, to defend its French, Swiss, and German frontiers.

VII.

No part of Europe is so advantageously situated as this peninsula for becoming a great maritime power. Its coasts extend from the mouths of the Var to the straits of Sicily, two hundred and thirty leagues; from the straits of Sicily to the cape of Otranto on the Ionian sea, one hundred and thirty leagues; from the cape of Otranto to the mouth of the Isonzo in the Adriatic, two hundred and thirty leagues;

and the extent of the coasts of the three islands of Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia, is five hundred and thirty leagues. Italy has, therefore, including its great and small islands, twelve hundred leagues of coast; without taking into this calculation those of Dalmatia, Istria, the mouths of the Cattaro, or the Ionian Isles, which, under the empire, were dependent on Italy. France has a hundred and thirty leagues of coast in the Mediterranean, and four hundred and seventy on the Atlantic, in all six hundred leagues; Spain, including her islands, has five hundred leagues of coast in the Mediterranean, and three hundred on the Atlantic; thus Italy has half as much coast again as Spain, and twice as much as France. France has three ports, the towns of which contain a population of 100,000 persons; Italy has Genoa, Naples, Palermo, and Venice, whose population is superior; Naples contains 400,000 inhabitants. The opposite coasts of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic being at a short distance from each other, almost the whole population of Italy is within reach of the coasts; Lucca, Pisa, Rome, and Ravenna, distant from three to four hundred leagues from the sea, are capable of enjoying all the advantages of maritime towns, and of supplying

great numbers of seamen; her three great military ports for armament and building are, la Spezia for the Ligurian seas, Tarento for the Ionian, and Venice for the Adriatic. Italy has all kinds of resources in timber, hemp, and, in general, every thing necessary for shipbuilding; la Spezia is the finest port in the world, its roads are even superior to those of Toulon; its defence by land and sea is easy; the plans drawn up under the empire, and the execution of which was commenced, proved that, at a moderate expense, the naval establishments might be placed in security, and inclosed in a place capable of making the greatest resistance. Its docks would be convenient for receiving the timber of Corsica, Liguria, and Tuscany; and iron from the isle of Elba, the Alps, and the whole of the Apennines. Its squadrons would command the seas of Corsica and Sardinia, and would be able, in case of need, to put into the ports of Porto Ferrajo, San Fiorenzo, Ajaccio, Porto Vecchio, San Pietro in Sardinia, Vado, and Villa Franca. Tarento is wonderfully well situated for commanding Sicily, Greece, the Levant, and the coasts of Egypt and Syria; under the empire there were plans drawn up for its land fortifications and naval establish-

ments; the greatest fleets may lie in this port sheltered from the winds and secure from the attack of any superior hostile force. Finally, at Venice, there is already every thing needful. The Venetians had no ships that drew above eighteen feet water; but under the Empire a great number of ships were built on the French plan, and, by means of the works constructed at the canal of Malamoko, and by the aid of floating butts, ships completely armed, built on the model of French seventy-fours, have come out of this canal, and fought with glory a few minutes after their launch. A commission of the engineers of the bridges and roads, of which Proni was president, had drawn up a plan, which at the expense of a few millions and some years' labour would have enabled the vessels to come out completely armed without the aid of butts. Sicily, Malta, Corfu, Istria, Dalmatia, and especially Ragusa, afford ports and shelter for the largest fleets. The ports of Genoa, Castelmare, Bari, and Ancona, which first-rate ships can enter, would be four secondary ports, either for building or for equipping, repairing, and revictualling small squadrons. Italy can raise and maintain for the naval service, even in her actual declining state, 120,000 seamen; the

sailors of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice, have been celebrated for ages. Italy might keep up three or four hundred ships of war, of which 100 or 120 might be ships of the line of seventy-four guns; her flag might contend with success against those of France, Spain, Constantinople, and the four Barbary powers.

VIII.

The King of Sardinia possessed Savoy, the county of Nice, Piedmont, and Montferrat. Savoy and the county of Nice had been taken from him in the campaigns of 1792, 1793, 1794, and 1795, and the French army occupied the upper ridge of the Alps. Piedmont and Montferrat, included between the Ticino, the states of Parma, the republic of Genoa and the Alps, contained a population of 2,000,000 of inhabitants, which, with the 500,000 of Sardinia, and the 400,000 of Savoy and the county of Nice, raised the number of his subjects to about 3,000,000. In time of peace the King of Sardinia maintained 25,000 men under arms; his annual revenue amounted to twenty-five millions. At the commencement of the campaign of 1796, he had brought into the field 60,000 men, by means of the subsidies of England and by extraordinary exertions.

These were national troops, inured to war by a long contest. The fortresses of la Brunette, Suza, Fenestrelles, Bard, Tortona, Cherasco, Alessandria, and Turin, were in good condition, well armed, and completely provided with stores and provisions; and the frontier was, on account of these fortresses situated in the defiles of all the mountains, considered as proof against every attack.

The republic of Genoa, lying to the south of Piedmont, and composed of the Riviera di Ponente, which has a coast of thirty leagues, and the Riviera di Levante, which has one of twenty-five, contained 500,000 inhabitants. It did not usually maintain more than 3 or 4000 men under arms; but in case of need all the citizens of Genoa became soldiers; and 8 or 10,000 men of the imperial fiefs and the valleys of Fontana-Bona were formed into regiments for the defence of the capital. The city of Genoa is extremely well fortified. The walls are four leagues in circuit, but only a few points are assailable. The small fortress of Gavi defends the defile of the Bocchetta.

The republic of Lucca, a small country extending along the Tuscan sea, had a population of 140,000 souls, and a revenue of two

millions. The duchy of Parma, Placenza, and Guastalla contained 500,000 inhabitants. It bordered on the republic of Genoa, on the Po, and on the states of Modena; its military establishment was 3000 men, its revenues four millions.

Austrian Lombardy, separated from the states of the King of Sardinia by the Ticino, from Switzerland by the Alps, from the duchy of Parma by the Po, and bordering, on the east, on the states of the republic of Venice, formed a population of 1,200,000 souls. Milan was the capital, and had a citadel in good condition. This part of Italy belonged to Austria, had no military establishment, and even paid a tax to be exempt from recruiting. Austria had only one Italian regiment, that of Strasoldo. Pavia, Milan, Como, Lodi, Cremona, and Mantua, formed the subdivisions of Austrian Lombardy; the fortifications of Pizzighettone on the Adda were in a bad state; Mantua, although neglected, was a good fortress.

The republic of Venice had, on the west, Austrian Lombardy, on the north the Cadorian Alps separating it from the Tyrol and from Carinthia; on the east Carinthia, Carniola, Istria, and Dalmatia; her population was

3,000,000 of inhabitants. She could bring 50,000 men into the field; her fleet ruled the Adriatic. She had thirteen regiments of Sclavonians, who were good soldiers. The Bergomasque, the Brescian, the Cremasque, the Polesina, the Veronese, the Vicentine, the Paduan, the Bassanese, the Trevisan, the Cadorine, the Feltrine, the Bellunese, and the Frioul, formed the Venetian states on the right bank of the Isonzo; Istria and Dalmatia those on the shores of the Adriatic.

The duchy of Modena included the duchies of Reggio, Modena, and Mirandola. It bordered on the Po, on the duchy of Parma, on the Legation of Bologna, and on the Tuscan Apennines. It was governed by the last scion of the house of Este; whose daughter, the wife of the archduke Ferdinand of Austria, was his heir. The duke of Modena was wholly Austrian; his military establishment was 6000 men; he had an arsenal, a depôt of artillery, and a rich treasury. The population of his states amounted to 400,000 souls.

Tuscany, bounded by the Mediterranean, the Apennines, the republics of Genoa and Lucca, and the states of the Pope, had a population of 1,000,000; the archduke Ferdinand, the Emperor's brother, governed there.

His military establishment was 6000 men; his revenues fifteen millions of francs. He possessed a great commercial port, Leghorn. The Grand Duke of Tuscany had acknowledged the republic in 1795; he was neutral, and at peace with it; Tuscany and the republic of Venice were the only powers of Italy at peace with France.

The states of the Pope were bounded by the Po, Tuscany, the Adriatic, the Mediterranean, and the kingdom of Naples. They contained a population of 2,500,000 souls, of which the three legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, formed 900,000; the Marches, and Saint Peter's Patrimony, including Rome, 1,600,000. The port of Ancona on the Adriatic had a bad fortress; Civita Vecchia, on the Mediterranean, was regularly fortified. The troops kept on foot by the Pope amounted to four or five thousand men.

The kingdom of Naples, bounded by the states of the Pope and by the sea, contained a population of 6,000,000 of souls, of whom there were 4,500,000 on the continent, and 1,500,000 in Sicily. The Neapolitan army was 60,000 strong. The cavalry was excellent: the navy consisted of three ships of the line, and several frigates.

Corsica had belonged to France ever since the middle of the last century: her population was 180,000 souls; this country was then in the power of the English. The isle of Malta, containing a population of 100,000 souls, belonged to the order of Saint-John of Jerusalem.

Thus the military establishment of the powers of Italy amounted to 160,000 men under arms, and might easily have been increased, in a short time, to 300,000. The Italian army was much stronger in infantry than in cavalry; but excepting the Piedmontese and Sclavonians, the troops were far from good.

CHAPTER V.

BATTLE OF MONTENOTTE.

I. Plan of the Campaign.—II. State of the Armies.—III. Napoleon arrives at Nice towards the end of March, 1796.—IV. Battle of Montenotte, (April 12).—V. Battle of Millesimo, (April 14).—VI. Action of Dego, (April 15).—VII. Action of Saint Michel, (April 20); Action of Mondovi, (April 22).—VIII. Armistice of Cherasco, (April 28).—IX. Examination of the expediency of passing the Po, and proceeding farther from France.

I.

In 1796 the King of Sardinia, whose military and geographical position had procured him the title of Porter of the Alps, had fortresses at the outlets of all the passes leading into Piedmont. For the purpose of penetrating into Italy by forcing the Alps, it was necessary to gain possession of one or more of these fortresses; the roads did not allow of bringing up a battering train; the mountains are covered with snow during three quarters of the year, which leaves but little time for besieging fortresses. Napo-

leon conceived the idea of turning the whole of the Alps, and entering Italy precisely at the point where those lofty mountains terminate and where the Apennines begin, as has already been stated in Chapter IV. Mont Blanc is the most elevated point of the Alps, whence the chain of these mountains decreases in height towards the Adriatic, as well as towards the Mediterranean as far as Mount Saint-Jacques, where they end, and where the Apennines begin, which rise gradually as far as Mount Velino near Rome. Mount Saint-Jacques is therefore the lowest point, both of the Alps and Apennines, the spot where the former end and the latter begin. Savona, a seaport and fortified town, was well situated for a depôt and point of *appui:* from this town to la Madonna it is three miles; a firm road leads to that town, whence it is six miles to Carcari by a road which might in a few days be rendered practicable for artillery. From Carcari there are carriage roads leading into the interior of Piedmont and Montferrat. This was the only point by which Italy could be entered without passing mountains: the elevations of the ground there are so trifling, that at a later period, under the Empire, a canal was planned for joining the Adriatic to the Mediterranean by the Po, the Tanaro, the Bormida, and locks from that river to Savona. The scheme of penetrating into Italy by

Savona, Cadibona, Carcari, and the Bormida, afforded hopes of separating the Sardinian and Austrian armies; because Lombardy and Piedmont would be equally menaced from those points; Milan and Turin might be marched upon with equal facility. The Piedmontese were interested in covering Turin, and the Austrians in covering Milan.

II.

The army of the enemy was commanded by General Beaulieu, a distinguished officer, who had acquired reputation in the campaigns of the North. It was provided with all that could render it formidable, and was composed of Austrians, Sardinians, and Neapolitans. Its numbers were double those of the French army; and were to be successively increased by the contingents of Naples, of the Pope, of Modena, and of Parma. These forces were divided into two grand corps; the active Austrian army, composed of four divisions of infantry of forty-two battalions, forty-four squadrons of cavalry, and one hundred and forty pieces of cannon: in all, 45,000 strong; under Lieutenants-general d'Argenteau, Melas, Wukassowich, Liptay, and Sebottendorf. The active army of Sardinia, composed of three divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry, in the whole 25,000 men, and

sixty pieces of cannon, was commanded by the Austrian General Colli, and by generals Provera and Latour; the rest of the Sardinian forces garrisoned the fortresses, or defended the frontier, opposite to the French army of the Alps, under the command of the duke of Aoste.

The French army was composed of four effective divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under Generals Massena, Augereau, Laharpe, Serrurier, Stengel, and Kilmaine; it amounted to 25,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, 2500 artillery, sappers, civil list, &c. Total, 30,000 men present under arms. The effective strength of the army amounted, according to the returns of the ministry, to 106,000 men; but 36,000 were prisoners, dead, or deserted. A regular review had long been expected for the purpose of striking them out of the states of situation. 20,000 were in the 8th military division, at Toulon, Marseilles, and Avignon, between the mouths of the Rhone and those of the Var: they could only be employed in the defence of Provence, depending on the ministry. There remained an effective force of 50,000 men on the left bank of the Var; of whom 5000 were in the hospitals, 7000 formed the depôts of the corps of infantry, cavalry, (the latter being 2500 men, not mounted,) and artillery; there remained 30,000 men actually under arms, ready to take the field: 8000 men,

infantry and artillery, were employed in the garrisons of Nice, Villa Franca, Monaco, the coasts of Genoa, and Saorgio, and in guarding the upper ridge of the Alps from the Col d'Argentieres to the Tanaro. The cavalry was in the worst condition possible, although it had long been on the Rhone to recruit itself; but it had suffered for want of provisions. The arsenals of Nice and Antibes were well provided with artillery, but destitute of means of carriage, all the draught horses having perished for want. The poverty of the finances was such that the government, with all its efforts, could only furnish the chest of the army with 2000 louis in specie to open the campaign with, and a million in drafts, part of which were protested. The army was totally destitute, and had nothing to expect from France; all its dependence was on victory; it was only in the plains of Italy that it could organize means of conveyance, procure horses for the artillery, clothe the soldiers, and mount the cavalry. It consisted, however, of only 30,000 men actually under arms, and thirty pieces of cannon; and it stood opposed to 80,000 men and two hundred pieces of cannon. If it had been under the necessity of engaging in a general battle, its inferiority in numbers and in artillery and cavalry would undoubtedly have prevented it from making an effectual resistance; it had,

therefore, to compensate for its inferiority in number by rapid marches; for the want of artillery by the nature of its manœuvres; and for its inferiority in cavalry by the choice of positions. The character of the French soldiers was excellent; they had distinguished themselves and grown inured to war on the summits of the Alps and Pyrenees. Privations, poverty, and want, are the school that forms good soldiers.

III.

Napoleon reached Nice on the 27th of March; the picture of the army which general Scherer laid before him, was even worse than any thing he had been able to conceive. The supply of bread was precarious, and no distributions of meat had been made for a long time. There were no means of conveyance but 500 mules; it was useless to think of carrying above thirty pieces of cannon. The state of affairs daily grew worse; there was not a moment to be lost; the army could no longer subsist where it was: it was indispensably requisite either to advance or to fall back. Napoleon gave orders to advance, and thus surprise the enemy in the very opening of the campaign, and dazzle him by striking and decisive successes. The head-quarters had never been removed from Nice since the commencement of the war: he instantly put them on their

march for Albenga. All the civil lists had long considered themselves as permanently stationed, and were much more intent on procuring the comforts of life for themselves than on supplying the wants of the army. Napoleon reviewed the troops, and addressed them thus: "Soldiers, you "are naked and ill-fed; government owes you "much, and can give you nothing. The pa- "tience and courage you have shewn in the midst "of these rocks are admirable; but they gain you "no renown; no glory results to you from your "endurance. It is my intention to lead you into "the most fertile plains in the world. Rich pro- "vinces and great cities will be in your power; "there you will find honour, glory, and wealth. "Soldiers of Italy, will you be wanting in cou- "rage or perseverance?" This speech from a young general of twenty-six, already renowned for the operations of Toulon, Saorgio, and Cairo, was received with eager acclamations.

For the purpose of turning the Alps and entering Italy by the Col di Cadibona, it was necessary to collect the whole army on its extreme right; a dangerous operation, had not the snow then covered all the debouchés of the Alps. The transition from the defensive to the offensive order is one of the most delicate of military operations. Serrurier posted himself at Garessio with his division to observe Colli's camps near

Ceva; Massena and Augereau took positions at Loano, Finale, and Savona. Laharpe was placed so as to menace Genoa; his vanguard, commanded by Brigadier-general Cervoni, occupied Voltri. The French minister demanded of the senate of Genoa a passage by the Bocchetta, and the keys of Gavi, declaring that the French wished to penetrate into Lombardy, and support their operations on Genoa. This caused a great bustle in the city: the councils placed themselves in permanence. The effects of these measures were also felt in Milan.

IV.

Beaulieu, greatly alarmed, hastened precipitately to the aid of Genoa. He advanced his head-quarters to Novi, and divided his army into three corps: the right, composed of Piedmontese, and commanded by Colli, whose head-quarters were at Ceva, was ordered to defend the Stura and Tanaro. The centre, under the command of d'Argenteau fixed their head-quarters at Sasello, and marched on Montenotte to intercept the French army, during its march on Genoa, by falling on its left flank, and cutting it off from the road of la Corniche. Beaulieu in person marched with his left, by the Bocchetta, on Voltri to cover Genoa.

At first sight these dispositions appeared to be

skilfully made; but on a more attentive examination of local circumstances, it was discovered that Beaulieu was dividing his forces, as no communication was practicable between his centre and his left, except round the back of the mountains; whilst the French army, on the contrary, was stationed in such a manner as to be able to unite in a few hours, and fall, in a mass, on either of the enemy's corps; on the defeat of one of which the other would be absolutely compelled to retreat. General d'Argenteau, commanding the centre of the enemy's army, encamped at Lower Montenotte, on the 10th of April; on the 11th he marched on Montelegino, to debouch by la Madonna on Savona. Colonel Rampon, who was ordered to guard the three redoubts of Montelegino, having received intelligence of the enemy's march, pushed forward a strong reconnoitring party to meet him, which was driven back from noon to two o'clock, when it regained the redoubts, which d'Argenteau attempted to carry by assault. He was repulsed by Rampon in three consecutive attacks; and as his troops were fatigued, he took up a position, intending to turn the redoubts in the morning in order to reduce them. Beaulieu debouched on Genoa on the 10th; he attacked General Cervoni, before Voltri, the same day; the latter defended his position throughout the day, took up another on Mount

la Fourche on the 11th, fell back in the course of the evening and night, and rejoined his division, that of Laharpe, which on the 12th before day-light was in position in the rear of Rampon, on Montelegino. During the night Napoleon marched with Augereau's and Massena's divisions; the latter by the Col di Cadibona and by Castellazzo debouched behind Montenotte. At day-break on the 12th, d'Argenteau, surrounded on all sides, was attacked in front by Rampon and Laharpe, and in rear and flank by Massena's division; the rout of the enemy was complete; they were all killed, taken, or dispersed: four stand of colours, five pieces of cannon, and 2000 prisoners were the trophies of this day. During these occurrences Beaulieu presented himself at Voltri, but found nobody there; he conferred, without impediment, with the English admiral Nelson; it was not until the 13th that he heard of the loss of the battle of Montenotte and the entrance of the French into Piedmont. He was then obliged to make his troops fall back precipitately, and repass the bad roads into which the dispositions he had made had led him. Such was the circuit he was obliged to take, that two days elapsed before part of his troops could reach Millesimo, and he was twelve days in evacuating his magazines at Voltri and la Bocchetta, which compelled him to leave troops there to protect them.

V.

On the 12th the head-quarters of the army reached Carcari; the Piedmontese had retreated on Millesimo, and the Austrians on Dego. These two positions were connected by a Piedmontese brigade, which occupied the heights of Biestro: at Millesimo the Piedmontese occupied both sides of the road which covers Piedmont; they were joined by Colli, with all the force he could muster from the right. At Dego the Austrians occupied the position which defends the Acqui road, the direct road to the Milanese: they were joined by Beaulieu with all the force he could bring from Voltri. In this position General Beaulieu was conveniently situated for receiving all the reinforcements which Lombardy could afford him: thus the two great openings into Piedmont and the Milanese were covered. The enemy was in hopes to fix and intrench himself there; for, advantageous as the battle of Montenotte had been to the French, the superiority of the enemy in number had enabled him to repair his losses.

But on the next day but one, the 14th, the battle of Millesimo opened the two roads of Turin and Milan. Augereau, forming the left, marched on Millesimo; Massena with the centre advanced on Biestro and Dego; and Laharpe with the right proceeded by the heights of Cairo.

The French army thus occupied four leagues of ground from right to left; the enemy had supported his right by causing the hill of Cossaria, which commands both branches of the Bormida, to be occupied. But on the 13th General Augereau, whose troops had not engaged at the battle of Montenotte, attacked the right of the enemy with such impetuosity that he carried the defiles of Millesimo, and surrounded the hill of Cossaria. The Austrian general, Provera, with his rear-guard 2000 strong, was cut off: in this desperate condition, he resorted to a desperate expedient; he took refuge in an old ruined castle, where he barricaded himself. From its top he saw the Sardinian army making dispositions for the battle of the following day, and conceived hopes of being extricated. Napoleon was sensible of the urgent importance of gaining possession of the castle of Cossaria in the course of the 13th, but this post was too strong; several attacks failed: the next day the two armies engaged. Massena and Laharpe carried Dego, after an obstinate conflict; Menard and Joubert took the heights of Biestro. All Colli's attacks, for the purpose of delivering Provera, were fruitless; he was constantly beaten and closely pursued: Provera, in despair, laid down his arms. The enemy was briskly pursued into the gorges of Spigno, on the Acqui road, by 400 men of the

22d chasseurs, 7th hussars, and 15th dragoons, and left behind him thirty pieces of horse-artillery, sixty ammunition waggons, fifteen stand of colours, and 6000 prisoners, amongst whom were two generals and twenty-four superior officers. The General-in-chief was every where present at the most decisive moments.

The separation of the Austrian and Sardinian armies was thenceforth very evident. Beaulieu removed his head-quarters to Acqui on the Milanese road; and Colli proceeded to Ceva, to oppose the junction of Serrurier, and to cover Turin.

VI.

In the mean time Wukassowich's division of Austrian grenadiers, which had been directed from Voltri by Sassello, reached Dego at three in the morning of the 15th of April. The position was then occupied only by a few French battalions: these grenadiers easily carried the village, and occasioned great alarm at the French head-quarters, where it was found difficult to conceive how the enemy could be at Dego, when the advanced posts stationed on the Acqui road were undisturbed. Napoleon marched to Dego, which place was retaken after a very hot action of two hours, and nearly the whole of the enemy's division were taken or killed. Adjutant-

general Lanusse, who was afterwards a general of division, and fell at the battle of Alexandria in Egypt (in 1801), decided the victory, which for a moment appeared doubtful. At the head of two battalions of light troops, he climbed the left side of the hill of Dego; some battalions of Hungarian grenadiers hastened up to prevent their reaching the summit: the two columns thrice advanced and fell back again; but the third time, Lanusse, placing his hat on the point of his sword, boldly advanced and decided the victory. This action, which took place in the sight of the General-in-chief, obtained Lanusse the rank of brigadier-general. Generals Causse and Bonnel were killed; they came from the Eastern Pyrenees; the officers who had served in that army always displayed remarkable courage and impetuosity. It was at the village of Dego that Napoleon, for the first time, took notice of a lieutenant-colonel whom he made a colonel: this was Lannes, who afterwards became a marshal of the empire, and duke of Montebello, and evinced the greatest talents: in the sequel he will be constantly seen taking a most conspicuous part in all events.

After the action at Dego, operations were directed against the Piedmontese, and it was thought sufficient to keep the Austrians in check. Laharpe was placed in observation at the camp

of San-Benedetto on the Belbo; Beaulieu was so much weakened that he attempted nothing more than to rally and organize the wreck of his army. Laharpe's division, being obliged to remain several days in this position, suffered through the scarcity of provisions, the want of means of conveyance, and the exhausted state of this country through the presence of so many troops; and this division abandoned itself to some disorders.

Serrurier, having heard at Garessio of the battles of Montenotte and Millesimo, occupied the heights of San Giovanni di Murialto, and entered Ceva on the same day that Augereau arrived on the heights of Montezemoto. On the 17th, after a fruitless resistance, Colli evacuated the intrenched camp of Ceva, repassed the Tanaro, and retreated behind the Corsaglia, occupying la Madonna di Vico by his right. On the same day the head-quarters were advanced to Ceva; the enemy having left there the artillery of his camp, which he had not had time to carry off, and contented himself with placing a garrison in the fort.

The arrival of the army on the heights of Montezemoto was a sublime spectacle: from that position the troops beheld the immense and fertile plains of Piedmont; the Po, the Tanaro, and a multitude of other rivers meandered in the

distance; in the horizon a white girdle of snow and ice bounded this rich valley of the promised land. Those gigantic barriers, which appeared the limits of another world, which nature had delighted to render formidable, and on which art had lavished all its resources, had fallen as by enchantment. "Hannibal forced the Alps," said Napoleon, contemplating those mountains, "and we have turned them." A happy expression, which in two words conveyed the idea and principle of the campaign. The army passed the Tanaro, and for the first time found itself in the plains: the cavalry became necessary; General Stengel, who commanded it, passed the Corsaglia at Lezegno on the right bank of that river, near its junction with the Tanaro.

VII.

On the 20th General Serrurier passed the bridge of Saint-Michel to attack the right of Colli's army, whilst Massena was passing the Tanaro to turn his left: but Colli, sensible of the danger of his position, had abandoned it during the night, and was himself marching on his right, to take position at Mondovi. By this fortuitous circumstance, he arrived with his forces before Saint-Michel, precisely at the moment when Serrurier was debouching from the bridge. He halted, opposed Serrurier with

superior numbers, and compelled him to fall back. The French general would nevertheless have maintained his ground in Saint-Michel, had not one of his light infantry regiments taken to pillage. He debouched on the 22d by the bridge of Torre, Massena by that of Saint-Michel, the General-in-chief by Lezegno. These three columns advanced on Mondovi: Colli had already raised some redoubts and taken up a position there, with his right on la Madonna di Vico, and his left on la Bicoque. Serrurier carried the redoubt of la Bicoque, and decided the battle of Mondovi. This town and all its magazines fell into the power of the victor. General Stengel, who had advanced too far into the plain, with a thousand horse, in pursuit of the enemy, was attacked by the Piedmontese cavalry, which was brave and in excellent condition. He made every disposition that might be expected from a consummate general, and was operating his retreat on his reinforcements, when, in a charge, he received a mortal thrust and fell dead. Colonel Murat, at the head of three regiments of cavalry, repulsed the Piedmontese, and in his turn pursued them for several hours. General Stengel, a native of Alsace, was an excellent hussar officer; he had served under Dumouriez, and in the other campaigns of the North; he was adroit, intelligent, and active, combining the

qualities of youth with those of maturity; he was the true general for advanced posts. Two or three days before his death, having been the first to enter Lezegno, the General-in-chief arrived some hours later, and found every thing he could want ready. The defiles and fords had been reconnoitred; guides had been secured; the curate and post-master had been interrogated; an understanding had been entered into with the inhabitants; spies had been sent in several directions; the letters at the post-office seized, and those which contained any military information translated and analyzed; and all proper measures taken for forming magazines of provisions for the refreshment of the troops. Stengel, unfortunately, was near-sighted, an essential defect in his situation, and which proved fatal to him.

The loss of the Piedmontese in this battle amounted to 3000 men, eight pieces of cannon, ten stand of colours, and 1500 prisoners, amongst whom there were three generals. After the battle of Mondovi, the General-in-chief marched on Cherasco, Serrurier advanced on Fossano, and Augereau on Alba. Beaulieu had marched from Acqui on Nezza-della-Paglia with half his army, to make a diversion in favour of the Piedmontese, but too late; he fell back on the Po as soon as he heard of the treaty of Cherasco.

VIII.

These three columns entered Cherasco, Fossano, and Alba, all at the same time. Colli's head-quarters were at Fossano; Serrurier dislodged him thence. Cherasco, at the junction of the Stura and Tanaro, was a fortified place, but ill armed, and unfurnished with stores, because it was not a frontier place. This acquisition was important; not a moment was lost in putting it in a state of defence; its artillery-magazines contained every thing necessary for the completion of its armament. The French army passed the Stura, and arrived before the little town of Bra. Serrurier's junction had afforded the means of communication with Nice by Ponte-di-Nave; and reinforcements of artillery, with all the stores that could be got ready, arrived from thence. In all these actions the army had enriched itself with a great quantity of cannon and horses; many more of the latter were levied in the plain of Mondovi: a few days after entering Cherasco, the artillery could furnish sixty guns well supplied and horsed. The soldiers, who had been without distributions during the ten days of this campaign, now received them regularly: pillage and disorder, the usual attendants of rapid movements, ceased; discipline was restored; the appearance of the army was speedily improved

amidst the abundance and resources which this fine country afforded; besides, the losses had not been so great as might have been supposed. The rapidity of the movements, the impetuosity of the troops, and, above all, the art of always opposing them to the enemy in at least equal numbers, and often superior, added to the constant success obtained, had saved numbers of men. These losses, moreover, were repaired, soldiers arrived by every road from all the depôts and hospitals of the Riviera di Genoa, on the mere report of the victories gained, and of the abundance which the army enjoyed. The condition of the French army had previously been so wretched that it would almost be rash to describe it; for several years the pay received by the officers had only been eight francs per month; and the staff had been entirely on foot. Marshal Berthier preserved amongst his papers an order of the day, dated from Albenga, granting a gratification of three louis to each general of division. Cherasco is ten leagues from Turin, fifteen from Alessandria, eighteen from Tortona, twenty-five from Genoa, and twenty from Savona.

The Court of Sardinia no longer knew what course to adopt; its army was discouraged and partly destroyed; the Austrian army no longer thought of any thing but covering Milan.

Throughout Piedmont great agitation prevailed; the Court was far from enjoying the confidence of the public; it placed itself at Napoleon's discretion, and solicited an armistice. Many persons would have preferred marching on Turin; but Turin was a fortified place; heavy cannon would have been requisite for forcing its gates. The King still had a great number of fortresses; and notwithstanding the victories which had just been gained, the slightest check, the least caprice of fortune, might overturn every thing. The two armies of the enemy were still, taken together, superior to the French army, notwithstanding the reverses they had sustained; they had a considerable train of artillery, and their cavalry, in particular, had suffered no loss. The French troops, in spite of their victories, were alarmed; they were struck with the magnitude of the enterprise; success appeared problematical when the feeble means that were to produce it were considered; they were disposed to exaggerate the least reverse. There were officers, and even generals, who could not conceive how any one could dare to think of the conquest of Italy with so little artillery, so bad a cavalry, and so feeble an army, which sickness and the distance from France would daily weaken still more. Traces of these sentiments in the army may be seen in the proclamation which the

General-in-chief addressed to his soldiers at Cherasco.

" Soldiers, you have, in fifteen days, gained " six victories, taken twenty-one stand of co- " lours, fifty-five pieces of cannon, and several " fortresses, and conquered the richest part of " Piedmont; you have taken 15,000 prisoners, " and killed or wounded upwards of 10,000 men. " Hitherto you have fought for barren rocks, " now celebrated through your valour, but use- " less to the country; but your services now " equal those of the Armies of Holland and the " Rhine. You were utterly destitute; and you " have supplied all deficiencies. You have " gained battles without cannon, passed rivers " without bridges, performed forced marches " without shoes, and bivouacked without brandy, " and often without bread. None but republican " phalanxes, the soldiers of liberty, could have en- " dured what you have; thanks be to you, soldiers, " for your exertions. Your grateful country owes " its prosperity to you; and if the conquest of " Toulon was an omen of the immortal cam- " paign of 1793, your present victories foreshow " one still more glorious. The two armies which " lately attacked you with confidence now fly " before you in consternation; the perverse men " who laughed at your distress, and inwardly " rejoiced at the triumphs of your enemies, are

" confounded and trembling. But, soldiers, you " have yet done nothing, for there still remains " much to do. Neither Turin nor Milan are " yours; the ashes of the conquerors of Tarquin " are still trodden under foot by the assassins of " Basseville. It is said that there are some " amongst you whose courage is enervated; who " would prefer returning to the summits of the " Apennines and Alps! No, I cannot believe it. " The victors of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, " and Mondovi, are eager to extend the glory of " the French people!"

Conferences on the subject of a suspension of hostilities were held at head-quarters in the house of Salmatoris, then maitre-d'hotel to the King of Sardinia, and afterwards prefect of the palace to Napoleon. The Piedmontese General Latour, and Colonel Lacoste were charged with the King's powers. Count Latour was an old soldier, a lieutenant-general in the Sardinian service, decidedly hostile to all new ideas, of little information, and but moderate capacity. Colonel Lacoste, a native of Savoy, was in the prime of life; he expressed himself with facility, was a man of talent, and made a favourable impression. The conditions were: That the King should secede from the coalition, and send a plenipotentiary to Paris to treat for a definitive peace; that in the mean time there should be an armistice;

that Ceva, Coni, and either Tortona or Alessandria, should immediately be surrendered to the French army, with all their artillery and stores; that the army should continue to occupy all that part of the country which was then actually in its possession; that a free communication should be allowed by the military roads in all directions from the army to France, and from France to the army; that Valenza should immediately be evacuated by the Neapolitans, and placed in the possession of the French general until he should have effected the passage of the Po; and lastly, that the militia of the country should be disbanded, and the regular troops dispersed in the garrisons so as to give no umbrage to the French army.

From that moment the Austrians, left to themselves, might be pursued into the interior of Lombardy. Part of the troops of the Army of the Alps, which had now become disposable, were about to descend into Italy. The line of communication with Paris was shortened by one half; and lastly, we had points of *appui* and grand depôts of artillery to form our battering trains, and to besiege Turin itself, if the Directory should not accede to the peace.

IX.

The armistice being concluded, and the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Ceva occupied, it became a subject of deliberation whether to advance, and how far? It was allowed that the armistice by which all the fortresses had fallen, and the Piedmontese army had been separated from that of Austria, was useful; "But would it "not be still more advantageous to avail ourselves "of the means already acquired, and to revolu- "tionize Piedmont and Genoa completely, pre- "viously to any farther advance? The French "government possessed the right of refusing the "negotiations proposed, and of declaring its will "by an ultimatum. Would it not be impolitic "to remove farther from France, and pass the "Ticino, without securing the rear? The kings "of Sardinia, who have been so useful to France "as long as they remained faithful, have likewise "been the most effectual contributors to her re- "verses when they changed their policy. At this "time the disposition of that Court does not "allow of the slightest misapprehension. The "nobles and priests rule it; they are the irre- "concilable enemies of the republic. If we "advance and suffer a defeat, what shall we not "have to dread from their hatred and revenge? "Even Genoa may well excite much anxiety.

"The oligarchical system still predominates "there; and however numerous the partisans of "France may be, they are without influence in "political decisions. The Genoese citizens may "declaim as much as they please, but that is the "extent of their power. The Oligarchs govern; "they command the troops, and have at their "disposal from eight to ten thousand peasants "of Fontana-Bona and other valleys, whom they "summon to their aid when they want them. "Lastly, are we to stop after passing the Ticino, "or to pass the Adda, the Oglio, the Mincio, "the Adige, the Brenta, the Piave, the Taglia-"mento, and the Isonzo? Is it prudent to leave "in our rear such a numerous and hostile popula-"tion? In order to proceed rapidly, is it not best "to proceed deliberately, and to form points of "support in every country we occupy, by chang-"ing the government, and intrusting the admi-"nistration to persons of the same principles "and interests as ourselves? If we advanced "into the Venetian countries, should we not "oblige the Republic of Venice, which has "50,000 men at its disposal, to side with the "enemy?"

To all this it was answered: "The French "army ought to profit by its victory: it ought "not to halt except on the best line of defence "against the Austrian armies which will speedily

" debouch from the Tyrol and the Frioul. This " line is the Adige: it covers all the valleys of " the Po; it cuts off lower and middle Italy; it " insulates the fortified city of Mantua, which may " probably be taken before the enemy's army " can recover itself, and be in a situation to suc- " cour it. It was through overlooking this princi- " ple that Marshal Villars missed the whole object " of the war in 1733. He was at the head of " 50,000 men assembled at the camp of Vigevano " in October; there was no army before him, " and he might have gone wherever he would. " He confined himself to remaining in observa- " tion of the Oglio, occupying positions on both " sides of the Po; having thus lost the oppor- " tunity, he never found another. Three months " after, Mercy arrived in the Seraglio with an " army. Marshal de Coigny, although at the " head of a very superior army during the whole " campaign of 1734, and victorious in two " pitched battles, those of Parma and Guastalla, " did not know how to take advantage of such " great successes; he manœuvred alternately on " the two banks of the Po. Had these generals " been well acquainted with the topography of " Italy, Villars would have taken up a position " on the Adige in the month of November, thus " intercepting all Italy; and Coigny would have " availed himself of his victories to hasten thither " with all possible despatch.

" On the Adige it is easy to provide for all the " expenses of the army, because the burthen will " be divided amongst a great population—that of " Piedmont, Lombardy, the Legations of Bologna " and Ferrara, and the Duchies of Parma and " Modena. Is it feared that Venice will declare " war against France? The best way of pre- " venting her, is to carry the war, in a few days, " into the midst of her states: she is not pre- " pared for such an event; she has not had time " to levy troops and form resolutions; the Senate " must be prevented from deliberating. If the " army remain on the right bank of the Ticino, " the Austrians will force that republic to make " common cause with them, or she will throw " herself into their arms, under the influence of " party spirit. The King of Sardinia is no longer " formidable; his militia is disbanded; the Eng- " lish will stop their subsidies; the domestic " affairs of that country are in the worst state " possible. Whatever course the court adopts, " the number of malcontents will increase; after " fever comes debility. All his remaining forces " do not amount to more than from fifteen to " eighteen thousand men; and these, dispersed " through a great number of towns, will scarcely " suffice to maintain internal tranquillity. Be- " sides, the dissatisfaction of the Court of Vienna " with the Cabinet of Turin will be constantly

" increasing: the latter will be reproached by " Austria with having despaired of the common " cause on the loss of a single battle. It was not " thus that Victor Amadeus acted in 1705, after " the victory gained by Vendome at Cassano, " when Prince Eugene was driven back to the " banks of lake Iseo, and when three French " armies invaded all his dominions, even the " county of Nice: he had nothing left but Turin; " yet he remained firm, and persisted in his al- " liance with Austria. He was rewarded the " following year by the battle of Turin, in which " he re-conquered all his territories, in conse- " quence of that most daring march by Prince " Eugene, which it pleased fortune to crown " with the most signal success.

" There is nothing to fear from the oligarchs of " Genoa; the best guarantee against them is to " be found in the immense profits they make by " their neutrality. It is wished to protect the " principles of liberty in Piedmont and Genoa; " but for that purpose a civil war must be kindled, " the people must be excited to revolt against " the nobles and priests; and this course will in- " cur the responsibility of all the excesses which " such contests never fail to occasion. On the " other hand, the army, on reaching the Adige, " will command all the States of the house of " Austria in Italy, and all those of the Pope on

" this side of the Apennines; it will be in a " situation to proclaim the principles of liberty, " and to excite Italian patriotism against the " sway of foreigners. It will not be necessary " to sow dissension between the various classes " of citizens. Nobles, citizens, and peasants, " will all be called on to exert themselves una- " nimously for the restoration of the Italian na- " tion. The word *Italiam! Italiam!* proclaimed " at Milan, Bologna, and Verona, will produce a " magical effect. But were it pronounced on " the right bank of the Ticino, the Italians would " say, *Why do you not advance?*"

Colonel Murat, principal aide-de-camp, was despatched to Paris with twenty-one stand of colours and the treaty for the armistice of Cherasco. His arrival at Paris, by way of Mount Cenis, with so many trophies and the King of Sardinia's act of submission, caused great joy in the capital, and excited the most lively enthusiasm. The aide-de-camp Junot, who had been despatched after the battle of Millesimo by the Nice road, arrived after Murat.

The province of Alba, the whole of which the French occupied, was more hostile to the royal authority than any other part of Piedmont, and that which contained the greatest quantity of revolutionary germs. Some disturbances had already broken out, and others occurred at a

later period. If the French had wished to continue the war against the King of Sardinia, they would have found the most aid and the greatest disposition to insurrection in that province. Thus, in fifteen days, the principal point of the plan of the campaign was secured. Great results were obtained; the Piedmontese fortresses of the Alps had fallen; the coalition was deprived of the aid of a power which furnished from sixty to seventy thousand men, and was still more important on account of its situation. In the course of a month from the commencement of this campaign, the legislature five times decreed that the Army of Italy had deserved well of its country; in the sittings of the 21st, 22d, 24th, 25th, and 26th of April; and each time for new victories.

According to the conditions of the armistice of Cherasco, the King of Sardinia sent Count Revel to Paris to treat for a definitive peace; which treaty he concluded and signed on the 15th of May 1796. By this treaty the fortresses of Alessandria and Coni were surrendered to the Army of Italy; Suza, la Brunette, and Exilles, were demolished, and the Alps opened: thus the King of Sardinia was placed at the mercy of the Republic, having no other fortified points than Turin and Fort Bard.

CHAPTER VI.

BATTLE OF LODI.

I. Passage of the Po (May 7).—II. Action of Fombio (May 8).—III. Armistice granted to the Duke of Parma (May 9).—IV. Battle of Lodi (May 10).—V. Entrance into Milan (May 14).—VI. Armistice granted to the Duke of Modena (May 20).—VII. Berthier.—VIII. Massena.—IX. Augereau.—X. Serrurier.

I.

THE gates of the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Mantua, were opened to the French in the beginning of May. Massena marched with his division to Alessandria, where he captured numerous stores belonging to the Austrian army. The head-quarters reached Tortona, by way of Alba, Nizza-della-Paglia, and the convent of Bosco. Tortona was a very fine fortress; it was abundantly provided with artillery and military stores of all kinds. Beaulieu had retreated in consternation beyond the Po to cover Milan; he intended to defend the passage of the Po, opposite Valenza, and after that passage should be

forced, to dispute those of the Sesia and Ticino. He stationed his troops on the left bank of the Cogna, at the camp of Valeggio; he was there reinforced by a reserve of ten battalions, which made his army equal to the French force. In all the military and political arrangements, Valenza had been designated as the place where the French would attempt the passage of the Po. In the conferences at Cherasco this supposition had been suffered to appear, though in a mysterious manner. An article in the concluding part of the armistice prescribed the surrender of that town to the French, to enable them to effect the passage of the river. Scarce had Massena reached Alessandria when he pushed forward parties in the direction of Valenza. Augereau set out from Alba, and encamped at the mouth of the Scrivia. Serrurier repaired to Tortona, where Laharpe had arrived by the Acqui road. The grenadiers of the army had been assembled there to the number of 3500; they formed ten battalions. With these choice troops, the cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of cannon, Napoleon advanced by forced marches on Placenza, to surprise the passage of the Po. The moment the intended passage was unmasked, all the French divisions abandoned their positions, and marched with all possible speed on Placenza. On the 7th of May, at nine o'clock in the morning, he

arrived before that town, having marched sixteen leagues in thirty-six hours. He proceeded to the bank of the river, where he remained until the passage was effected, and the van was on the opposite bank. The ferry-boat of Placenza carried 500 men or 50 horses, and crossed in half an hour. Colonel Andreossy of the artillery, director of the bridges, and Adjutant-general Frontin had taken, on the Po, between Castel-Saint-Joane and Placenza, ten boats carrying 500 wounded men, and the pharmacy of the Austrian army. Colonel Lannes passed first, with 900 grenadiers. Two squadrons of the enemy's hussars in vain attempted to oppose their landing. A few hours after, the whole of the van was on the opposite side. In the night of the 7th the whole army arrived; on the 9th the bridge was completed. In the evening of the 7th, General Laharpe, commanding the grenadiers, fixed his head-quarters at Emetri, between Fombio and the Po. This river is very rapid at Placenza; it is two hundred and fifty toises in breadth. The passage of rivers of such importance is amongst the most critical of military operations.

II.

Liptay's division of the Austrian army consisting of eight battalions and eight squadrons,

having marched from Pavia, arrived during the night at Fombio, one league from the bridge of Placenza. On the 8th, in the afternoon, it was discovered that the steeples and houses of the village were embattled and filled with troops; and that cannon were planted on the roads, which crossed some rice-fields. It became of the utmost importance to dislodge the enemy from Fombio. He might receive great reinforcements; it would have been much too dangerous to be compelled to give battle with so large a river in the rear. Napoleon gave orders for such dispositions as the nature of the ground required. Lannes attacked on the left; Lanusse in the centre; Dallemagne on the right: in one hour the village was carried, and the Austrian division which defended it routed, with the loss of their cannon, 2500 prisoners, and three standards. The wrecks of this corps threw themselves into Pizzighettone, and there passed the Adda. A few days before, the fortress of Pizzighettone had not been put in a state of defence, and was considered so far from the theatre of war and from all danger, that the enemy had not thought of it; but Liptay had time enough to raise the drawbridges and place some field-artillery on the ramparts. The French van-guard halted at night at the landing place of Malleo, at half cannon-shot distance from Pizzighettone. Laharpe exe-

cuted a retrograde movement, in order to place himself in advance of Codogno, and to cover the roads to Pavia and Lodi. It had been ascertained from the prisoners taken at Fombio, that Beaulieu was on his march to encamp with his army behind Fombio. It was therefore possible that some of his corps, not knowing what had taken place in the afternoon, might advance to Codogno to take up their quarters there; and the troops were instructed accordingly. After giving orders for the most vigilant look-out, the General-in-chief returned to his head-quarters at Placenza. During the night Massena passed the Po, and placed himself in reserve at the head of the bridge, to support Laharpe in case of need. What had been foreseen took place: the march of the troops from Tortona to Placenza, rapidly as it was executed, had not been so secret but that Beaulieu had received information of it. He put all his troops in march to occupy the country between the Ticino and the Adda, in hopes of arriving opposite Placenza in time to prevent the passage of the river; he knew that the French were unprovided with pontoons. One of the regiments of cavalry which preceded the column in which he was, presented itself at General Laharpe's advanced posts, coming by way of Pavia, and gave the alarm there. The bivouacs were speedily under arms; after a few

discharges they heard no more of the enemy; nevertheless Laharpe, followed by a piquet and several officers, went forward to ascertain what was the meaning of this attack, and to interrogate in person the inhabitants of the first farm-houses on the road, who told him that this alarm had been caused by a regiment of cavalry which was ignorant that the French had passed the Po, and that it had turned to the left to make for Lodi. Laharpe returned to his camp. But, instead of returning by the road by which the troops had seen him set out, he unfortunately took a by-path. The soldiers were on the watch; they received their general with a very brisk fire of musquetry. Laharpe fell dead, pierced by the bullets of his own soldiers. He was a Swiss of the canton of Vaud. His hatred of the government of Berne had exposed him to persecutions, from which he had sought an asylum in France. He was an officer of distinguished bravery; a grenadier both in stature and in courage; he commanded his troops skilfully, and was much beloved by them, though of an unquiet temper. It was remarked that during the action of Fombio, throughout the evening preceding his death, he had seemed very absent and dejected; giving no orders, appearing as it were deprived of his usual faculties, and entirely overwhelmed by a fatal presentiment. The news

of this melancholy event reached head-quarters at four in the morning. Berthier was instantly sent to this division of the vanguard, and found the troops in the greatest affliction.

III.

On entering the states of Parma, Napoleon received, at the passage of the Trebbia, envoys from the prince, requesting peace and his protection. The Duke of Parma was of no political importance; the seizure of his states could be of no advantage. Napoleon left him in possession of the government, imposing on him, as the conditions of the armistice, all the sacrifices of which his states were capable. Thus every benefit was obtained from them, without the trouble of undertaking the administration; this was the wisest and simplest course. On the morning of the 9th, the armistice was signed at Placenza. The duke paid two millions in money, furnished the magazines of the army with a great quantity of hay, wheat, &c., supplied sixteen hundred horses for the artillery and cavalry, and engaged to defray the expenses of all the military routes, and the hospitals which should be established in his states. It was on this occasion that Napoleon imposed a contribution of works of art for the Museum at Paris; being the first instance of the kind that occurs in modern

history. Parma furnished twenty pictures, chosen by the French Commissioners, amongst which was the famous Saint-Jerome. The duke offered two millions to be allowed to keep this picture; the opinion of the army-agents was decidedly in favour of the acceptance of the money. The General-in-chief said that there would very soon be nothing left out of the two millions proposed; whilst the possession of such a masterpiece by the city of Paris would be ornamental to that capital, and would produce other *chefs-d'œuvre* of art.

The city of Parma is situate thirty leagues from the gulf of Rapalo in the Mediterranean, at the same distance from the mouths of the Po in the Adriatic; sixty leagues from the mouth of the Var, the western frontier of Italy on the French side; twenty-five leagues from the Isonzo, the eastern frontier of Italy, and boundary of that country towards Germany; sixty leagues south from the pass of the Saint-Gothard, the boundary of Switzerland; two hundred and ten leagues from the Ionian sea; twenty leagues from Spezia, and four leagues from the Po. Its population was 40,000 souls. Its citadel was in a bad condition. The duchies of Parma, Placenza, and Guastalla, were possessed by the house of Farnese. Elizabeth, wife of Philip V., heiress of that house, brought these duchies into the house of Spain.

Don Carlos, his son, possessed them in 1714, who being afterwards called to the throne of Naples, these duchies passed to the house of Austria, in 1748, by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle; the infant Don Philip was invested with them, whose son Ferdinand succeeded him in 1762. He was Condillac's famous pupil, and died in 1802. He inhabited the castle of Colorno, surrounded with monks, and occupied with the most minute and rigid observance of religious practices.

IV.

The army levied four hundred artillery horses in the city of Placenza. On the 10th it marched from Casal-Pusterlengo on Lodi, where Beaulieu had effected the junction of Sebottendorf's and Roselmini's divisions, and had directed Colli and Wukassowich on Milan and Cassano. The fate of these last troops depended therefore on rapidity of marching. They might be cut off from the Oglio, and made prisoners; but within a league of Casal the French army met with a strong rear-guard of Austrian grenadiers, posted in an advantageous position, defending the Lodi road. It became necessary to manœuvre, which was performed with the utmost ardour, the enemy resisting with all the obstinacy which circumstances required; at length his ranks fell into disorder, and he was hotly pursued even

into the town of Lodi. This place was walled; the enemy attempted to close the gates, but the French soldiers entered pell-mell with the fugitives, who rallied behind the line of battle, which Beaulieu had taken up on the left bank of the Adda. This general unmasked from five and twenty to thirty pieces of cannon to defend the bridge; the French immediately opposed a like number to him. The strength of the Austrian line was 12,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, which, with the 10,000 who were retreating on Cassano, the 8000 who had been beaten at Fombio, and the remains of whom had retreated to Pizzighettone, and the 2000 of the garrison of the castle of Milan, made up about 35 or 36,000 men, being all that remained of the Austrian army.

Napoleon, in hopes of cutting off the division which was marching by Cassano, resolved to pass the bridge of the Adda the same day, under the enemy's fire, and to astonish them by so daring an operation. Accordingly, after a few hours' rest at Lodi, about five o'clock in the evening, he ordered General Beaumont, commanding the cavalry, to pass the Adda half a league above the town, where there was a ford which was then practicable; and as soon as he should reach the opposite side, to open a cannonade on the right flank of the enemy with a battalion of light artillery. At the same time he

placed at the debouché of the bridge and on the right bank all the disposable artillery of the army, directing it against the enemy's guns which enfiladed the bridge; he formed the grenadiers in close column behind the rampart of the town on the edge of the Adda, where it was nearer the enemy's batteries than the line of the Austrian infantry itself, (which had withdrawn to a distance from the river to take advantage of a rise in the ground which sheltered it from the balls of the French batteries,) and when he perceived the fire of the enemy's artillery slacken, he ordered the charge to be beaten. The head of the column, by a mere wheel to the left, reached the bridge, which it crossed at a running step, in a few seconds, and instantly took the enemy's cannon; the column was only exposed to the enemy's fire at the moment of wheeling to the left to pass the bridge. It accordingly reached the opposite side in a twinkling, without any sensible loss, fell on the enemy's line, broke it, and forced him to retreat on Crema in the greatest disorder, with the loss of his artillery, several stand of colours, and 2500 prisoners. This vigorous operation, conducted, under such a murderous fire, with all suitable prudence, has been regarded by military men as one of the most brilliant actions of the war. The French did not lose above 200 men; the enemy was

destroyed. But Colli and Wukassowich had passed the Adda at Cassano, and were retreating by the Brescia road, which determined the French to march on Pizzighettone; they considered it important to drive the enemy instantly from that fortress, before he should have time to put it in a state of defence and victual it; it was scarcely invested when it surrendered; it contained 300 men, whom the enemy sacrificed to facilitate his retreat. Napoleon, in his nightly rounds, fell in with a bivouac of prisoners, in which was an old garrulous Hungarian officer, whom he asked how matters went with them: the old captain could not deny but that they went on badly enough; "but," added he, "there "is no understanding it at all; we have to do "with a young general, who is this moment be- "fore us, the next behind us, then again on our "flanks; one does not know where to place "oneself. This manner of making war is insuf- "ferable, and against all usage and custom." The French cavalry entered Cremona after a brilliant charge, and pursued the Austrian rear-guard as far as the Oglio.

V.

No French troops had yet entered Milan, although that capital was several days' march in the rear of the army, which had posts at Cre-

mona. But the Austrian authorities had abandoned it, and taken refuge in Mantua. The town was guarded by the national guards. The municipality and the states of Lombardy sent a deputation to Milan, with Melzi at its head, to make a protest of their submission, and implore the clemency of the victor. It was in memory of this mission that the King of Italy afterwards created the duchy of Lodi, in favour of Melzi. On the 15th of May the victor made his entrance into Milan under a triumphal arch, amidst an immense population, and the numerous national guard of the city, clothed in the three colours, green, red, and white. At the head of this corps was the duke of Serbelloni, whom the members had chosen for their commander. Augereau retrograded to occupy Pavia; Serrurier occupied Lodi and Cremona; and Laharpe's division Como; Cassano, Lucca, and Pizzighettone, which place was armed and victualled.

Napoleon addressed the following order of the day to his men: "Soldiers, you have rushed "like a torrent from the top of the Apennines, "you have overthrown and dispersed all that "opposed your march. Piedmont, delivered from "Austrian tyranny, indulges her natural senti- "ments of peace and friendship towards France. "Milan is yours; and the republican flag waves "throughout Lombardy. The dukes of Parma

"and Modena are indebted for their political "existence only to your generosity. The army "which so proudly threatened you, can now "find no barrier to protect it against your cou- "rage; neither the Po, the Ticino, nor the Adda "could stop you a single day: these vaunted bul- "warks of Italy opposed you in vain; you passed "them as rapidly as the Apennines. These "great successes have filled the heart of your "country with joy; your representatives have "ordered a festival to commemorate your vic- "tories, which has been held in every commune "of the Republic. There your fathers, your "mothers, your wives, sisters and mistresses, "rejoiced in your victories, and proudly boasted "of belonging to you. Yes, soldiers, you have "done much.—But remains there nothing more "to perform?—Shall it be said of us that we "knew how to conquer, but not how to make "use of victory? Shall posterity reproach us "with having found Capua in Lombardy?—But "I see you already hasten to arms. An effemi- "nate repose is tedious to you; the days which "are lost to glory, are lost to your happiness. "Well then! let us set forth, we have still forced "marches to make, enemies to subdue, laurels "to gather, injuries to avenge. Let those who "have sharpened the daggers of civil war in "France, who have basely murdered our minis-

" ters, and burnt our ships at Toulon, tremble!
" The hour of vengeance has struck: but let the
" people of all countries be free from apprehen-
" sion; we are the friends of the people every
" where, and more particularly of the descend-
" ants of Brutus and Scipio, and the great men
" whom we have taken for our models. To
" restore the Capitol, to replace there the statues
" of the heroes who rendered it illustrious, with
" suitable honours, to awaken the Roman peo-
" ple, stupefied by several ages of slavery—such
" will be the fruit of our victories; they will
" form an historical era for posterity: you will
" have the immortal glory of changing the face
" of the finest part of Europe. The French peo-
" ple, free, and respected by the whole world,
" will give to Europe a glorious peace, which
" will indemnify her for the sacrifices of every
" kind which for the last six years she has been
" making. You will then return to your homes,
" and your countrymen will say, as they point
" you out, '*He belonged to the Army of Italy.*'"

The army spent six days of rest in improving its *matériel;* nothing was spared to complete the trains of artillery. Piedmont and the Parmesan had afforded great resources, but those found in Lombardy were much more considerable, and furnished the means of discharging the arrears of pay, supplying all the wants of the troops, and

establishing regularity in the different branches of the service.

Milan is situate in the midst of one of the richest plains in the world, between the Alps, the Po, and the Adda, thirty-two leagues from the summit of the Alps at the pass of the Saint-Gothard; eight leagues from the Po, six from the Ticino, six from the Adda, forty-three from Mount Cenis, twenty-eight from Genoa, twenty-eight from Turin, twenty-nine from Parma, and fifty-six from Venice. Its population was 120,000 souls; its circumference 10,000 toises; it had ten gates, one hundred and forty convents of men and women, and a hundred confraternities. The cathedral is the finest and most vaunted in Italy, next to St. Peter's at Rome; it is faced with white marble, was begun by Galeasso in 1300, and finished in 1810 by Napoleon. The hospital, the Ambrosian library, and a great number of fine palaces, adorn this city. The Naviglio forms its communication with the Ticino and the Adda; their waters unite in Milan by means of six locks. Another canal was constructed during the existence of the kingdom of Italy, to join Pavia and Milan, establish a direct communication with the Po, and facilitate intercourse with Genoa. The conveyance of goods from that city was effected by wheel-carriages as far as Cambio on the Po,

where they were embarked on that river, went by the lower Ticino to Pavia, and were there unloaded for Milan: but by means of the new canal they now proceed thence by water as far as Milan, whence they are again forwarded on the Adda. Milan was founded by the Gauls of Autun in the year 580 before the Christian era. This city has been besieged forty times, and twenty times taken. Its citadel was built on the ruins of the Palace of the Visconti; every thing there reminds one of Saint-Ambrose and Saint-Charles Borromeo. Under the Roman empire, Milan was the capital of Cisalpine Gaul. It was afterwards the capital of the kingdom of the Ostrogoths; was at the head of the league of the Lombard Republics in the 11th century; afterwards the strong hold of the Guelphs during the 12th and 13th centuries. Otho Visconti, one of the archbishops of Milan, favoured by the Guelphs, usurped the sovereignty, which the Visconti retained until 1450, when that family became extinct. The natural heiress, Valentina Visconti, wife of the duke of Orleans, who was assassinated by the duke of Burgundy, the grandfather of Louis XII., brought that duchy to the house of France. The Condottiere Francesco Sporza succeeded the Visconti. Louis XII. took possession of Milan in 1508, and it remained under the government of France until

1526, when Charles V. seized it, and bestowed it on Philip II. The kings of Spain possessed it until 1714, when it passed to the house of Austria, to which it still belonged in 1796.

Milan was the capital of Austrian Lombardy, which was divided into seven provinces; those of Milan, Pavia, Varese, Como, Lodi, Cremona, and Mantua. Lombardy had its particular privileges: the Emperor of Austria kept a prince of the blood there as governor-general, and confided most affairs of importance to his chief minister. The states of Lombardy were composed of deputies from the seven provinces, and were frequently in opposition to the governor-general and the Austrian minister. Amongst these deputies Count Melzi enjoyed the greatest credit, through his talents, patriotism, and integrity. He was afterwards president of the Italian republic, and chancellor of the kingdom of Italy. He was sincerely devoted to his country, and to the idea of the independence of Italy. His family was considered at Milan as one of those distinguished by nobility and wealth. On the liberation of Italy, green, white, and red became the national colours; national guards were established in all the towns. Serbelloni, the senior colonel of those of Milan, was the greatest landholder in the country; he enjoyed great popularity, and a very considerable fortune.

He was afterwards well known at Paris, where he long resided as ambassador from the Cisalpine republic. At Milan, as in all the great towns of Italy, and perhaps throughout Europe, the French Revolution at first excited the most lively enthusiasm, and found partisans every where; but at a later period, the hideous scenes acted during the Reign of Terror, dissipated these favourable sentiments. Yet revolutionary ideas still had warm partizans at Milan; the mass of the people was allured by the attraction of equality. The Austrians, notwithstanding their protracted rule, had not inspired the people of Lombardy with any feelings of attachment, with the exception of a few noble families; they were generally disliked on account of their pride and the rudeness of their manners. The governor-general, the archduke Ferdinand, was neither beloved nor esteemed; he was accused of being fond of money, of influencing the government in favour of depredations, of speculating in wheat, and other offences of this kind, which are always very unpopular. He was married to the princess Beatrice d'Este, daughter and heiress of the last duke of Modena, then reigning.

The citadel of Milan was in a good state of defence, and well supplied with provisions. Beaulieu had left in it a garrison of 2500 men. The French general Despinois was intrusted

with the command of Milan and the blockade of the citadel. The artillery department formed the besieging train by drawing the guns and military stores from the Piedmontese fortresses occupied by French garrisons, namely, Tortona, Alessandria, Coni, Ceva, and Cherasco.

VI.

The three duchies of Modena, Reggio and Mirandola, on the right bank of the lower Po, were governed by the last prince of the house of Este, a covetous old man, whose only pleasure was to amass gold. He was despised by his subjects. On the approach of the French, he sent the commander d'Este, his natural brother, to solicit an armistice and Napoleon's protection. The city of Modena was surrounded by a wall with bastions, and had a well-furnished arsenal; its military establishment was 4000 men. This prince was of no political importance; he was treated in the same manner as the duke of Parma, and without regard to his consanguinity to the house of Austria. The armistice was concluded and signed at Milan on the 20th of May. He paid ten millions, gave horses and provisions of all kinds, and a certain number of works of art. He sent plenipotentiaries to Paris to treat for peace, but it was not concluded; the negotiations went on slowly, and were at last broken off.

Wishing to place his treasures in security, he sought an asylum at Venice, where he died in 1798. On his death the house of Este, so famous in the middle ages, and celebrated with so much taste and genius by Ariosto and Tasso, became extinct. His daughter, the princess Beatrice, wife of the archduke Ferdinand, was the mother of the Empress of Austria, who died in 1816.

The successive arrivals of the news of the passage of the Po, the battle of Lodi, the occupation of Lombardy, and the armistices concluded with the dukes of Parma and Modena, so intoxicated the Directory, that it adopted the fatal plan of dividing the Army of Italy into two armies. Napoleon, with 20,000 men, was to pass the Po, and march on Rome and Naples; and Kellerman, with the other 20,000, was to command on the left bank of the Po, and to cover the siege of Mantua. Napoleon, indignant at this piece of ingratitude, sent in his resignation, refusing to be instrumental to the destruction of the Army of Italy and of his brethren in arms. He declared that all the men who should penetrate deep into the Peninsula would be lost; that the principal army, intrusted to Kellerman, would be inadequate to maintain its ground, and would be compelled to repass the Alps in a few weeks. One bad general, said he, is better than two good ones. The government became sensible of its

error, and recalled its liberticidal decrees; and from that time interfered no farther with the Army of Italy than merely to approve whatever Napoleon did or projected.

VII.

Berthier was then about forty-two years of age. His father, a geographical engineer, had had the honour of seeing Louis XV. and Louis XVI. occasionally, being employed to draw plans of the chases, and these princes being fond of pointing out the errors they discovered in the plans, on their return from hunting. Berthier, in his youth, served in the American war as lieutenant-adjoint to Rochambeau's staff; he was a colonel at the period of the Revolution, and commanded the National Guard of Versailles, where he strongly opposed Lecointre's party. Being employed in la Vendée as quarter-master-general of the revolutionary armies, he was wounded there. After the 9th of Thermidor he was quarter-master-general to General Kellerman, in the Army of the Alps, and followed him to the Army of Italy. He it was who caused the army to take the line of Borghetto, which stopped the enemy. When Kellerman returned to the Army of the Alps, he took Berthier with him; but when Napoleon took the command of the Army of Italy, Berthier solicited and ob-

tained the place of quarter-master-general, in which capacity he constantly followed Napoleon in the campaigns of Italy and Egypt. He was afterwards minister at war, major-general of the grand army, and prince of Neufchatel and Wagram. He married a Bavarian princess, and was loaded with favours by Napoleon. His activity was extraordinary; he followed his general in all his reconnoitring parties and all his excursions, without in the least neglecting his official duties. He was of an irresolute character, unfit for a principal command, but possessed of all the qualifications of a good quarter-master-general. He was well acquainted with the map, understood the reconnoitring duty perfectly; attended personally to the despatch of orders; and was thoroughly trained to presenting the most complicated movements of an army with perspicuity. There was an attempt made, at first, to disgrace him with his general, by describing him as Napoleon's Mentor, and asserting that it was he who directed operations; but this did not succeed. Berthier did all in his power to silence these reports, which rendered him ridiculous in the army. After the campaign of Italy, he had the command of the army ordered to take possession of Rome, where he proclaimed the Roman republic.

VIII.

Massena was born at Nice, and entered the French service in the Royal Italian regiment; he was an officer at the commencement of the Revolution. He advanced rapidly, and became a general of division. In the Army of Italy, he served under the generals in chief Dugommier, Dumorbion, Kellerman, and Scherer. He was of a hardy constitution, and an indefatigable character; night and day on horseback amongst rocks and mountains, the warfare peculiar to which he was particularly acquainted with. He was resolute, brave, intrepid, full of ambition and pride; his distinguishing characteristic was obstinacy; he was never discouraged. He neglected discipline, and took little care of the affairs of the army, for which reason he was not much beloved by the soldiers. He used to make very indifferent dispositions for an attack. His conversation was uninteresting; but on the report of the first cannon, amongst balls and dangers, his ideas gained strength and clearness. If defeated, he began again as if he had been victorious. After the campaign of Italy, he was commissioned to carry the preliminaries of Leoben to the Directory. During the campaign of Egypt, he was commander-in-chief of the army of Helvetia, and saved the Republic by winning

the battle of Zurich. He was afterwards a Marshal, duke of Rivoli, and prince of Essling.

IX.

Augereau, who was born in the faubourg Saint-Marceau, was a serjeant when the Revolution broke out. He must have been a distinguished sub-officer, for he was selected to go to Naples to instruct the Neapolitan troops. He at first served in La Vendée. He was made a general in the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees, where he commanded one of the principal divisions. On the peace with Spain he led his division to the Army of Italy, and served in all the campaigns of that army, under Napoleon, who sent him to Paris on the occasion of the 18th of Fructidor. The Directory afterwards gave him the chief command of the Army of the Rhine. He was incapable of conducting himself in this capacity, being uninformed, of a narrow intellect, and little education; but he maintained order and discipline amongst his soldiers, and was beloved by them. His attacks were regular, and made in an orderly manner; he divided his columns judiciously, placed his reserves with skill, and fought with intrepidity: but all this lasted but a day; victor or vanquished, he was generally disheartened in the evening; whether it arose from the peculiarity of his temper, or from the deficiency

of his mind in foresight and penetration. In politics he was attached to Babœuf's party, that of the most decided anarchists, and he was surrounded by a great number of them. He was nominated a deputy to the Legislative Body in 1798, engaged in the intrigues of the Manége, and frequently made himself ridiculous. The members of that society were not devoid of information; nobody could be less adapted than Augereau for political discussions and civil affairs, with which, however, he was fond of meddling. Under the empire, he became duke of Castiglione and Marshal of France.

X.

Serrurier was a native of the department of the Aisne; and at the commencement of the Revolution was a major of infantry: he retained all the formality and strictness of a major: was very severe in point of discipline, and passed for an aristocrat, in consequence of which opinion he ran great risks in the midst of the camps, especially during the first few years. He gained the battle of Mondovi, and took Mantua, and had the honour of seeing Marshal Wurmser file off before him. He was a brave man, of great personal intrepidity, but not fortunate. He had less energy than the other two, but excelled them by the morality of his character, the soundness of his

political opinions, and the strict integrity he observed in all his intercourse. He had the honourable commission to carry the colours taken from Prince Charles to the Directory. He was afterwards made a Marshal of France, governor of the *Invalides*, and a senator.

CHAPTER VII.

REVOLT OF PAVIA.

I. The army quits its cantonments to take up the line of the Adige.—II. Revolt of Pavia (May 24).—III. Taking and sack of Pavia (May 26).—IV. Causes of this revolt.—V. The army enters the territories of the Republic of Venice (May 28).—VI. Battle of Borghetto; passage of the Mincio (May 30).—VII. The army arrives on the Adige (June 3).—VIII. Description of Mantua.—IX. Blockade of Mantua (June 4).—X. Armistice with Naples (June 5).

I.

On the opening of the campaign, the city of Mantua was disarmed. The Court of Vienna was in hopes that its army would assume and preserve the offensive: it calculated on victories, not on defeats; and it was not until after the treaty of Cherasco, that it ordered Mantua and the fortresses of Lombardy to be armed and victualled. Some military men have been of opinion that if the French army, instead of taking up cantonments in the Milanese, had continued its march to drive Beaulieu beyond the Adige,

Mantua would have been surprised: but it would have been against all principle to leave so many large towns and a population of more than a million of inhabitants behind, without taking possession of the former, and ascertaining the dispositions of the latter. The French remained only seven or eight days in Lombardy. On the 27th of May all the cantonments were raised. These few days had been well employed; the French dominion was secured by the national guards formed in all the towns of Lombardy, the change of all the public authorities, and the new organization of the country. General Despinois took the command of Milan; a brigade invested the citadel; the divisions of infantry and cavalry formed small depôts of convalescents and wearied men, who kept garrison in the most important points; the depôt of Augereau's division, 300 strong, was collected in the citadel of Pavia, and seemed a sufficient force to guard that city and the bridge over the Ticino.

II.

On the 24th the head-quarters were fixed at Lodi. Two hours after the arrival of the General-in-chief at that place, he was informed of the insurrection of Pavia, and of all the villages of that province, which Augereau's division had quitted on the 20th. A slight commotion had even taken

place at Milan. He instantly set out again for that capital with 300 horse, six pieces of artillery, and a battalion of grenadiers. He arrived there the same evening, and found tranquillity restored. The garrison of the citadel, which had made a sortie to favour this revolt, had returned within its ramparts; the mobs had entirely dispersed. He proceeded to Pavia, sending on the archbishop of Milan before him, and despatching agents in all directions with proclamations for the information of the peasants. This archbishop was an old man of eighty, of the house of Visconti, respectable for his age and character, but without talent or reputation; his mission was wholly fruitless; he persuaded nobody. The insurgents of Pavia, who were to have joined the garrison of the castle of Milan, had pushed a vanguard of 800 men as far as Binasco. Lannes attacked it: Binasco was taken, pillaged, and burnt: it was hoped that the conflagration, which was visible from the walls of Pavia, would over-awe that city. This was by no means the case; 8 or 10,000 peasants had entered the town, and made themselves masters of it; they were led by some turbulent individuals and agents of Austria, who cared little for the misfortunes of the country, and, in case of failure, had secured means of reaching Switzerland. In the evening the fol-

lowing proclamation was published in Milan, and was posted, during the night, on the gates of Pavia: "A misled multitude, destitute of all "effectual means of resistance, is committing "the greatest excesses in several communes, "disregarding the republic, and defying the "army which has triumphed over kings; "this unaccountable delirium deserves pity; "these poor people are led astray and allured "to their destruction. The General-in-chief, "faithful to the principle adopted by his Nation "of not making war upon the people, is willing "to leave a door open to repentance; but after "twenty-four hours, those who shall not have "laid down their arms shall be treated as rebels; "their villages shall be burnt. Let the terrible "example of Binasco induce them to open "their eyes! its fate will be that of every com- "mune that persists in the revolt."

III.

On the 26th the French column left Binasco, and reached Pavia at four in the afternoon; the gates were closed. The French garrison had capitulated; the insurgents had for several hours been masters of the citadel; this success had emboldened them. It seemed a difficult thing, with only 1500 men and six field-pieces, to gain possession of a city containing 30,000

souls in a state of insurrection, enclosed within a wall, and even an ancient rampart with bastions, in very bad condition, it is true, but not to be taken by a *coup de main*. The tocsin was sounding throughout the adjacent country; the least retrograde step would have increased the evil and rendered it necessary to recall the army which had reached the Oglio. Under these circumstances temerity was the dictate of prudence; Napoleon risked the attack. The six pieces of artillery continued firing a long time, for the purpose of battering down the gates, but without success; the grape and shells, however, dislodged the peasants posted on the walls, and enabled the grenadiers to break down the gates with axes. They entered at the charge, debouched on the square, and lodged themselves in the houses at the tops of the streets. A troop of cavalry proceeded to the bridge of the Ticino, and made a successful charge; the peasants were fearful of being cut off, fled from the city, and gained the fields; the cavalry pursued them, and sabred a great number of them. The magistrates and principal inhabitants, with the archbishop of Milan and the bishop of Pavia at their head, then came to implore pardon. The 300 French who had been taken prisoners in the citadel, liberated themselves during this tumult, and came to the

square unarmed, and in bad plight. The General's first impulse was to have this garrison decimated. "Cowards," said he, "I intrust-"ed you with a post essential to the safety "of the army, and you have abandoned it to "a mob of wretched peasants, without offer-"ing the least resistance." The captain commanding this detachment was arrested. He was a weak man, and attempted to justify himself by an order given by General Haquin. The latter was coming from Paris; he had been stopped by the insurgents whilst changing horses at the post-house; they had clapped a pistol to his breast, threatening him with death unless he caused the citadel to surrender. He persuaded the garrison of the fort to deliver it up. But the guilt of General Haquin, however great, could not justify the commandant of the fort, who was, in no respect, under his command; and even if he had been so, ought to have ceased to obey, the moment the general was made prisoner; this captain was accordingly delivered over to a council of war, and shot. The confusion in the city was extreme. Fires were already lighted to set several quarters in flames; but compassion prevailed. The pillage, nevertheless, lasted several hours; but occasioned more fear than damage: it was confined to some goldsmiths' shops; but report exaggerated the

losses suffered by the city, which was a salutary lesson for all Italy. Light columns were sent into the country, and effected a general disarming. Hostages were taken throughout Lombardy, and the selection fell on the principal families, even when no suspicion attached to them. It was conceived to be advantageous that some of the persons of most influence should visit France. In fact they returned a few months after, several of them having travelled in all our provinces, where they had adopted French manners.

The city of Pavia is situate seven leagues from Milan, on the Ticino, two leagues from its junction with the Po. It is eight hundred and fifty toises in breadth, and two thousand five hundred in circuit; it has a stone bridge over the Ticino, the only one which crosses that river: it is surrounded by a rampart of bastions, in ruins, and was the capital of the monarchy of the Lombards. In the XIth and XIIth centuries this city was very powerful, and the rival of Milan, being the seat of the Ghibelline party, that of the emperors and nobles; whilst Milan was for the Guelphs, that is to say, on the side of the Popes and the people. In 1517, Francis I. by his own fault, lost the famous battle of Pavia, where he was taken prisoner. The University of Pavia is celebrated;

Volta, Spallanzani, Marcotti, Fontana, &c. were professors there.

IV.

This insurrection was attributed to the extraordinary contribution of twenty millions which had just been imposed, to the requisitions necessarily made by the army, and perhaps to some particular instances of oppression. The troops were destitute of clothing, which occasioned the titles of banditti and brigands, bestowed upon them by the enemy. The Lombards and other Italians did not consider themselves conquered; it was the Austrian army that had been defeated, there was no Italian corps in the Austrian service; the country even paid a tax to be exempt from recruiting: it was a settled principle with the Court of Vienna that it was impossible to make good soldiers of the Italians. This circumstance, the necessity under which the French army lay, of subsisting upon the local resources, materially retarded the progress of public spirit in Italy. If, on the contrary, the troops could have been maintained at the expense of France, numerous levies of Italians might have been raised at the very commencement. But to attempt to call a nation to liberty and independence, to require public spirit to arise amongst her inhabitants, to expect her to raise troops,

and at the same time to take away her principal resources, are two contradictory ideas, and their reconciliation is a proof of talent. Nevertheless, discontent, murmurs, and conspiracies existed at first. The conduct of a general in a conquered country, is surrounded with difficulties: if he is harsh he irritates his enemies, and increases their numbers; if he is gentle, he excites hopes which afterwards make the abuses and oppressions necessarily attached to a state of war the more severely felt. Nevertheless, if under such circumstances an insurrection be suppressed in time, and if the conqueror exert a mixture of severity, justice, and mildness, the affair will have a good effect, will be rather advantageous than otherwise, and will be a security for the future.

V.

In the mean time the army had continued its march on the Oglio, under the command of Berthier; the commander-in-chief rejoined it at Soncino, and on the 28th marched with it into Brescia, one of the largest towns of the Venetian Terra Firma; the inhabitants of which were discontented with the government of the Venetian nobles. Brescia is eleven leagues from Cremona, fifteen from Mantua, twenty-eight from Venice, twenty-four from Trent, and fourteen from Milan. It submitted to the Republic of Venice in 1426. Its inhabitants amount to 50,000; those of the

whole province to 500,000, some living in the mountains, others inhabiting rich plains. The following proclamation was posted: "It is to "deliver the finest country in Europe from the "iron yoke of the proud house of Austria, that "the French army has braved the most formida- "ble obstacles. Victory, uniting with justice, "has crowned its efforts with success; the "wreck of the enemy's army has retreated be- "yond the Mincio. In order to pursue them, "the French army enters the territory of the Re- "public of Venice, but it will not forget that the "two republics are united by ancient friendship. "Religion, government, and customs shall be "respected. Let the people be free from ap- "prehension, the severest discipline will be kept "up; whatever the army is supplied with shall be "punctually paid for in money. The General-in- "chief invites the officers of the Republic of Ve- "nice, the magistrates and priests, to communi- "cate his sentiments to the people, in order that "the friendship which has so long united the "two nations may be cemented by confidence. "Faithful in the path of honour as in that of vic- "tory, the French soldier is terrible only to the "enemies of his liberty and his government."

The Senate sent Proveditores to meet the army, to make protestations of its neutrality. It was agreed that the senate should supply

all necessary provisions, to be afterwards paid for. Beaulieu had received great reinforcements on the Mincio; on the first news of the movements of his army, he had removed his head-quarters behind the Mincio, being desirous to defend that river in order to prevent the investing of Mantua, the fortifications and supplies of which were daily increased. Disregarding the protestations of the Venetians, he forced the gates of the fortress of Peschiera, and made that place the *appui* of his right, which was commanded by General Liptay; he supported his centre on Valeggio and Borghetto, where he placed Pittony's division, while Sebottendorf's took up a position at Pozzuolo, and Colli's at Goito; the garrison of Mantua stationed posts on the Seraglio. The reserve, under Melas, 15,000 strong, encamped at Villa Franca, to advance on any point that should be menaced.

VI.

On the 29th of May, the French army had its left at Dezenzano, its centre at Montechiaro, and its right at Castiglione, wholly neglecting Mantua, which place it left on its right. On the 30th at day-break, it debouched on Borghetto, after having deceived the enemy by various movements, which led him to think it would pass the Mincio at Peschiera, and drew his reserve from

Villa Franca to that place. On approaching Borghetto, the French vanguard fell in with 3000 Austrian and Neapolitan cavalry in the plain, and 4000 infantry intrenched in the village of Borghetto, and on the heights of Valeggio. General Murat charged the enemy's cavalry; he obtained an important success in this action: it was the first time that the French cavalry, on account of its bad condition, had measured its strength to advantage with the Austrian cavalry: it took nine pieces of cannon, two standards, and 2000 men, amongst whom was the Prince de Cuto, who commanded the Neapolitan cavalry. From that time forth the French cavalry emulated the infantry. Colonel Gardane, who was marching at the head of the grenadiers, charged into Borghetto; the enemy burnt the bridge, which it was impossible to restore under the fire from the height of Valeggio. Gardane threw himself into the water; the Austrians imagined they saw the terrible column of Lodi, and beat a retreat; Valeggio was carried. It was then ten in the morning, by noon the bridge was restored, and the French divisions passed the Mincio. Augereau went up the left bank, advancing on Peschiera, and occupied the heights of Castel Nuovo; Serrurier followed the troops which were evacuating Valeggio and retiring on Villa Franca. The General-in-chief marched with this

division as long as the enemy was in sight, but, as they avoided an engagement, he returned to Valeggio, which place had been fixed on for head-quarters. Massena's division, appointed to cover Valeggio, was preparing dinner on the right bank of the Mincio, and had not yet passed the bridge. Sebottendorf's division, having heard the cannonade at Valeggio, had begun its march up the left bank of the river; their scouts approached Valeggio without meeting with any troops; they entered the town, and penetrated as far as the lodgings where the General-in-chief was; his piquet guard had barely time enough to shut the carriage gateway, and cry to arms, which afforded him an opportunity of mounting his horse and escaping through the gardens behind the house. Massena's soldiers overturned the kettles and passed the bridge. The sound of the drums put the Austrian hussars to flight. Sebottendorf was closely and vigorously pursued during the whole evening, and lost a great number of men.

The danger which Napoleon had incurred, convinced him of the necessity of having a guard of picked men trained to this service, and especially charged to watch over his personal safety. He formed a corps to which he gave the name of Guides. Major Bessieres was directed to organize it. This corps thenceforth wore the

uniform which was afterwards worn by the chasseurs of the guard, of which it was the nucleus: it was composed of picked men who had served ten years at least, and rendered great services in the field. Thirty or forty of these brave fellows, opportunely set on, always produced the most important results. The Guides had the same effect in a battle, as the squadrons on duty afterwards had under the Emperor; which is easily explained, because both were under his immediate direction, and he ordered them forward at critical moments.

Bessieres, who was born in Languedoc, served originally in the 22d chasseurs, in the army of the Eastern Pyrenees. He possessed a cool species of bravery, was calm amidst the enemy's fire; his sight was excellent, he was much habituated to cavalry manœuvres, and peculiarly adapted to command a reserve. In all the great battles he will be seen to render the greatest services. He and Murat were the first cavalry officers in the army, but of very opposite qualities. Murat was a good vanguard officer, adventurous and impetuous; Bessieres was better adapted for a reserve, being full of vigour, but prudent and circumspect. From the period of the creation of the Guides, he was exclusively intrusted with the duty of guarding the General-in-chief and the head-quarters. He was afterwards

duke of Istria, marshal of the Empire, and one of the marshals of the guard.

VII.

In order to cover the siege of Mantua and Italy, it was necessary for the French army to occupy the line of the Adige, and the bridges of Verona and Legnago. All the insinuations of the Proveditore Foscarelli against marching on Verona were fruitless. On the 3d of June, Massena took possession of that city, situate thirty-two leagues from Milan, twenty-five from Venice, and sixteen from Trent, with three stone bridges over the Adige. Ponte-Vecchio is sixty toises in length and has three arches; this town contains 60,000 inhabitants, and is handsome, large, rich, and very healthy. It became subject to the Venetians in 1405: its walls occupy both sides of the river, and are six thousand toises in extent: its forts are situate on the heights, commanding the left bank. Porto-Legnago was armed, and the army of observation occupied Montebaldo with its left, Verona with its centre, and the lower Adige with its right, thus covering the siege of Mantua. The object was attained; the tri-coloured flag waved on the passes of the Tyrol. It was now time to force Mantua, and take that bulwark from Austria: hopes were entertained of accomplishing this undertaking

before the arrival of the new Austrian army; but what battles, what events, what dangers were first to be encountered!

VIII.

Mantua is situate amidst three lakes formed by the waters of the Mincio, which springs from the Lake of Garda at Peschiera and runs into the Po near Governolo. The city then communicated with the town by means of five dykes; the first, that of la Favorite, which separated the upper from the middle lake, is a hundred toises in length; it is of stone, the mills of the town are built against it; it has two flood-gates for discharging the water; at its outlet is the citadel of la Favorite, a regular pentagon, tolerably strong, and protected, on several of its fronts, by inundations. It is by this causeway that people leave Mantua to go to Roverbella, and thence to Verona or Peschiera. The causeway of Saint-George is sixty toises long; it leads into the faubourg Saint-George; it is the road to Porto Legnago. This causeway was closed by a stone gate, and in the middle of the lake by drawbridges. The third dyke is the causeway of Pietoli; the lower lake is there only eighty toises wide; but the ground between the lake and the place is occupied by an intrenched camp under the place, with ditches full of water. The

fourth dyke is that of the gate of Ceresa, which leads to Modena; it was closed by a stone gate; the lake at that part, was of considerable breadth. Lastly, the fifth dyke or causeway was that of Pradella; it is two hundred toises long, and is the road to Cremona, defended by a hornwork placed in the midst of the lake. Thus, of the five causeways, that of la Favorite or Roverbella was the only one defended by a citadel; the four others were without defence; so that the besiegers, placing a handful of men at the extremities of these causeways, could blockade the garrison. In the time of the kingdom of Italy, there being an intention of completing this grand fortress, it was thought important to occupy all the *debouchés* of the dykes by fortifications; the engineer Chasseloup had a permanent fort constructed before the causeway of Pradella; so that it would now be necessary, in order to blockade Mantua, to blockade the four forts placed at the four outlets.

The Seraglio is the space comprised between the Mincio, Mantua, the Po, and la Fossa Maestra, a canal which runs from the Lake of Mantua into the Po at Borgo-forte: it is a triangle of five or six square leagues, an island. Mantua requires a garrison of at least 12,000 men; this garrison ought to maintain itself as long as possible in the Seraglio to make use of the resources

which are to be found there, the land being very fruitful, and in order to continue masters of the course of the Po, and draw supplies from the right bank of that river. Governolo was formerly fortified. The abbey of Saint-Benedetto, the central seat of the Benedictines, is on the right bank of the Po, opposite the mouth of the Mincio: the garrisons of Mantua make use of this abbey in time of peace, by fixing an hospital for convalescents there, the air being better than at Mantua.

IX.

The besieged, who were fully sensible of the importance of maintaining themselves at the head of the five causeways, proceeded with great activity in the construction of retrenchments there; but the French did not allow them sufficient time. On the 4th of June the General-in-chief proceeded himself to the faubourg Saint-George; carried it, after a brisk action, and drove the enemy into the place: they had scarcely time to raise the draw-bridges of the dyke; had they delayed a few minutes longer, the place itself would have been in danger. Augereau gained possession of the Ceresa gate after a firm resistance; the enemy evacuated Pietoli, and retired into the hornwork. The besiegers being thus masters of the heads of the four dykes, the besieged

could now make no sortie except by the citadel of la Favorite, so that the garrison was kept in check by a besieging army of inferior force. Serrurier was intrusted with the direction of the blockade; he fixed his head-quarters at Roverbella, as the point nearest to the citadel of la Favorite, on which he placed 3600 men in observation; 600 men were posted at Saint-George, 600 at Pietoli, 600 at Ceresa, and 1000 at Pradella; and 2000 men, including artillery, cavalry, and infantry, formed flying columns round the lakes, while a dozen gun-boats, manned by French seamen, cruised in them. Thus, with an army of only 8000 soldiers of all descriptions actually in the field, Serrurier blockaded a garrison amounting to 14,000 effective men, of whom more than 10,000 were under arms. It was not conceived necessary to form lines of circumvallation, which was an error; but the engineers held out hopes that the place would be surrendered before the Austrian army would be able to come to its relief. Undoubtedly such lines would have been of no use against Wurmser, when he revictualled the place on the eve of the battle of Castiglione. Napoleon, who then raised the blockade and abandoned his besieging train, would have also abandoned his lines of circumvallation; but when Wurmser was driven into Mantua after the battle of Bassano, it

is probable that if there had been lines of circumvallation, he would not have been able to force them, and would have been obliged to lay down his arms: this was the third blockade. When lines of circumvallation were constructed round Saint-George, they produced the surrender of the general's corps, and the success of the battle of la Favorite, in January 1797.

X.

The King of Naples, seeing Upper Italy in the power of the French, sent Prince Belmonte to head-quarters to request an armistice, which was signed on the 5th of January. The Neapolitan division of cavalry, of 2400 horse, quitted the Austrian army. A Neapolitan plenipotentiary repaired to France to conclude a definitive peace with the Republic. As the King of Naples could bring 60,000 men into the field, this armistice was an important event; and the more so as this prince, remote from the theatre of the war, is, on account of his geographical situation, out of the influence of an army commanding Upper Italy; it being 200 leagues from the Po to the extremity of the peninsula.

The General-in-chief found it difficult to induce the French government to adopt his policy; they wished to revolutionize Rome, Naples, and Tuscany, without calculating the distances,

chances, or strength they would have to contend with. They had formed erroneous ideas respecting the localities, the spirit of the people, and the power of the revolutionists. The principles of war which regulated the determinations of the cabinet, were erroneous, and contrary to rule.

Colonel Chasseloup commanded the engineers in the Army of Italy; he was made a general. He was one of the best officers of his corps; of an unsteady character, but well acquainted with all the resources of his art.

Lespinasse, who commanded the artillery, was an old officer of great personal bravery and zeal.

Dammartin, Sugny, and Songis, were officers of merit. The artillery general Dujard, who was sent to fortify the coasts of Nice and Provence, was assassinated in the Col di Tende by the Barbets.

Beaulieu, after all these disasters, fell into disgrace with his master; he was recalled, and Melas took the command of the Austrian army *ad interim*, and fixed his head-quarters at Trent. Marshal Wurmser was removed from the command of the Army of the Upper Rhine to that of Italy.

CHAPTER VIII.

MARCH ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE PO.

I. Motives of the march of the French army on the Apennines.—II. Insurrection of the Imperial Fiefs.—III. Entrance into Bologna and Ferrara (June 19).—IV. Armistice granted to the Pope (June 23).—V. Entrance into Leghorn (June 29).—VI. Napoleon at Florence.—VII. Revolt of Lugo.—VIII. Opening of the trenches before Mantua (July 18).—IX. Favourable posture of affairs in Piedmont and Lombardy.

I.

THE army had fulfilled its destination. It occupied the line of the Adige, covered the siege of Mantua, middle and lower Italy; and was in readiness to oppose the Austrian armies, whether they should debouch by the Tyrol, or the Frioul. The French could advance no farther until Mantua should be taken, and the princes of the right bank of the Po disarmed. But in order to besiege Mantua, a battering train was requisite: that of the army had been left at Antibes; that which had been formed of the

heavy cannon taken from the fortresses of Tortona, Coni, and Ceva, was engaged in the siege of the citadel of Milan: it was, therefore, of primary importance to accelerate the siege of that fortress.

Gerola, the Austrian minister at Genoa, had excited the Imperial Fiefs to insurrection, organized free companies, composed of the Austrian prisoners who had escaped and were daily escaping, of Piedmontese deserters, or natives of Piedmont, who had turned smugglers since the disbanding of the Piedmontese army. The oligarchy of Genoa contemplated with pleasure all the schemes put in execution by this minister to annoy the French army. The evil had become intolerable; the routes of the army by Genoa, Savona, and Nice, were almost intercepted, so that a battalion of 600 men had been compelled to fight several times in order to join the army. A prompt and efficacious remedy was necessary.

The Court of Rome was arming; and if its body of troops had been reinforced by the 6000 English in Corsica, a formidable diversion would have been effected on the right bank of the Po, the moment the Austrian army was ready to resume offensive operations. It was therefore necessary to repass the Po, force the Pope's army beyond the Apennines, compel the Court of Rome to conclude an armistice, pass the Apen-

nines, occupy Leghorn, drive out the English factory, unite the five or six hundred Corsican refugees in that city, and send them to Corsica to raise an insurrection, which would detain the English division there to defend itself. Marshal Wurmser, who had quitted the Rhine with 30,000 chosen troops, was marching on Italy. He could not arrive before the 15th of July; there were, then, thirty or forty days left, during which the necessary detachments might conveniently be spared, so as to return to the Adige by the middle of July.

II.

Napoleon repaired to Milan, had the trenches opened before the citadel, proceeded thence to Tortona, and directed a column of 1200 men, commanded by Colonel Lannes, to march into the Imperial Fiefs. Colonel Lannes entered Arquata after an obstinate resistance, shot the brigands who had slaughtered a detachment of 150 French, and demolished the chateau of the Marquis de Spinola, the principal instigator of these commotions. At the same time the aide-de-camp Murat proceeded to Genoa, and being introduced into the Senate by Faypoult, the minister of the republic, demanded and obtained the dismission of the governor of Novi, the expulsion of the Austrian agents, and the ambas-

sador Gerola from Genoa, and the establishment of columns of Genoese troops at the different halting-places, with instructions to clear the roads, to escort the French convoys, and to restore the safety of the communications.

General Augereau, with his division, passed the Po on the 14th of June, at Borgo-forte, reached Bologna and Ferrara in four marches, and took possession of these two legations, which belonged to the Pope. General Vaubois collected a brigade of 4000 men and 700 horses at Modena. Napoleon left Tortona, passed through Placenza, Parma, and Reggio, and on the 19th arrived at Modena. His presence electrified the people of those two cities, who loudly called for liberty; but the armistice was scrupulously observed by the Regency. He exerted all his influence to retain these people in the obedience they owed to their sovereign, and to still the ferment which existed amongst them. At Modena he accepted the fêtes which the Regency offered him, studied to inspire it with confidence, and to give it that respectability in the eyes of the people of which it stood in need. The old duke had long before fled to Venice with his treasures. The road from Modena to Bologna passes under the glacis of Fort Urbino, belonging to the Pope; this fort had old bastions and advanced works; it was armed, victualled, and

defended by a garrison of 800 men. The troops of Augereau's division, which had entered Bologna the same day, had not had time to take possession of it, or to blockade it. Colonel Vignoles, deputy quarter-master-general, advanced against it with 200 guides, and made the garrison capitulate; they surrendered as prisoners of war. The fort was lined with sixty pieces of cannon, half of which were forwarded to Borgo-forte, where was the park of the besieging train.

III.

Augereau's division found at Bologna a cardinal and 400 men, and took them prisoners. The cardinal obtained leave to go to Rome on his parole; a few months afterwards, as he conducted himself very ill, General Berthier sent him orders to return to head-quarters; he answered in a very specious style, that he was released from his parole by a brief from his Holiness, which caused much laughter in the army. In the citadel of Ferrara were found 114 pieces of cannon, with abundance of ammunition. Forty of these guns were sent to Borgo-forte.

Bologna is surnamed the *Learned.* It is situate at the foot of the Apennines, on the Reno, and contains from fifty to sixty thousand inhabitants. The Academy at Bologna, called the Institute of the Sciences, is the most renowned in Italy; its

noble streets are adorned with porticoes in arcades for the convenience of foot-passengers; it has a canal communicating with Venice. This city exercises a great influence over all the three legations, which were dissatisfied with the government of the Popes, a bastard, disgraceful government for all secular people. What can be worse, said they, than to be governed by priests? We have no country; we are ruled by men devoted to celibacy, who belong to the Christian religion, and consider affairs in a false point of view; they are accustomed from infancy to theological studies, which do not tend in the least to qualify them to judge of the affairs of the world. Bologna, in particular, was ardently desirous of liberty; that town and Brescia contained the warmest partisans, and those best disposed to work the triumph of the Italian cause. There was no place that testified a more sincere affection for the French than these. Bologna persisted in these sentiments; the entrance of the army was a triumph. Caprara, Marescalchi, and Aldini, deputies of the senate, did the honours; the two former were of the best families in the country. Caprara, then a senator, was afterwards master of the horse to the King of Italy, and Marescalchi minister of exterior relations; Aldini was the best advocate in Bologna; he was the confidential man of the senate; and he after-

wards became minister secretary of state to the King of Italy. There were three or four hundred Spanish Jesuits at Bologna at that period; they were alarmed; the richest and youngest had sought an asylum at Rome; the staff of the army dispelled their fears, and ordered that all proper respect should be paid to them. There were men of distinguished merit amongst them. In the course of the few days that Napoleon remained at Bologna, the appearance of this city was entirely changed. Never was a general revolution in the manners and habits of a people more promptly effected. All who were not priests assumed the military dress and the sword; and even a great number of ecclesiastics were drawn in by the spirit that animated the people. The city as well as individuals gave a great number of entertainments, bearing a character of popularity and grandeur which had not previously been seen in Italy. The French general shewed himself constantly in the midst of the people, without guards; and made a point of going to the theatre every evening with no other escort than the Bolognese.

IV.

In the mean time the Vatican was struck with alarm. Azara, the Spanish minister, provided with powers from the Pope, came with all pos-

sible despatch to conclude an armistice, which was signed on the 23d of June, and removed the apprehensions of his Holiness, who engaged to send a minister to Paris to treat for a definitive peace with the Republic; and agreed that the armistice should last until the conclusion of peace; that Bologna and Ferrara should remain in the possession of the French army; that the French should garrison Ancona; that he, the Pope, should pay twenty-one millions in money, horses, and articles necessary for the army; and that he should give up one hundred works of art, to be chosen by the French commissioners, for the museum at Paris. Military circumstances were such that it could never have been Napoleon's intention to march to Rome. Nevertheless the philosophers and the enemies of the holy see, regarded this suspension of hostilities with dissatisfaction: the people of Bologna in particular were apprehensive of returning under the Pope's authority; but they were easily convinced that the French being now masters of the conditions of peace, it would not be made without securing their liberty. They exacted a promise to this effect, and immediately armed a body of national guards.

V.

This important affair, which secured the flanks of the army from molestation, and contributed to conciliate the people to the French, being ended, Napoleon passed the Apennines, and on the 26th of June joined Vaubois' division at Pistoia. He lodged at the bishop's, the same who afterwards contended so warmly for religious opinions conformable to those of the constitutional priests. Manfredini, the prime minister of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, alarmed at the report that the French troops were to pass through Florence, came to head-quarters; he was satisfied, and convinced that the French were extremely desirous to cultivate the friendship of the Grand Duke, and that they only passed over his territories on their way to Siena. On the 29th of June, Murat, who commanded the van, on leaving Firenzuola, turned suddenly on Leghorn, and arrived there in eight hours, hoping to surprise the English merchants, who had a hundred ships laden in the port; but they received timely notice, and took refuge in the ports of Corsica.

The walls of Leghorn must have been intended to inclose 8 or 10,000 inhabitants: but commerce has made such progress there, that the population has increased to above 60,000 souls; whence it has become necessary to build im-

mense faubourgs, which obstruct the glacis. It is difficult to enter the port. The roads are distant from the land, and far from safe; some accident happens every year. They have succeeded the port of Pisa, which was situate at the mouth of the Arno, the principal river of Tuscany. This is the port of Florence; it is much frequented by the English, who have established a factory there as an entrepot for their manufactures, and for their Indian and colonial merchandize. The occupation of Leghorn and the destruction of the factory, was sensibly felt by the trade of London. The Corsican refugees in France assembled to the number of 600 at Leghorn. The communication with Corsica by the shores of Fiumorbo and la Rocca, could not be intercepted. A multitude of agents penetrated into the interior of the isle with proclamations. The viceroy, Elliot, soon perceived the effects. Several insurrections took place. The refugees were persons of importance: their vicinity and correspondence excited the warlike population of the mountains. A series of sanguinary actions took place; the English daily lost numbers of men; they were not sufficiently numerous to maintain their footing in the country; there was no longer any fear of their disturbing the coasts of Italy. At length, in the month of October, Gentili and

the Corsican refugees landed in a body in the isle, raised a general insurrection, and drove out the English. Spanocchi, the Tuscan commandant of Leghorn, was distinguished for his extreme partiality to the English; some instances of misconduct of which he was guilty, filled up the measure of his offences; he was arrested and taken to Florence, where he was placed at the disposal of the Grand Duke. The French Consul Belleville had the management of the contentious business relating to the English merchandize. Notwithstanding the efforts of a multitude of robbers who flocked from Genoa and Marseilles, the chest of the army received twelve millions from this property. Vaubois was left in command of the city with a garrison of 2000 men; the rest of the troops repassed the Apennines and the Po, to rejoin the army on the Adige.

VI.

The General-in-chief went from Leghorn to Florence, in consequence of the invitation of the Grand Duke. He arrived there without any escort, and alighted at the residence of the French minister, where a battalion of the prince's guards awaited him as a guard of honour. He was highly satisfied with the Archduke, and visited with curiosity every object calculated to excite his attention in this ancient and im-

portant capital. The French troops twice crossed the grand duchy, but they passed at a great distance from Florence, observed the strictest discipline, and gave rise to no complaints. The Tuscan minister confessed that the English had more authority than himself in Leghorn, and complained of the arrogance of the English general.

Whilst at dinner with the Grand Duke, Napoleon received the news of the taking of the Castle of Milan, which had capitulated on the 29th of June. This castle had several large towers, the remains of the Visconti-palace, which commanded the country; some pieces mounted thereon swept the trenches, and had retarded the approaches for several days. The garrison, 2500 strong, were made prisoners of war; a hundred pieces of cannon were found in this castle. The besieging train was immediately embarked on the Po for Mantua, and with the pieces taken from the castle of Urbino and Ferrara made up two-hundred guns well supplied, which were thought sufficient for the siege of Mantua. After dinner, the Grand Duke conducted his guest into the celebrated gallery of Florence, to view the masterpieces of art which it contained; he admired the Venus de Medicis. The Anatomist Fontana shewed him some very fine models in wax, and he ordered similar ones for Paris.

Manfredini, the Grand Duke's majordomo and principal minister, had been preceptor to this prince as well as to the Archduke Charles; he was a native of Padua in the Venetian States, and proprietor of the Austrian regiment of Manfredini. He was an enlightened man, as much attached to all the philosophical ideas of the Revolution as shocked at their excesses, he had constantly opposed the pretensions of the Court of Rome, which after the death of Leopold had endeavoured to overturn the acts of that prince. He was a man of a clear understanding, generally esteemed, and had, moreover, a secret inclination for the independence of Italy. There was not a generous heart or noble mind in the country that did not feel involuntarily impelled, whatever might be their rank or situation in the world, to sacrifice their dearest affections to the independence and restoration of the fine country of Italy.

VII.

After a short stay at Florence, Napoleon proceeded to Bologna, where he spent several days in regulating the public impulse towards liberty. Lugo had revolted, excesses had been committed there against small French detachments. General Beyrand marched thither with his brigade, he met with some resistance; 4 or 5000

peasants had thrown themselves into the town; he attacked and defeated them, and took the town by assault; it was pillaged. The Bishop of Imola, afterwards Pius VII, in whose diocese this insurrection had broken out, published a mandate to open the eyes of the deluded populace. *Render unto Cæsar that which is Cæsar's*, said he; *Christ commands us to obey him who has power*. He even sent the Bishop of Edessa, then his grand-vicar, and afterwards his almoner, to Lugo, who failed in his mission. The rebels received him with respect, but did not obey his orders. They submitted only to force. The army passed the Po; there were only a few piquets of gens-d'armes and some depôts left on the right bank. The country was so well disposed, that the national guards were sufficient; although the regency of Modena was entirely devoted to the enemy, it was powerless; in Reggio and Modena the patriots were by far the most powerful party.

VIII.

Mantua was commanded by General Canto d'Irles, who had under him Generals Roccavina, Roselmini, and Wukassowich, with 12,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, 600 artillery, 150 miners, and 100 seamen, total 14,000 men. The head-quarters of the army were removed from Bologna, to Ro-

verbella, where was Serrurier, who commanded the blockade; there were several French sloops on the lower lake. Colonel Andreossy had collected a considerable number of boats, in hopes of surprising the place. One hundred grenadiers had embarked, they were to land at two in the morning under the battery and bastion of the palace, to seize the postern gate, and let down the drawbridges of the causeway of St. George, by which the army was to enter the city. This scheme appeared infallible. Colonel Lahoz, a native of Mantua, was to head the column, accompanied by several patriots of the country. But the Po having fallen considerably, and the waters of the lower lake having run off with great rapidity, there was not sufficient water for the boats, which were obliged to get amongst the reeds, to avoid being perceived from the place; they grounded there during the night, and it was impossible to get them off. The next night the waters abated still more, and this expedition was therefore abandoned. It was debated whether the trenches should be opened or not. The storm from the Tyrol seemed ready to burst. But Chasseloup promised to take the place in fifteen days open trenches, it being ill armed and the garrison much weakened. The General-in-chief resolved to make the attempt. Generals Murat and D'Allemagne passed the lower

arm of the lake at Pietoli, where it was very narrow, and after a warm action got possession of the ground which was not overflowed from Pietoli to the palace del T, and of the intrenched camp of Migliazetto; on the 18th of July, all the natural obstacles were surmounted, there was nothing before the besiegers but a simple bastion and a large ditch full of water. General Chasseloup of the engineers opened the trenches; the siege became merely an ordinary one. On the 22d, the trench was fifty toises from the covered way; the enemy attempted several sorties to retard the approaches; the skirmishes became sanguinary, but he was always repulsed with loss. Colonel Dupont, at the head of a battalion of grenadiers, behaved gallantly; he was the same officer who afterwards distinguished himself at the time of the surrender of Cairo in Egypt.

IX.

But the moment of the resumption of offensive operations by the Austrians was approaching. Napoleon, being freed from anxiety respecting the works of the siege of Mantua, wished to accelerate the progress of the internal organization of Lombardy, in order to secure his rear during the contest which was about to begin: he proceeded to Milan, in order to return by the

time of the recommencement of hostilities. The King of Sardinia had placed himself absolutely at the disposal of the Republic, he had given up all his fortresses. Suza, Exilles, and Demonte, were demolished. Alessandria was in the possession of the Army of Italy. The chevalier Borgues resided at Milan, as charged with the temporary affairs of Sardinia; but the King frequently sent the Count de Saint-Marsan to headquarters, either to give particular explanations, or to request the assistance necessary for maintaining tranquillity in the country; his affairs could not have been in better hands; the Count was, both personally and in point of character, agreeable to the commander-in-chief. He was of one of the best families in Piedmont; was from twenty-five to thirty years of age, of a cool, mild, enlightened character; he suffered no prejudices to sway his mind, and consequently saw things as they really were. He was personally hostile to the Austrian policy, a sentiment inherited from his ancestors and confirmed by his own experience.

CHAPTER IX.

BATTLE OF CASTIGLIONE.

I. Marshal Wurmser arrives in Italy at the head of a new army. —II. Situation of the French army.—III. Plan of the Campaign.—IV. Wurmser debouches in three columns (July 29), the right by the road of the Chiesa, the centre on Montebaldo, between the Adige and the lake of Garda, and the left by the valley of the Adige.—V. Grand and prompt resolution taken by Napoleon; Action of Salo; Action of Lonato (July 31).—VI. Battle of Lonato (August 3).—VII. Surrender of the three divisions of the enemy's right, and of part of his centre.—VIII. Battle of Castiglione (August 5).—IX. Second blockade of Mantua, (end of August).—X. Conduct of the different nations of Italy, on the news of the success of the Austrians.

I.

THE Court of Vienna being informed of the arrival of the French on the borders of the Tyrol, and of the blockade of Mantua, relinquished its intended offensive operations in Alsace, and detached Marshal Wurmser at the head of 30,000 men from the Army of the Upper Rhine, into

Italy; which detachment, added to Beaulieu's army, which had been recruiting for two months, and to the garrison of Mantua, raised that army to 80,000 men, exclusive of the sick in Mantua. The French army had fulfilled its task in destroying that of Beaulieu; had the armies of the Rhine been equally successful, this grand contest would have been finished. But reports of the preparations making by the house of Austria were spread throughout the Venetian territory; they were greatly exaggerated in commercial letters, in which it was stated that before the end of August Austria would be mistress of Milan, and the French expelled from the peninsula, without being able to reach the Alps; the proverb would again be verified this year, that *Italy was their tomb.*

II.

Napoleon contemplated all these preparations with attention, and was seriously alarmed at them. He convinced the Directory that it was impossible for 40,000 men to withstand, alone, the efforts of the whole Austrian power; he required either that reinforcements should be sent to him, or that the armies of the Rhine should take the field without delay. He reminded them of the promise which had been made to him on his quitting Paris, that they should commence

operations on the 15th of April; and that nevertheless, although two months had elapsed, they had not left their winter-quarters. They opened the campaign at last, in the month of June, but the diversion was then useless to the Army of Italy. Wurmser's 30,000 men were on their march, and expected to arrive. In this situation, reduced to his own forces alone, he assembled all his army on the Adige and Chiesa, left only one battalion in the citadel of Ferrara, and two at Leghorn; and depôts only at Coni, Tortona, Alessandria, Milan, and Pizzighettone. The siege of Mantua began to produce sickness; although the troops which the general kept before that unhealthy place were only equal in number to two thirds of the garrison, the losses were nevertheless considerable. He could not muster, with the army of observation on the Adige, above 30,000 men actually under arms; yet with this small number of brave soldiers he was to contend with the principal army of the house of Austria. A very active correspondence was kept up between Italy and the Tyrol, where the enemy were assembling; and the fatal influence of these grand preparations on the minds of the people became every day more evident. The partisans of the French trembled; those of Austria behaved in a haughty and threatening manner; but all were astonished that such a power

as France should leave an army which had deserved so well of its country without assistance or support: these remarks even reached the soldiers themselves, by means of their daily communications with the inhabitants.

Soret's division, posted at Salo, covered the country between the lakes of Idro and Garda, intercepting the road from Trent to Brescia, by the valley of the Chiesa; Massena, placed at Bussolengo, occupied la Corona and Montebaldo with Joubert's brigade; the rest of his division encamped on the level of Rivoli. D'Allemagne's brigade of Despinois' division guarded the bridges of Verona; the other brigade of this division, the Adige as far as Porto Legnago; Augereau's division, Porto Legnago and the lower Adige. General Guillaume commanded at Peschiera, where six gallies, under the command of Captain Lallemand, kept possession of the lake of Garda; Serrurier was besieging Mantua; Kilmaine commanded the cavalry of the army, Dammartin the artillery. Head-quarters were fixed at Castel-Nuovo, which place was within a convenient distance of the Adige, the Chiesa, and Mantua.

III.

Wurmser fixed his head-quarters at Trent, and assembled his whole army in the Italian Tyrol: he divided it into three corps; that of the left

commanded by Generals Davidowich, Mezaros, and Metroski, 20,000 strong, was intended to debouch by the valley of the Adige; Mezaros was to proceed along the road on the left bank, and to penetrate into Verona by the heights; Davidowich and Metroski, the cavalry and artillery, were to pass the Adige on a bridge built opposite la Dolce, and to advance on Cassario; the centre, 30,000 strong, under Wurmser, forming four divisions, under Generals Melas, Sebottendorf, Bayalitsch and Liptay, were to penetrate by Montebaldo and the country between the Adige and the lake of Garda; the right, consisting of 20,000 men, under Quasdanowich, the Prince de Reuss and Ocskay, was to pass by the Chiesa, advance on Brescia, and turn the whole of the French army, which, being separated from Milan, would thus have its retreat cut off: its entire destruction was to be the result of this skilful plan. Proud of his great superiority, Wurmser meditated not how to conquer, but how he should make use of his victory, and render it decisive and fatal to the enemy.

IV.

Napoleon had been at Milan but a few days when he heard of the movements in the Tyrol; he repaired with all possible speed to Castel-Nuovo, where he fixed his head-quarters; in this

little town he was within reach of the mountains, Monte Baldo and Verona. On the twenty-ninth in the morning, he was informed that la Corona was attacked by an army; that the light troops of Mezaros's division were debouching upon the heights of Verona on the left bank of the Adige; and that numerous columns were descending by the Rocca d'Anfo. In the course of the night, farther intelligence arrived every hour; it appeared that Joubert, being attacked at la Corona, had resisted throughout the day, but that in the evening he had fallen back on the level of Rivoli, which Massena occupied in force; that the numerous lines of the fires of the Austrian bivouacs covered the country between the lake of Garda and the Adige; that on the heights of Verona, the whole division of Mezaros had joined his light troops; that on the Brescia side, Quasdanowich, who had debouched by the valley of the Chiesa, had divided his force into three columns, one of which covered the heights of Saint-Ozetto, appearing to direct its march on Brescia; that another had taken up a position at Gavardo, and threatened to advance on Ponte di San Marco and Lonato; and that the third had marched on Salo, where it had been fighting ever since three o'clock in the afternoon. On the 30th, at daybreak, advices arrived that the column of Saint-Ozetto had penetrated to Brescia, where it had

met with no resistance, and had made prisoners of four companies left there to guard the hospitals. One of the communications of the army with Milan was thus intercepted; that of Cremona was the only one which now remained. Scouts already appeared on all the roads from Brescia to Milan, Cremona, and Mantua, announcing that an army of 80,000 men had debouched by Brescia, and that another, of 100,000, was at the same time debouching by Verona; that Soret, fearful of finding himself cut off from Brescia and the army, had retreated on the heights of Dezenzano, leaving General Guyeux at Salo, with 1500 men, in an ancient castle, a kind of fortress, secure from a *coup de main;* that the enemy's column at Gavardo had sent a few light horse towards Ponte di San Marco, but that they had been kept in check there by a company of chasseurs, ordered to guard that bridge.

V.

Wurmser's plan was now unmasked; he had taken the lead in moving, and expected to keep it. But he considered the army as fixed about Mantua, and imagined that by surrounding this fixed point, he should surround the French army. In order to disconcert his schemes, it was necessary for the French commander himself to take the lead, to render the army moveable by raising

the siege of Mantua, sacrificing the trenches and besieging train, for the purpose of advancing rapidly, with the whole army in junction, upon one of the enemy's corps, and afterwards against the two others successively. The Austrians were superior in number in the proportion of five to two; but if the three corps were attacked separately by the whole French army, the latter would be superior in number on the field of battle. The right under Quasdanowich, which had debouched on Brescia, was the farthest advanced, and Napoleon therefore marched against this corps first. Serrurier's division burned the carriages of their besieging train, and their platforms, threw their powder into the water, buried their shot, spiked the guns, and raised the siege of Mantua in the night of the 31st of July. Augereau's division proceeded from Legnago to Borghetto on the Mincio; Massena's troops defended the heights between the Adige and the lake of Garda during the whole of the 30th. D'Allemagne's brigade directed its march on Lonato. Napoleon proceeded to the heights behind Dezenzano; made Soret march back on Salo, to disengage General Guyeux, who was compromised in the disadvantageous post in which General Soret had left him; nevertheless he had engaged a whole division of the enemy's troops there for forty-eight hours, who had five

times attacked him by assault, and been five times repulsed. Soret came up at the very moment when the enemy was making a final attempt, fell on his flanks, totally defeated him, and took a number of colours, cannon, and prisoners. At the same time General Ocskay's Austrian division had advanced from Gavardo on Lonato, to take up a position on the heights, and effect a junction with Wurmser on the Mincio. Napoleon himself led D'Allemagne's brigade against it. It performed prodigies of valour; the thirty-second was part of it. Ocskay was routed, and suffered great loss; the remains of these two divisions, beaten by Soret and D'Allemagne, rallied at Gavardo. Soret was fearful of compromising himself; he came back, and took up an intermediate position between Salo and Dezenzano. In the mean time Wurmser's cavalry and artillery had passed the Adige. Being now master of all the country between the Adige and the lake of Garda, he placed one of his divisions on the heights of Peschiera, to mask that place and guard his communications; he directed two others with part of his cavalry on Borghetto, to seize the bridge over the Mincio and debouch on the Chiesa, in order to place himself in communication with his right. Lastly, with his two last divisions of infantry, and the rest of his cavalry, he marched on Mantua, to force the

French to raise the siege of that place; but it had already been raised twenty-four hours before: he found the trenches and batteries entire, the guns overturned and spiked; the whole place covered with the wreck of carriages, platforms, and ammunition of all kinds. The precipitation with which these measures seemed to have been effected, probably gave him great satisfaction; for every thing he saw around him seemed much more like the effect of terror than the result of a calculated plan.

Massena, after having kept the enemy in check throughout the 30th, passed the Mincio in the night at Peschiera, and continued his march on Brescia. The Austrian division, which appeared before Peschiera, found the right bank of the Mincio lined with skirmishers detached by the garrison and by Massena's rear-guard, commanded by Pigeon, who had orders to dispute the passage of this river, and, when he should be forced, to retire and rally on Lonato. When Augereau marched for Brescia, he had passed by Borghetto, broken down the bridge, and left a rear-guard to line the right bank, with orders to fall back on Castiglione when it should be forced. Napoleon marched the whole night of the 31st of July, with Augereau's and Massena's divisions, on Brescia, which place he reached at ten o'clock in the morning. The Austrian division, hearing

that the French army was debouching upon it by all the roads, retreated precipitately. On entering Brescia they had found 500 sick, but their stay was so short and their departure so hasty that they had no time to reconnoitre or dispose of their prisoners. General Despinois and Adjutant-general Herbin, each with several battalions, went in pursuit of the enemy on Saint-Ozetto and the debouches of the Chiesa; and Napoleon, with the two divisions of Augereau and Massena, then returned, by a rapid countermarch, on the side of the Mincio, to the Chiesa, whence those two divisions had marched to support their rear-guards, which by this countermarch became their vanguards.

VI.

On the 2d of August, Augereau, on the right, occupied Montechiaro; Massena, in the centre, encamped at Ponte di San Marco, connecting his line with that of Soret, who, on the left, occupied an eminence between Salo and Dezenzano, facing about to keep Quasdanowich's right in check, which was already thrown into disorder. In the mean time the rear-guards which Augereau and Massena had left on the Mincio, had retreated before the enemy's divisions, which had forced the passage of that river. That of Augereau, which had orders to join at Castiglione,

quitted its post too soon, and returned in a disorderly manner to rejoin its corps. General Valette, who commanded this rear-guard, was cashiered before the troops, for not having shewn more resolution on this occasion. As for General Pigeon, with Massena's rear-guard, he reached Lonato in good order, and established himself there. The enemy, taking advantage of General Valette's error, entered Castiglione on the 2d, and intrenched themselves there. On the 3d the battle of Lonato took place; it was fought by Wurmser's two divisions that passed the Mincio over the bridge of Borghetto (that of Liptay being one), and by Bayalitsch's division, which he had left before Peschiera; which, with the cavalry, composed a body of 30,000 men: the French had from 20 to 23,000. The victory was not doubtful. Neither Wurmser, with his two divisions of infantry and the cavalry which he had taken to Mantua, nor Quasdanowich, who was already retreating, could be present at this battle.

At day-break the enemy advanced on Lonato, and commenced a vigorous attack, intending by this point to effect his junction with his right, respecting which he now began to be anxious. Massena's vanguard was overthrown, and Lonato was taken. The General-in-chief, who was at Ponte di San Marco, placed himself at the head

of the troops. The Austrian general having extended his line too far, still with the intention of gaining on his right, in order to open his communications with Salo, his centre was broken; Lonato was retaken at the charge, and the enemy's line intersected. One part fell back on the Mincio, and the other threw themselves into Salo; but the latter being taken in front by General Soret, whom they met, and in the rear by General Saint-Hilaire, and turned on every side, were obliged to lay down their arms.

The French had been attacked in the centre, but on the right they were the assailants. Augereau encountered Liptay's division, which covered Castiglione, and broke it after an obstinate action, in which the valour of the troops supplied the want of numbers. The enemy suffered greatly, lost Castiglione, and retreated on Mantua, whence his first reinforcements reached him, but not until after the engagement. Augereau's division lost many brave men in this hard-fought action; the army particularly regretted General Beyrand and Colonel Pourailles, highly distinguished officers.

VII.

During the night Quasdanowich was informed of the result of the battle of Lonato; he had heard the cannon all day: his position was

rendered very precarious; his junction with the main body of the army was becoming impossible. Besides, he believed that the French divisions which had manœuvred against him on the 2d were still following him, which made the French army appear to him immense: he saw it in all directions. Wurmser had directed part of his troops from Mantua towards Marcaria, in pursuit of Serrurier: he could not avoid losing time in recalling them on Castiglione. On the 4th he was not ready for action: he spent the whole day in collecting his troops, rallying those who had fought at Lonato, and renewing the supplies of his artillery. Napoleon, about two or three o'clock in the afternoon, reconnoitred the line of battle taken up by the Austrian army, which he found to be formidable; it still presented from 25 to 30,000 combatants. He ordered Castiglione to be intrenched, rectified the position taken up by Augereau, which was defective, and set out for Lonato, in order to superintend, personally, the movements of all his troops, which it became of the utmost importance to assemble in the course of the night round Castiglione. Throughout the day, Soret and Herbin on the one side, and Dallemagne and Saint-Hilaire on the other, had followed the march of the three divisions of the enemy's right, and of those cut off from the centre at

the battle of Lonato, and had pursued them closely, making prisoners at every step: whole battalions had laid down their arms at Saint-Ozetto, others at Gavardo, and others were still wandering in the neighbouring valleys. Four or five thousand men having been informed by the peasants that there were only 1200 French in Lonato, marched thither in hopes of opening a road towards Mantua. It was five o'clock in the evening. Napoleon was also entering Lonato, coming from Castiglione; a flag of truce was brought to him; and he heard at the same time that some columns of the enemy's troops were debouching by Ponte di San Marco, that they wished to re-enter Lonato, and summoned the town to surrender. But as he was still master of Salo and Gavardo, it was evident that these could only be straggling columns that wanted to clear themselves a passage. He ordered his numerous staff to mount, had the officer who came with the flag of truce brought in, and ordered the bandage to be taken off his eyes in the midst of all the bustle of the head-quarters of a commander-in-chief. "Go and tell your general," said he, "that I give him eight minutes to lay "down his arms; he is in the midst of the French "army: after that time there are no hopes for "him." These four or five thousand men who had been harassed for three days, wandering

about and uncertain of their fate, were convinced that they had been deceived by the peasants, and laid down their arms. This one fact may convey an idea of the confusion and disorder of those Austrian divisions which, having been defeated at Salo, Lonato, and Gavardo, and pursued in all directions, were almost destroyed. All the rest of the 4th, and the whole night, were spent in rallying all the columns and concentrating them on Castiglione.

VIII.

Before day-break on the 5th, the French army, 20,000 strong, occupied the heights of Castiglione, an excellent position. Serrurier's division, consisting of 5000 men, had received orders to set out from Marcaria, to march all night, and to attack Wurmser's left in the rear, at daylight; the firing of this division was to be the signal for the battle. A great moral success was looked for from this unexpected attack, and in order to render it more sensible, the French army made a feint of falling back; but on the report of the first cannon fired by the division of Serrurier (who being ill, his place was supplied by General Fiorella,) the troops marched briskly forward and attacked the enemy, whose confidence was already shaken, and whose first ardour had evaporated. The hill of Medole, in the midst of the

plain, was the *appui* of the enemy's left; Adjutant-general Verdier was ordered to attack it; the Aide-de-camp Marmont directed several batteries of artillery against it: the post was carried. Massena attacked the right, Augereau the centre, and Fiorella took the left in rear. The light cavalry surprised the head-quarters of the enemy, and were very near taking Wurmser. The enemy retreated from all points. Nothing but the excessive fatigue of the French troops could have saved Wurmser's army, which reached the left bank of the Mincio in great disorder, hoping to rally and make a stand there. That position afforded the advantage of a communication with Mantua; but Augereau's division marched on Borghetto, and Massena's on Peschiera. General Guillaume, commandant of that fortress, having only 400 men, had walled up the gates, and some hours were lost in clearing them again. The Austrian troops which blockaded Peschiera were fresh; they long maintained the conflict with the 18th of the line, commanded by Colonel Suchet, but at length they were broken, and lost eighteen pieces of cannon and many prisoners. The General-in-chief marched with Serrurier's division on Verona, where he arrived on the 7th, during the night. Wurmser had had the gates shut, wishing to gain the night for his baggage to file off, but they were battered down by the

cannon, and the French took the town. The Austrians lost a great number of men. Augereau's division; finding it difficult to effect its passage at Borghetto, passed the Mincio at the bridge of Peschiera. Wurmser, having lost the line of the Mincio, tried to preserve the important positions of Montebaldo and Rocca d'Anfo. General Saint-Hilaire attacked Quasdanowich, by the valley of the Ydro, on the 12th, took possession of Rocca d'Anfo, Lodrone, and Riva, and made many prisoners, which obliged the Austrians to burn the flotilla on the lake. Massena marched on Montebaldo, and retook la Corona on the 11th. Augereau reascended the left bank of the Adige, traversing the ridges of the mountains, until he reached the heights of Alla. The fighting and manœuvres of these two divisions produced 200 prisoners and several pieces of cannon. After the loss of two such battles as those of Lonato and Castiglione, Wurmser perceived that he could no longer dispute the power of the French to occupy whatever position they might choose; he therefore retreated to Roveredo and Trent. The French army itself stood in need of repose. The Austrians, notwithstanding their defeat, were still 40,000 strong; but there was this difference, namely, that one battalion of the Army of Italy was now sufficient to put to flight four battalions of the

enemy, and that the French troops were picking up cannon, prisoners, and military effects in all directions.

Wurmser had, indeed, revictualled the garrison of Mantua; and withdrawn from it the brigades of Rocca Vina and Wukassowich; but he had only brought back half his fine army. Nothing could equal the discouragement and dejection of his troops since their reverses, except the extreme confidence with which they had opened the campaign. The Austrian general's plan, which might have succeeded under other circumstances and against another antagonist, was calculated to produce the fatal result with which it was attended; and although at the first glance the defeat of this numerous and excellent army in so few days, seems attributable only to the talents of Napoleon, who incessantly invented new manœuvres as occasion required, whilst the enemy was confined to a general plan laid down beforehand, it must be allowed that this plan rested on an erroneous foundation; it was an error to make corps which had no communication with each other act separately in the face of a centralized army, whose communications were easy; the right could only communicate with the centre by Roveredo and Ledro. It was a second error to subdivide the corps of the right, and to allot different tasks to its several divisions. That which

went to Brescia found nobody opposed to it, and that which reached Lonato had to contend with the troops which were at Verona the preceding day, opposed to the left, which was now entering the Veronese with no enemy before it. The Austrian army contained some very good troops, but it had also some of very indifferent quality: all those who came from the Rhine with Wurmser were excellent; but the skeletons of Beaulieu's old army, which had been so often defeated, were disheartened. In the different engagements and battles which occurred between the 29th of July and the 12th of August, the French army took 15,000 prisoners, 70 pieces of cannon, and nine stand of colours, and killed or wounded 25,000 men; the loss of the French army was 7000 men; 1400 being taken, 600 killed, and 5000 wounded, half of whom were only slightly hurt.

IX.

The garrison of Mantua employed the first few days after the raising of the siege in destroying the works of the besiegers, and in getting in the guns and stores which they had abandoned; but the reverses sustained by Wurmser speedily brought the French once more before the place. But the loss of their artillery had left them destitute of the means of resuming the siege. This

train of artillery, formed, by great exertions, of pieces collected in the different fortresses of Italy, was a very severe loss. Besides, the opening of the trenches and the duty therein would have been too dangerous for the troops, at the moment when the malignity of the climate was about to commence its usual ravages during the dog-days. Napoleon did not attempt to form a second besieging train, as it could not have been ready before new enemies would have exposed him to the chance of losing it as he had lost the former, by forcing him to raise the siege a second time. He therefore contented himself with a mere blockade. General Sahuguet was appointed to the command of it; he attacked Governolo, and caused General Dallemagne to attack Borgo-Forte; on the 24th of August he was master of the whole of the Serraglio, had driven the enemy into the place, and increased the strictness of the blockade. He then proceeded to multiply the redoubts and works on the line of countervallation. The troops were daily diminished in number by the ravages of the fever, and it was foreseen with consternation that this destruction would increase during the autumn. The garrison, was, indeed, subject to the same calamity, but was better sheltered in the houses, and enjoyed more accommodations than the besiegers.

X.

On the first rumours of the reverses sustained by the French army, the Italians of the different states discovered their secret inclinations. The enemy's party appeared the stronger at Cremona, Casal Maggiore, and Pavia; but, in general, Lombardy continued to manifest a good spirit; at Milan, in particular, the people shewed great firmness, which subsequently gained them Napoleon's confidence, who supplied them with arms, which they had constantly and earnestly solicited, and of which they afterwards made a good use. He wrote, shortly after, to the Milanese, in these terms: "When the French army beat a "retreat, and the partisans of Austria and ene- "mies of the liberty of Italy, regarded it as "irretrievably lost; when you yourselves could "not possibly suspect that this retreat was only "a stratagem, you proved your attachment to "France and to liberty; you displayed a zeal "and resolution by which you have merited "the esteem of the army, and well deserve the "protection of the Republic. Your people ren- "der themselves daily more worthy of liberty; "they are constantly acquiring fresh energy, "and they will, no doubt, one day appear with "glory on the stage of the world. Accept the "testimony of my satisfaction, and of the sincere

" prayers of the French nation to see you free " and happy."

The people of Bologna, Ferrara, Reggio, and Modena, evinced a lively interest in the cause of the French; the news of their defeats was ill received, but the accounts of their victories were hailed with enthusiasm. Parma remained faithful; the Regency of Modena assumed a hostile attitude. At Rome the French were insulted in the streets; and the execution of the conditions of the armistice was suspended. Cardinal Mattei, archbishop of Ferrara, testified his joy at the raising of the siege of Mantua, and called on the people to revolt. He took possession of the citadel of Ferrara, and hoisted the colours of the Church; the Pope immediately sent a legate thither; they thought the French army already beyond the Alps. After the battle of Castiglione, Cardinal Mattei was ordered to Brescia; when brought before the Commander-in-chief, he answered only by the word *peccavi*, which disarmed the victor, who merely confined him three months in a seminary. This cardinal was afterwards the Pope's plenipotentiary at Tolentino. He was of a princely family in Rome; a man of little talent or information, but who passed for sincerely devout; he was a scrupulous observer of the practices of religion. After the death of Pope Pius VI, the Court of Austria made great efforts

in the conclave at Venice to get him elected Pope, but did not succeed; Chiaramonti, bishop of Imola, gained the election, and took the name of Pius VII.

It was to reward Augereau's good conduct at the battle of Lonato, when he commanded the right, and was ordered to attack Castiglione, that he was afterwards made a duke with that title. That day was the most brilliant of General Augereau's life, nor did Napoleon ever forget it.

CHAPTER X.

MANŒUVRES AND ACTIONS BETWEEN THE MINCIO AND THE BRENTA. (SEPTEMBER.)

I. Position of the Austrian army in the Tyrol, on the 1st of Sept.—II. Battle of Roveredo (Sept. 4).—III. Wurmser descends into the plains of the Bassanese.—IV. Actions of Primolano, Covolo, and Cismone (Sept. 7); the French army forces the defiles of the Brenta.—V. Action of Verona (Sept. 7).—VI. Battle of Bassano (Sept. 8).—VII. Wurmser passes the Adige by the bridge of Porto Legnago (Sept. 11). —VIII. Battle of Saint-Georges (Sept. 19).—Wurmser is shut up in Mantua (Sept. 18).—IX. Third blockade of Mantua.

I.

THE Armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Rhine and Moselle, had at length passed the Rhine; they advanced rapidly into the heart of Germany; the former had reached the Rednitz, and the latter the Lech. Wurmser, recruited with 20,000 men, was in the Tyrol; he was commencing his movement to advance from Trent, with 30,000 men, to the relief of Mantua, marching by the defiles of the Brenta, Bassano, and the Lower Adige, and leaving Davidowich,

with 25,000 men, in charge of the Tyrol. Napoleon was sensible of the importance of occupying the Austrian army, in order to prevent its detaching any troops against the army of the Rhine, which was approaching the plains of Bavaria. As soon, therefore, as he discovered Wurmser's intentions, he resolved to assume the offensive, defeat him in detail, by surprising him in *flagrante delicto*, and complete the destruction of this army, which had caused him so much anxiety, and had not sufficiently expiated its offences by the disasters of Lonato, and Castiglione.

General Kilmaine, with a corps of 2500 or 3000 soldiers of all weapons, was charged with the guarding of the Adige, in order to cover the blockade of Mantua, which was commanded by General Sahuguet; Kilmaine occupied the plains of Verona and Porto Legnago. That part of the walls of Verona which is on the left bank of the Adige, had been restored, and the forts put in a state of defence capable of sustaining a siege. In the instructions which Kilmaine received, all the events which took place were foreseen.*

* These instructions, which must be in the hands of Kilmaine's heirs, are an important historical document.

On the first of September, Wurmser and his head-quarters were still at Trent; Davidowich's head-quarters were at Roveredo, covering the Tyrol by Wukassowich's division, which was encamped at Saint-Marc, having its vanguard at Serravalle, and its advanced posts at Alla, and by Reuss's division, encamped at Mori, on the right bank of the Adige, with its vanguard at the bridge of Serea, and its advanced posts on Lodrone, its reserve in the excellent position of Calliano, behind Roveredo: the three divisions and the reserves of cavalry with which Wurmser wished to operate on the Adige, were on their march between Trent and Bassano; Mezaros's division near that town; Sebottendorf's at Rovigo and Magano; and Quasdanowich's at Lavis.

Vaubois' division, forming the left of the French army, marched on the same day, the first of September, from Ladrone up the Chiesa, along the road leading to Trent. Massena's division, the reserve of cavalry, and the head-quarters, passed the Adige by the bridge of Pola, directing their march by the road of the left bank. Augereau's division left Verona, and marched as a second line by the same road; its light infantry occupying the upper ridge of the mountains which command the valley on the left bank of the Adige.

The Tyrol is one of the most ancient posses-

sions of the house of Austria, to which the people are strongly attached. The Trentine country, which is the southern part, also called the Italian Tyrol, was governed by a bishop, who was sovereign of Trent. There are three roads leading from Trent into Italy; one to Bassano, along the Brenta; one to Verona, by Roveredo, along the left bank of the Adige; and one to Brescia, crossing the Sarca, doubling the lake of Garda, running along the Chiesa, and passing Rocca d'Anfo. There is a communication between the Verona road, and that of Bassano, by a cross road, without going back to Trent, from which place both roads branch out.

II.

The prince of Reuss wished to defend the bridge of the Sarca; but General Saint-Hilaire, who commanded the vanguard of Vaubois' division, attacked him furiously, carried the bridge at the point of the bayonet, made a great number of prisoners, and pursued the enemy closely as far as their camp at Mori. At the same time General Pigeon, commanding Massena's vanguard, overthrew that of Wukassowich at Serravalle, pursuing them to the camp of Saint-Marc and taking several hundred prisoners.

The two armies met on the 4th of September at day-break, on both sides of the Adige.

The attack was impetuous, the resistance obstinate. As soon as Napoleon perceived some hesitation in the Austrian line, he made General Dubois charge with 500 horse; the charge was successful, but Dubois received three bullets, and fell dead on the spot. He was a brave officer, and had distinguished himself in the preceding campaigns on the Rhine. The troops entered Roveredo intermixed with the enemy, who were unable to rally until they reached the defile before Calliano, a very strong position, where the Adige is inclosed between very steep mountains. The defile is not four hundred toises wide, and the entrance is defended by fortifications and a wall supported by several batteries. General Davidowich was posted there with a reserve; General Dammartin planted a battery of light artillery so as to take the gorge obliquely. The skirmishers engaged, and obtained some success on the mountains. Nine battalions in close column rushed into the defile, attacked and overthrew the enemy; his artillery, cavalry, and infantry, were all thrown into confusion and intermixed. Fifteen pieces of cannon, seven stand of colours, and 700 men were taken. At the same time General Vaubois forced the camp of Mori, and pursued the enemy briskly up the right bank of the river, in the direction of Trent. Lemarrois, aide-de-camp to the Ge-

neral-in-chief, was grievously wounded in a daring and brilliant charge at Roveredo. This young man had distinguished himself in Vendemiaire at Paris; he was of a very ardent character, and came from the department of La Manche.

The army continued its march during part of the night. On the 5th, at day-break, it entered Trent. In the evening Vaubois' division, continuing its march, took up a position on the Avisio, three leagues from Trent; the wrecks of Davidowich's army were in position behind that river. Napoleon ordered the general commanding the cavalry to ford the river with three squadrons, to cut the enemy's line, and to take the troops which defended the bridge in the rear, whilst he caused them to be charged in front. The enemy was thrown into the greatest disorder, and abandoned his position; and General Vaubois established himself on the banks of the Avisio.

III.

The loss of the battle of Roveredo, instead of stopping Wurmser's movement on Bassano, only accelerated it: indeed, being cut off from Trent and the Tyrol, it was necessary for him to get out of the defiles as speedily as possible, and to collect his army at Bassano, in order to take up his line of operations by the Frioul. But another motive determined him to take this step: he

suffered himself to be persuaded that Napoleon wished to march to Innspruck, to join the Army of the Rhine, then arrived in Bavaria; and on this false supposition he ordered Mezaros's division to march on Mantua. On the 7th of September it arrived before Verona; and at the same time, Wurmser's head-quarters, with Sebottendorf's and Quasdanowich's divisions and his reserves, reached Bassano; and his rear-guard took position at Primolano, to defend the passes of the Brenta. In the night of the 5th of September, intelligence reached Trent from General Kilmaine at Verona, that Mezaros's division had passed the Brenta and was marching on the Adige, and that it would probably attack Verona on the 7th of September. Napoleon instantly conceived the idea of hemming in Wurmser between the Brenta and the Adige, or, if on the approach of the French, he should fall back on the Piave, of surrounding and taking Mezaros's division, which was already compromised, and too far advanced to retreat. He intrusted the defence of the Italian Tyrol to General Vaubois, who from his position at the Avisio, could easily advance to the Brenner to meet Mezaros's general, should his right reach Innspruck. At night he organized the administration of the country, and caused the following proclamation to be posted.

"Tyrolese! you solicit the protection of the "French army: you must render yourselves "worthy of that protection; and, since the ma- "jority of you are well disposed, compel the "few obstinate men amongst you to submit. "Their senseless proceedings tend to draw the "horrors of war upon their country; the supe- "riority of my arms is now sufficiently proved. "The Emperor's ministers, purchased by Eng- "lish gold, are betraying their master, and that "unfortunate prince does not take a single step "without committing an error. You wish for "peace, and the French are fighting for the same "object. We only enter your territories to force "the Court of Vienna to yield to the wishes of "distracted Europe, and to listen to the cries of "its own people! We do not come to aggrandize "France; Nature has marked our limits by the "Rhine and the Alps, whilst she has placed the "limits of the house of Austria in the Tyrol. Ty- "rolese, whatever may have been your conduct "heretofore, return to your homes, quit the co- "lours so often defeated and so powerless in "your defence: the conquerors of the Alps can "have nothing to fear from a few additional ene- "mies, but the generosity of my nation com- "mands me to endeavour to save unnecessary "victims. We have rendered ourselves formid- "able in battle, but we are the friends of all who

" receive us with hospitality. The religion, cus-
" toms, and property of all the communes which
" submit shall be respected;" &c.

On the 6th, at day-break, Napoleon commenced his march, with Augereau's divisions in front, Massena and the reserve, by the defiles of the Brenta, to proceed on Bassano with all possible expedition. It was necessary to perform this march of twenty leagues, over a difficult road, in two days at the utmost. In the evening the head-quarters and the army were at Borgo-Val-Sugagna.

IV.

On the 7th at day-break, he recommenced his march; his van soon fell in with that of Wurmser, in position behind Primolano: it seemed impossible to dislodge them from this post; but nothing could withstand the French army; the fifth light infantry, dispersed as skirmishers, and supported by the three battalions of the fourth of the line in three close columns, broke the double line of the Austrians. The fifth dragoons, commanded by Colonel Milhaud, cut off the road. Almost the whole of the enemy's vanguard laid down their arms; all the artillery, colours, and baggage, were taken. The little fort of Covolo, a kind of Chiusa, in vain attempted to resist; it was turned and taken. At night the French

army bivouacked in the village of Cismone, where Napoleon took up his head-quarters, without attendants or baggage, and passed the night half dead with hunger and fatigue. A soldier (who reminded him of the circumstance at the camp of Boulogne, in 1805, when he was emperor) shared his ration of bread with him. Several parks of ammunition waggons, twelve pieces of cannon, five stand of colours, and 4200 men were taken.

V.

The same evening Mezaros's division attacked Verona, which place it was in hopes to occupy without resistance. But all the ground before Verona had been put in a defensive state; a strong half-moon had been constructed before the Vicenza gate. General Kilmaine expected Mezaros. He defended the approaches of the town by means of some squadrons of cavalry, which, falling back behind the fortifications, allowed thirty guns from the ramparts to shower grape on the Austrian column. After a few vain attempts, Mezaros, considering it impossible to take the town by main force, encamped at St. Michel, and demanded reinforcements and pontoons to enable him to pass the Adige and surround the town; but Wurmser being just then surprised and menaced in Bassano, ordered him

to fall back and join him with all possible expedition. He hoped to collect his army together in time to stop the French before Bassano. It was too late. Mezaros's division did not reach Montebello until the 8th, the day on which the battle of Bassano was fought.

VI.

On the 8th of September, before day-light, Napoleon was at the advanced posts; at six o'clock the vanguard attacked, and overthrew six battalions which were in position in the passes on the two banks of the Brenta; their remains fell back on the line of battle, which was about 20,000 strong, but which made only a weak resistance. Augereau's division attacked the left; Massena's the right; the enemy was broken in all directions, and driven back on Bassano. The fourth of the line, in a close column, passed the bridge as at Lodi. At three o'clock the army entered Bassano, and took 6000 prisoners, eight stand of colours, two pontoon trains, two hundred baggage waggons, thirty-two pieces of cannon, and one hundred ammunition waggons of all kinds, all which waggons had teams of four horses. Wurmser retreated in disorder on Vicenza, being now unable to retreat on the Piave; at Vicenza he rallied Mezaros's division. He thus found himself cut off from the heredi-

tary states, and from his communications with Austria. General Quasdanowich, with 3000 men, being cut off from Bassano, fell back on the Frioul. On the 9th, Massena's division marched on Vicenza, and Augereau's on Padua, intercepting those two great roads, in case Wurmser should attempt to return to the Brenta, in order to reach the Piave. But that general, after his defeats at Roveredo, in the passes of the Brenta, at Bassano and before Verona, had now no troops under his command but such as were much disheartened; he had lost the flower of his army; out of a force of 60,000 men, he had now but 16,000 in junction under his command. Never was there a more critical situation. He himself despaired, and the French were every hour in hopes of seeing him lay down his arms.

VII.

Of these 16,000 men, 6000 were cavalry, of good quality, and not discouraged, not having suffered loss or been defeated. These horsemen spread themselves over the country in search of a passage across the Adige; two squadrons of them passed to the right bank of the Adige at the ferry of Albaredo, to reconnoitre the position of the French, and obtain some intelligence from Mantua. It was impossible for Wurmser to pass the Adige at this ferry, closely followed

as he was by the French army, and after having lost his pontoons at Bassano. His position was become desperate, when the French evacuated Legnago without destroying the bridge. This error, committed by a lieutenant-colonel, saved Wurmser. Kilmaine when attacked at Verona by Mezaros's division, had ordered the 400 men who guarded Legnago to join him, and directed Sahuguet to replace them by a detachment from the forces blockading Mantua. The lieutenant-colonel who commanded this detachment, having had a few men sabred on the road from Legnago to Mantua, suffered himself to be persuaded that the whole of the Austrian army had passed at Albaredo, and was about to cut off his retreat. He gave credit to the report spread by the enemy of the disasters experienced by the French army, which was said to have perished in the Tyrol. Believing himself intercepted, he was perfectly bewildered, evacuated the place, and retreated on Mantua. Wurmser, informed of this fortunate occurrence, instantly marched on Legnago, entered the place without firing a shot, and availed himself of the bridge to pass the Adige. At the same time the General-in-chief reached Arcole. On receiving this vexatious intelligence, he took possession of the ferry of Ronco, sent Massena over to the right bank, and ordered Augereau to march from Padua on Legnago: still entertaining hopes of sur-

rounding the Marshal once more by reaching the Molinella before him. Kilmaine, with all the disposable force he could muster, had stationed himself on that river, intercepting the road to Mantua: but his force being inconsiderable, it was necessary to join him before the enemy should reach him. Wurmser lost valuable time at Legnago; whether excessive fatigue compelled him to give his troops a little rest, or whether, supposing the French to be on the road from Vicenza to Ronco, he hesitated for a time, in hopes to open once more his natural communications by way of Padua. As he had a great number of cavalry, he was enabled to obtain intelligence and watch the French at a great distance. His scouts informed him that the French were at Montagnana, a place in his front, where they had arrived by way of Padua; and that they were approaching Legnago by the two roads. He then commenced his march on Mantua.

There are two roads leading from Ronco to Sanguinetto, where it was intended to intercept the enemy: one of them runs on the left, along the Adige, and intersects the road from Legnago to Mantua at Cerea; the other leads direct from Ronco to Sanguinetto. General Pigeon, with Massena's vanguard, marched directly on Sanguinetto; but Murat, who was sent forward to reconnoitre with the light horse, had taken the Cerea road, as that which would bring him

nearest to the enemy. He soon began a cannonade with them. Pigeon, hearing the cannon, rested his left on Cerea, advanced to that place, and drew up the fourth light demi-brigade in line behind the rivulet to stop the way. Wurmser was cut off; he would have been lost, had he not succeeded in forcing a passage. He attacked Cerea, deployed his whole army, and surrounded the small vanguard of the French, which was soon broken; 3 or 400 men remained in his power. Being left master of the field of battle, he continued his march on Sanguinetto without delay. It was during the conflict at Cerea that the General-in-chief, having galloped up to the village just as his vanguard was routed, had only just time enough to turn round, clap spurs to his horse, and get clear off. Wurmser came up, a few minutes after, to the very spot where he had been, and learning the circumstance from an old woman, sent in pursuit of him in every direction, particularly recommending that he should be brought in alive. After reaching Sanguinetto, Wurmser marched all night. Having discovered that Sahuguet's and Kilmaine's reserves were waiting for him at the Molinella, he quitted the high road, turned to the left, and reached Villa-Impenta on the 12th, where there was a little bridge guarded by a small detachment; his cavalry surprised it. Ge-

neral Charton, who hastened with 500 men of the 12th light demi-brigade from the army before Mantua, to defend this bridge, could not reach it in time; he then formed the square, on the road, and made a vigorous resistance; but he was sabred by the Austrian cuirassiers, and left dead on the field. This detachment was lost. On the 14th the reverses of the old Marshal were again alleviated by another slight advantage at Due-Castelli, similar to those of Cerea and Villa-Impenta; a battalion of light infantry was there cut off and broken by two regiments of cuirassiers, and lost 300 men. The troops were excessively fatigued, and their duty began to be negligently performed.

VIII.

The trifling successes obtained by the Austrian army, in the actions of Cerea, Villa-Impenta, and Due-Castelli, encouraged it to keep the field. The garrison of Mantua came out, and Wurmser encamped his army between Saint-Georges and the citadel. He had then 33,000 men under his command; 5000 were in the hospitals; he left 5000 to guard the place; and encamped with 25,000, of whom 5000 were cavalry; he was in hopes, by thus occupying the country, to find an opportunity of reaching Legnago, and repassing the Adige: but General Bon, who

commanded Augereau's division, entered Legnago on the 13th of September, made 1700 prisoners, took twenty-four pieces of horse artillery, and liberated 500 French soldiers, who had been taken at Cerea and in other petty engagements. On the 16th he reached Governolo, forming the left of the army; Massena, who was at Due-Castelli, formed the centre; Sahuguet, with the troops engaged in the blockade, was at la Favorite, forming the right; Kilmaine had collected all the cavalry. The forced marches performed during this last fortnight, had greatly weakened the regiments. On the 16th, in the evening, the army amounted to 24,000 men under arms, of whom 3000 were cavalry. The two armies were equal in strength, but their quality was very different; of the enemy's troops the cavalry alone retained their confidence.

On the 19th of September, General Bon began his march from Governolo, supported his left on the Mincio, and approached Saint-Georges. The action became very brisk; the Austrians sent their reserve to take part in it. Bon was not only stopped, but even lost a little ground. Sahuguet engaged on the right; the enemy thought the whole line was in action, when Massena debouched in column on the centre, and carried disorder into the enemy's army, which retreated precipitately into the town, after having

lost 3000 prisoners, amongst whom was a regiment of cuirassiers, completely mounted, with three standards and eleven pieces of cannon. After the battle of Saint-Georges, Wurmser spread his troops throughout the Serraglio, threw a bridge over the Po, and got provisions into the place. On the 21st of September he attacked Governolo, and was repulsed with the loss of 1000 men, and six pieces of cannon; had he gained possession of this point, he meant to have endeavoured to reach the Adige. At length, on the 1st of October, Kilmaine, who commanded the blockade, entered the Serraglio, seized Pradella and Ceresa, and completely blockaded the place. This operation, which occasioned several very hot actions, maintained with a few men, did the General great credit. From the 1st of June to the 18th of September, the enemy had lost 27,000 men, of whom 18,000 were taken prisoners, 3000 killed, and 6000 wounded, seventy-five pieces of cannon, twenty-two ensigns and standards, thirty generals, eighty of the civil list from head-quarters, and 6000 horse. The marshal and 16,000 men had been obliged to throw themselves into Mantua: 10,000 men out of this army had escaped into the Tyrol under Davidowich, and into the Frioul under Quasdanowich. The French army had lost 7500

upon by the false reports which they are accustomed to spread in the rear of an army, nor by those heads of columns which they place on the communications, in all directions, to make the enemy believe there are great forces present, when in fact there are none. His political opinions were very moderate.

CHAPTER XI.

SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMIES OF THE SAMBRE AND MEUSE AND RHINE, IN GERMANY, DURING THE YEAR 1796.

I. Winter quarters in 1796.—II. The Austrian armies of Germany detach 30,000 men into Italy.—III. Marches and actions in the month of June.—IV. The Army of the Rhine arrives on the Necker on the 18th of July.—V. The Army of the Sambre and Meuse reaches the Mein on the 12th of July.—VI. March of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse from the Mein to the Naab; position occupied by it on the 21st of August.—VII. March of the Army of the Rhine from the Necker to the Lech; battle of Neresheim (August 11); position occupied on the 23d of August.—VIII. Prince Charles's manœuvre against the Army of Sambre and Meuse; battle of Amberg (August 24); precipitate retreat of that army; battle of Wurtzburg (September 3); the army encamps on the Lahn (September 10); on the 20th it repasses the Rhine; marches and countermarches of the Army of the Rhine, during September; its retreat.—IX. Battle of Biberach (October 8).—X. Siege of Khel and of the *tête-de-pont* of Huninguen.—XI. Observations.

I.

PRUSSIA concluded her peace with the Republic in April 1795. By a convention signed on the 17th of May following, regulations were made

respecting the conduct to be pursued by the belligerent armies in the provinces which they would be obliged to cross. But this convention having given rise to many discussions, it was stipulated, at Berlin, on the 20th of August, that a line should be drawn from Wesel on the Rhine along the frontiers of the mountains of Thuringia, which line no belligerent army should cross; that the territories of the King of Prussia and of the German princes who should adhere to this Prussian confederation, and situate to the south of this line, should be neutral; but that the belligerent armies should nevertheless be at liberty to cross them, on paying for the supplies they should require, but should not be allowed to construct any intrenchments therein.

During the summer of 1795, the Austrians had two armies acting on the Rhine; one called that of the Lower Rhine, under the command of Field-Marshal Clairfaith; the other called that of the Upper Rhine, under the command of Marshal Wurmser. To the former the French opposed the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by General Jourdan, and to the second the Army of the Rhine, commanded by Pichegru, who occupied lines of circumvallation round Mentz. Notwithstanding the defection of Prussia, this campaign ended favourably for the Austrians. In October they forced the lines of countervalla-

tion at Mentz; took a great number of field-pieces, and repulsed Pichegru into the lines of Weissemburg. Hostilities were terminated by an armistice, signed, on the 23d of December, 1795, by which it was stipulated, 1st, that the Army of the Sambre and Meuse should occupy the fortress of Dusseldorf, with its advanced posts three leagues in advance on the left bank of the Wipper, whence its line should run along the left bank of the Rhine as far as the mouth of the Nahe, near Bingen, from which place it was to pass up the left bank of the Nahe as far as the mountains, reach the frontiers of Alsace, and run along the lines of Weissemburg, whence the Rhine was to form the limit as far as Bâle; 2dly, that the Austrians should have their advanced posts on the left bank of the Sieg, a river which falls into the Rhine opposite Bonn; that the countries between the Wipper and the Sieg should be neutral; that the Austrian line should run from the mouth of the Sieg along the right bank of the Rhine as far as the mouth of the Nahe, whence it should cross the Rhine near Bingen, and pass up the left bank of the Nahe as far as the mountains; the Austrians thus occupying Mentz and all the countries on the left bank of the Rhine as far as Weissemburg, whence their line should return to the right bank, along which it was to run to Bâle. These

arrangements being concluded, Jourdan fixed his head-quarters in the Hundsruck; Pichegru his at Strasburg; Clairfaith his at Mentz; and Wurmser his at Manheim.

During the winter France and Austria omitted nothing that was necessary to be done for the purpose of recruiting and clothing their armies, and putting them in the best possible state. The success of the past campaign had inspired the Cabinet of Vienna with great hopes. Clairfaith was recalled, and Prince Charles was appointed to command in his stead. General Pichegru caused the French government much anxiety: the operations which had caused the misfortunes of the conclusion of the campaign were so unaccountable, that they were ascribed to treachery, of which, however, the Directory had no proofs, and therefore did not dare to entertain so painful a suspicion. They nevertheless seized the first opportunity of removing this general from the army, and appointed him ambassador to Sweden. Pichegru refused this diplomatic mission, and retired to his estate. Moreau was appointed General-in-chief of the Army of the Rhine, of which he took the command on the 23d of May, 1796.

II.

In the mean time the campaign had opened in Italy in the month of April; the battles of Monte-

notte, Millesimo, and Mondovi, had determined the King of Sardinia to sign the armistice of Cherasco and abandon the coalition. The more the Aulic Council had reckoned on the talents and reputation of General Beaulieu, the greater was its astonishment at this news. The Archduke was immediately ordered to notify the recommencement of hostilities, and to begin operations on the Rhine, either to hinder the French from reinforcing their army beyond the Alps, or to effect a diversion in the minds of the people, to withdraw attention from the disasters of Italy. When Napoleon left Paris at the end of February, he received a promise that the Armies of the Sambre and Meuse should open the campaign in the course of April, yet they remained in their winter-quarters at the end of May. Every victory gained by the Army of Italy, every step it advanced, rendered the necessity that the French armies of the Rhine should begin operations more urgent and sensible. The moment was, however, deferred under various pretexts, but at length the imprudence of the enemy did what the French government had not had the wisdom to order. Moreau, who was at Paris, had only just time enough to reach Strasburg. All the troops cantoned on the Moselle, the Sarre, and the Meuse, put themselves in motion, and hostilities recommenced on the 1st of June.

In the mean time the news of the battle of Lodi, the battle of Borghetto, the investment of Mantua, the arrival of the French head-quarters at Verona, and of their advanced posts on the mountains of the Tyrol, produced a change in the arrangements of the Court of Vienna. This army, it was said, marching forward with the utmost rapidity, had no obstacle to impede its progress; it was important to check its audacity. Wurmser received orders to proceed into Italy with 30,000 men from the army of the Upper Rhine, to act as a reserve to the remains of Beaulieu's army, which was reforming in the Tyrol, Carinthia, and Carniola; to march to the relief of Mantua before that place should fall, and to reconquer the hereditary estates of Lombardy, the preservation of which was of more importance than hazardous conquests in France. The Emperor united his two armies of the Rhine under the command of the Archduke, commanding him not to begin hostilities, but to let the armistice continue. But this order came too late, that is to say, only two hours before hostilities began.

The Archduke, weakened by detaching Wurmser, renounced all the plans of conquest which he had conceived, and confined his ambition to defending the passage of the Rhine and covering Germany. He had under his command: 1st, the army of the Lower Rhine, under the artillery

General Wartensleben, and the Lieutenant-marshals *de camp* Kray, Werneck, Hotze, Graber, Colloredo-Mels, Staader, and Lindt; it consisted of 101 battalions of infantry, containing 71,000 men, and 139 squadrons of cavalry, containing 22,700 men; total 93,700 men, out of which he was to supply the garrisons of Ehrenbreitstein, Mentz, and Manheim; 2dly, the army of the Upper Rhine, which, after Wurmser's departure, remained under the command of the General of artillery Latour, and of Lieutenant-marshal *de camp* Starray, Frœlich, the Prince of Furstemberg, Reuss, Riesch, and the Prince of Condé: it consisted of fifty-eight battalions of infantry, containing 65,000 men, and 120 squadrons of cavalry, containing 18,000 men; total 83,000 men. Thus the total of the Austrian forces on the Rhine amounted to 176,700 men, in the month of May; but the departure of 30,000 men from that army for Italy, without reckoning the first detachment of 6000 men, reduced the Archduke's army to 150,000 men.

The two French armies amounted, together, to more than 150,000 combatants. That of the Sambre and Meuse contained 65,000 infantry and 11,000 cavalry; total 76,000 men; that of the Rhine and Moselle 71,000 infantry and 6500 cavalry; total 77,500 men. The former was divided into three corps; the left under Kleber,

formed of Collaud's and Lefebvre's divisions, was on the right of the Rhine, at Dusseldorf; the General-in-chief Jourdan was in the Hunsdruck, with the centre, formed of the divisions of Championnet, Grenier, and Bernadotte; the right, under the command of Marceau, was composed of his division and that of Poncet; General Bonnaud commanded the reserve. The Army of the Rhine and Moselle was formed in three corps; Desaix commanded the left, being the divisions of Beaupuis and Delmas; Saint-Cyr the centre, Duhesme's and Taponnier's divisions; Ferino the right, Laborde's and Tharreau's divisions; and General Bourcier the reserve of cavalry.

III.

On the 1st of June Kleber marched from Dusseldorf with his corps d'armée, consisting of twenty-four battalions, and twenty squadrons; on the 2d he reached the Sieg, passed that river after an engagement with his van, and carried the position of Ukerath. On the 4th he attacked the Prince of Wurtemburg, encamped with a corps of 15,000 men on the heights of Altenkirchen, beat him, and took 2000 men, four standards, and twelve pieces of cannon; after which he marched on the Lahn. The General-in-chief Jourdan passed the Rhine at Neuwied, and joined his left on the Lahn. Marceau raised his

camp at Bergelfield, and advanced before Mentz. Prince Charles drew a detachment of 8000 men from the Upper Rhine, and marched on the Army of the Sambre and Meuse. On the 15th of June he attacked Lefebvre's division at Wetzlar, defeated it, and took a standard, and seven pieces of cannon. Jourdan relinquished the plan he had announced of giving battle on the 17th of June, and put all his troops in retreat. He repassed the Rhine by the bridges of Cologne and Neuwied, with part of his army, directing Kleber on Dusseldorf. This general, being closely pressed by the enemy, was obliged to receive battle at Altenkirchen, on the 19th of June; he extricated himself from this affair with honour, and regained his position at Dusseldorf without sustaining any material loss.

After Wurmser had put his detachment in march for Italy, he contracted his position, placed his left on the Rhine, at the little town of Franckenthal, which he intrenched, and his right so as to rest on the mountains. Moreau ordered Desaix and Saint-Cyr to attack him; the former manœuvred between the Rhine and the mountains; the second by Homberg and Deux Ponts. On the 15th of June, after a pretty warm action, the Austrian rearguard was overthrown, and obliged to retreat on the tête-de-pont of Manheim, losing 1000 men; but

this slight success did not compensate for the check sustained at the same time by the Army of the Sambre and Meuse.

IV.

At length the French government became sensible that Moreau's manœuvres on the left bank of the Rhine were of no assistance to the Army of the Sambre and Meuse; he was therefore ordered to pass the Rhine. On the 24th of June, at two o'clock in the morning, Desaix with 2500 men took possession of the Isle of Erlhen-Rhin, and in the course of the morning carried Kehl, taking 800 men and twelve pieces of cannon. In the evening he began to construct a bridge of boats, which was finished on the 25th at noon. In the course of that day, these two divisions, the reserve of cavalry, the head-quarters, and a division of Ferino's, forming a total of 40,000 men, passed to the right bank; General Saint-Cyr with his two divisions remained on the left bank opposite the *tête-de-pont* of Manheim; and one of Ferino's divisions on the Upper Rhine. General Starray with twenty-six battalions, of which Condé's army and the Swabian contingent formed part, was charged with the defence of the Rhine from Switzerland to Rastadt; Latour with twenty-two battalions was at Manheim; he kept guard from Rastadt to the Mein, and occupied the *tête-de-pont* of Man-

heim on the left bank. Starray's troops were dispersed along the right bank. He had two little camps, each of 6000 men, placed nearly two leagues from Kehl, one at Wilsteet, and the other near Offemburg. On the 26th, Ferino marched up the Rhine, and advanced on the camp of Wilsteet; and on the 28th marched on that of Offemburg; the enemy evacuated them both. At the same time Desaix, with his corps and the reserve of the army, advanced on the Renchen, where General Starray was in position with 10,000 men. He attacked him briskly, forced him, took ten pieces of cannon and 1200 men, and pursued him as far as Rastadt, where General Latour had just arrived from Manheim with 25,000 men, and taken a position behind the Murg. But as soon as Saint-Cyr was informed of the enemy's movement from Manheim on the Upper Rhine, he followed him on the left bank, passed the bridge of Kehl, advanced on Freudenstadt, carried the redoubts placed on Mount Kniebis, and forced the passage of the Murg, after a brisk action which lasted the whole day. On the 15th of July General Latour fell back on the Alb, having lost 1000 men. The French head-quarters were removed to Rastadt. In the mean time Ferino took possession of the Kentzig, proceeding up the Rhine, and, as fast as he advanced, the brigades which

were on the left bank passed the river, and increased his forces.

On the 24th of June the Archduke, being informed of the passage of the Rhine at Kehl, marched at the head of twenty-four battalions and two squadrons to the aid of his army of the Upper Rhine, leaving 36,000 men under the command of Wartensleben to observe Jourdan, and 26,000 at the intrenched camp of Hechtzheim, to cover Mentz. Having rallied General Latour behind the Alb, he then had under his command forty-five battalions, and eighty squadrons: that is to say, on his left, in the mountains, under General Keim, nineteen battalions and nineteen squadrons; in the centre before Ettlingen, thirteen battalions and twenty-eight squadrons; on his right, under General Latour, ten battalions and twenty-nine squadrons; and three battalions and twenty-four squadrons in observation. With these considerable forces, he intended to attack the French army on the 10th, and drive it into the Rhine, but General Moreau anticipated him. On the 9th Saint-Cyr forced the Rotensohl, beat Keim, and drove the Saxons on the Necker. The Archduke, thus anticipated, marched his centre and his right against Desaix. The latter withstood the efforts of the Archduke, and by dint of courage maintained his ground during the greater part of the day, and in the

evening retreated on a position a little in his rear. This vigorous resistance overawed the enemy, who, fearful of being cut off by General Saint-Cyr, who had already reached Nauenburg, beat a retreat on Pforzheim, on the 10th, after having detached ten battalions to complete the garrisons of Philipsburg and Manheim. The following day he continued his march on Stutgard, where he passed the Necker, pursued by General Saint-Cyr. In the mean time General Ferino had forced the position of Biberach on the Kintzig, crossed the Black Forest, and arrived at Willingen. The enemy had entirely evacuated the whole of the country between the Rhine and the Black Mountains, and the Forest towns had received French garrisons.

V.

As soon as it was known at the head-quarters of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse that the Army of the Rhine had effected its passage, General Kleber again set out, on the 29th of June, from Dusseldorf. He was joined by Grenier's division, which passed the Rhine at Cologne; he had an engagement at Limburg, and on the 8th of July he passed the Lahn. The General-in-chief Jourdan, with the rest of the army, joined him by the bridge of Neuwied, pressed General Wartensleben, had some vanguard affairs of ordinary importance, and passed the Lahn in three co-

lumns by the bridges of Giessen, Wetzlar, and Leun. He had a very warm engagement at Friedberg, beat the enemy, passed the Nidda, debouched in the plains of the Mein, took up a position before Frankfort, and granted Wartensleben an armistice of a few days to treat for the surrender of Frankfort, which place opened its gates; but that gave the enemy time to gain two marches, and to reach the Upper Mein. Frankfort was well fortified, victualled, and provided with artillery and military stores. The fort of Kœnigstein, situate one march from Frankfort on the high road to Cologne, surrendered on the 21st of July, with ninety-three pieces of cannon, and a garrison of 500 men.

VI.

Jourdan, having received his instructions from government, left Marceau with 30,000 men before the fortresses, and advanced into the heart of Germany with only six divisions, composing a force of 50,000 men. He skirted the borders of the mountains of Thuringia on the confines of Saxony, and thus left the Danube behind him. On the 21st of July his van entered Schweinfurt, at which place his head-quarters were fixed on the 26th. Wurtzburg and its citadel, occupied by 3000 men of the Prince-Bishop's troops, capitulated on the 3d of August. General Wartensleben, with 31,000 men, retreated on Bamberg,

without offering any resistance. The Army of the Sambre and Meuse followed him, passed the Rednitz at Bamberg, and defeated him at the action of Forsheim, on the 6th of August, upon which he resolved to retire behind the Wils. The head-quarters of the French were fixed at Lauf on the 11th of August. The fort of Rothemberg, situate on the high road from Bayreuth to Amberg, capitulated; it contained forty-three pieces of artillery. On the 15th of August the French marched on Sulzbach and Amberg; they fought during the whole of the day; four divisions were engaged; the enemy evacuated his positions on the Wils, and retired behind the Naab to Schwartzenfeld, still removing farther from the archduke's army. On the 19th the French army was beyond the Wils; General Bernadotte was detached to Neumarck, on the road from Ratisbon to Nuremberg, ten leagues from Ratisbon: the two armies commanded the left bank of the Danube, and might be considered as in junction. On the 20th the General-in-chief, with five divisions, advanced on the Naab; the enemy sustained a very severe engagement on the heights of Wolfering, but evacuated them during the night. On the 21st of August the position of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse was as follows: the head-quarters at Amberg; five divisions, amounting to 40,000 men, lining

into the defiles of the mountains of the Alb, had not now a moment to lose to avoid being surrounded; he made his retreat in the night, considering the junction of the two armies as already effected, and relinquishing all thoughts of opposing it, for he abandoned to them the left bank of the Danube, the Warnitz, and the Altmulh, and repassed the Danube and the Lech; the Austrians seemed to have lost the campaign.

In the mean time General Ferino, with twenty-three battalions and seventeen squadrons, being one third of the army, after having crossed the mountains of the Black Forest, had taken possession of Lindan and Bregents on the Lake of Constance, where he had left seven battalions and three squadrons, under the command of General Laborde, to observe the debouches of the Tyrol, and had advanced by Stockach, with sixteen battalions and fourteen squadrons, on Memmingen. On the 13th, General Abatucci, who commanded his vanguard, attacked the corps of Mindelheim, and destroyed several regiments of it; after which he joined the Army of the Rhine, and formed its right on the Lech.

VIII.

General Moreau remained several days on the field after the battle of Neresheim; at length he marched on Donawerth; but he retrograded on Hochstett without even sending a party of caval-

ry on the Altmulh, to endeavour to effect his junction with the Army of the Sambre and Meuse. This hesitation and these false manœuvres encouraged the archduke; he saw that he might still oppose the junction of the two armies, which he had despaired of being able to do. He left General Latour behind the Lech, with thirty battalions, to keep the armies on the Rhine in check and retard their movements, while with a detachment of 30,000 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, he passed the Danube and advanced to the Nuremberg road. On the 22d of August he attacked Bernadotte in his position before Neumarck, pursued him into Lauf and Nuremberg, and forced him to fall back to Forsheim. General Wartensleben immediately put his troops in motion and repassed the Naab. The Army of the Sambre and Meuse retreated on Amberg and Sulzbach; but being attacked in this position, in front by Wartensleben and in flank and rear by a detachment from Prince Charles's army, its general did not think it expedient to risk a serious affair. His retreat had become very difficult; he had lost his line of communication, the road from Lauf to Nuremberg; he was manœuvring across mountains and roads scarcely practicable for carriages; his artillery and waggons were much damaged and thrown into confusion. These precipitate and disorderly marches affected the

discipline of the army, which, on the 26th, arrived at Forsheim, the left being at Ebermenstadt, where it halted on the 28th. The general meditated several offensive operations, which, however, the rapidity of Prince Charles's march, and the offensive demonstrations which he made on the rear of the French, did not allow him to execute; for the enemy had already sent a division to Bamberg, created alarm at headquarters, thrown the parks and civil lists into confusion, and intercepted the road from Bamberg to Schweinfurth, which place the army did not reach, even by forced marches, until the 31st, and then by forcing a passage at the point of the bayonet. In this town the troops halted, as they needed rest. Wurtzburg was occupied by General Hotze, who, with his division, blockaded the citadel, in which General Bellemonte, commandant of artillery, was shut up with 800 men; he was supported by Starray's division. The archduke, with the rest of the army, was one march behind. Jourdan took advantage of this dispersed state of the enemy's army, and resolved to open himself a way to Wurtzburg. On the 2d of September in the forenoon he commenced his march, and attacked Prince Charles on the following day, the 3d; Kray and Wartensleben arrived during the battle; they opposed Jourdan with 40,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. The

French were but 30,000; they lost the battle. They had left Lefebvre's division at Schweinfurth. Jourdan retreated on Arnstein and the Lahn, where he arrived on the 10th of September; his troops were harassed with fatigue, and much disheartened. He fixed his head-quarters at Wetzlar. Ever since the 22d of August he had had to contend with the armies of Wartensleben and the archduke, which amounted to 68,000 combatants, whilst he had but 44,000. On reaching the Lahn, he joined Marceau and a division of 10,000 men, which arrived from Holland; and with these reinforcements found himself superior to the enemy. In fifteen days he had lost all his conquests in Germany, solely through his adversary's manœuvres and the loss of the battle of Wurtzburg; but every thing might yet be retrieved, and there was still the greatest probability that the fortune of the campaign would change, and that it would terminate favourably to the French. The general formed a just conception of what was expedient to be done, but he was wanting in activity and resolution. He suffered himself to be anticipated on the Lahn, and driven beyond the Rhine. The brave Marceau was killed at the action of Altenkirchen; Kleber and Collaud had been dismissed from the army for insubordination. The army was disseminated; part crossed the Rhine;

Lefebvre's division occupied the camp of Dusseldorf. Shortly after, Jourdan ceased to command; but by a singular and inexplicable mode of conduct the Directory appointed Beurnonville, a man scarcely capable of manœuvring a battalion, as his successor. The archduke left the banks of the Lahn, with 12,000 men, to advance against the Army of the Rhine and Moselle, which was still in Bavaria, leaving Gen. Wernech with 50,000 men to observe the Army of the Sambre and Meuse.

IX.

On the 23d of August, twelve days after the battle of Neresheim, the French army of the Rhine and Moselle passed the Danube, and marched on the Lech; General Desaix forming the left, arrived opposite Rain at the mouth of the Lech; the centre, under the command of Saint-Cyr, was at Augsburg, and the right, commanded by Ferino, was opposite Landsberg. Lieutenant-general Latour, intrusted with the defence of the passage of the Lech, had placed three battalions in Ingolstadt, and a division of eight battalions and twenty squadrons opposite Rain, defending the Lower Lech, and had stationed himself with fifteen battalions on the heights of Friedberg opposite Augsburg; Condé's corps formed the left opposite Landsberg. On the 24th General Ferino forced a passage at the ford of Hanstetten; Saint-Cyr passed at the

ford of Lech-Hausen before Augsburg, and Desaix at the ford of Landgwied. The bridges at Augsburg were immediately repaired, and after a brave resistance General Latour was driven from the fine positions of Friedberg, leaving 17 pieces of cannon and 1500 prisoners in the hands of the victor. After the passage of the Lech, the right of the French army advanced on Dachau, three leagues from Munich, with its vanguard under the walls of that city; the centre on Pfaffenhoffen and Geisenfeld, with a corps of observation on Ingolstadt. The Austrian general removed his head-quarters to Landshut on the Iser, where he assembled his principal corps-d'armée; General Nauendorf's division, 8000 strong, which the archduke had detached to observe the Danube, after the battle of Amberg, occupied Abensberg, and covered Ratisbon. Condé's corps occupied Munich; in that position he watched for several days for the movement which the French general should make; but finding that he made none, he suspected that he had passed to the left bank of the Danube in pursuit of Prince Charles; consequently, on the 1st of September, he advanced with his whole army in several columns, on Geisenfeld, attacked the left of the French, and penetrated as far as the Paar, but was speedily repulsed and informed by the prisoners that the army had not stirred,

and was completely mustered on the right bank of the Danube. He then returned to his positions; the losses on both sides in this action having been equal; the enemy left a howitzer in the hands of the French. On the 7th of September General Moreau determined, without any particular project in view, to march forward. On the 9th the left reached Neustadt, being supported on the Danube opposite Abensberg, the centre on Menburg and the right at Mosburg. Munich and Freysing had fallen into the power of the French; but the enemy were in position on the left bank of the Iser. Moreau met with few obstacles in this movement, and made upwards of 500 prisoners. The enemy expected he would advance on Ratisbon, but he did not move on the 8th or 9th, and on the 10th he retreated in order to resume his positions and detach General Desaix, with 12,000 men, to seek the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, which was then above eighty leagues distant from him. Desaix passed the Danube in the night of the 10th at Neuberg, and arrived at Achstett on the 12th; on the 14th he pushed on to Heydeck, half way to Nuremberg, where he heard the particulars of all the events which had taken place for a long time back, and that the Army of the Sambre and Meuse was already repulsed to the Rhine; he made a retrograde march, and on the 16th rejoined the army on the Danube. In the mean time General

Latour, being informed of Desaix's movement, came forward; he engaged in actions of little importance in all directions; but having obtained information of the weakness of Desaix's detachment, and of the superiority of the forces on the right bank of the Danube to his own, he acted with circumspection.

When the archduke abandoned the Rhine he left the following garrisons: in Mentz 15,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry; in Ehrenbreitstein 300 infantry; in Manheim 8800 infantry and 300 cavalry; in Philipsburg 2500 infantry and 300 cavalry. Jourdan had left Marceau's division with those of Poncet and Bonnard, 26,000 strong, on the Mein, to blockade Mentz and Ehrenbreitstein. But against Manheim and Philipsburg Moreau had only left a moveable column of 2800 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, under the command of Brigadier-general Scherb, whom he had brought from the garrison of Landau. The Archduke on reaching the Lahn, immediately ordered General Petrasch to take nine battalions from Manheim and Philipsburg, to attack General Scherb, and to carry the *têtes-de-pont* of Kehl and Huningen. General Scherb was still at Bruchsal; having received timely notice from deserters, he beat a retreat on the 13th of September, and retired on Kehl, which place was not yet completely repaired. Petrasch followed and attacked him, on the 18th, with forces quadruple to his, but failed

in the attempt, and lost a great number of men. The French were partly indebted for this success to the zeal evinced by the national guard of Strasburg. Moreau was much alarmed at this action, which had nearly cut off his retreat; he felt the necessity of approaching the Rhine, and commenced his retreat. He repassed the Lech on the same day that Jourdan repassed the Rhine, and took up a position on the 20th behind the Schmutter, on the 21st behind the Mindel, and on the 22d behind the Gunz. He marched in three columns, Ferino commanding the left, Saint-Cyr the centre, and Desaix the right, (with respect to the direction in which the retreat was made). General Frœlich followed Ferino, Latour followed Saint-Cyr, and General Nauendorf proceeded along the left bank of the Danube, on a line with Desaix. The fortress of Ulm, which was not garrisoned, was fortunately occupied by a detachment under the command of Montrichard, twenty-four hours before General Nauendorf could enter it. On the twenty-fourth the French army took up a position on the Iser, supported on Ferino at Memmingen, and on Desaix in Ulm. On the 25th, 26th, and 27th, it continued its retreat: Desaix proceeding along the left bank of the Danube, made for Ehingen; the Austrians entered Ulm six hours after his departure. On the 27th the army arrived on the

Feder-See, where intelligence was received that General Petrasch occupied the debouchés of the Black Mountains, and that the frontier towns were occupied by hordes of insurgent peasants. On the 28th General Latour attacked at all points, and was every where repulsed; General Nauendorf, whose troops had up to that time composed the right of the Austrian army, left it, advanced on Tubingen, and joined Petrasch in the position of Rothweil, thus securing the valleys of the Kintzig and Renchen with his forces, whilst Prince Charles, with a corps of 12,000 men, arrived at the village of Renchen, sending out light horse on the Kintzig near Kehl. General Latour, thus weakened, had only 25,000 men left; he found himself compromised; yet as he was encamped at Steinhausen and appeared to suspect nothing, Moreau felt the necessity of removing him thence in order to have an opportunity of forcing the passes. On the 2d of October he attacked him vigorously at Biberach. The Austrians, notwithstanding all the resistance they could make, were overwhelmed by numbers and completely routed, and left two standards, several pieces of cannon, and 4 or 5000 prisoners, in the hands of the victor.

After this battle Moreau continued his retreat: the baggage, lumber, and wounded, were sent by way of the frontier towns to Huninguen. Mo-

reau attacked the passes and took possession of the villages of Rothweil and Willingen, on the 10th of October; the army countermarched on the passes of the Val d'Enfer; Saint-Cyr arrived on the 12th at Freyburg in the valley of the Rhine. The army spent the 13th, 14th, and 15th, in passing this terrible defile, and took up a position behind the little river of Eltz, covering Freyburg. In the mean time Prince Charles had reached Etteinheim, where he was successively joined by Petrasch on the 15th of October, by Nauendorf on the 18th, and by Latour on the 20th; Condé's and Frœlich's corps followed the rear of the French army into the gorges of the Val d'Enfer and on the frontier towns; thus the French were in junction from the 15th, and in communication with France by the bridges of Vieux Brisach, and Huninguen; the spirit and means of the troops were improved, yet they remained inactive. On the 18th the enemy marched against them with 36,000 men; his left supported on the Rhine, commanded by Petrasch; his centre commanded by Wartensleben, and his left by Latour: an obstinate conflict ensued, with equal advantages and losses on both sides. Frœlich and Condé's corps had entered Waldkirch by the valley of the Black Forest; the General-in-chief thought it expedient to approach Freyburg, refusing his right, but still

covering that town and New Brisach. On the 21st, Desaix passed the Rhine at New Brisach, and marched down the left bank to Strasburg. The army evacuated Freyburg, and took up a position, with the right resting on Kaudern, and the left on the Rhine at Schliengen. It was attacked there on the 23d, and having been weakened by the detachment of Desaix's troops, was very inferior in number; but as it occupied a fine position, it was enabled to defend its ground, and on the 26th of October repassed the Rhine over the bridge of Huninguen in some little disorder. Ferino remained on the Upper Rhine; the rest of the army proceeded to Strasburg. Thus, after having kept up the war in Germany for four months, disarmed and detached from the cause of the Emperor the Margrave of Baden, the Duke of Wurtemberg, and the Elector of Bavaria, granted them armistices, and imposed contributions which it had not time to collect, after gaining several victories, and without sustaining any important defeat, the French army repassed the Rhine, retaining nothing on the right bank but the fortress of Dusseldorf and the *têtes-de-pont* of Kehl and Huninguen.

X.

Dusseldorf, being far to the North, did not attract the attention of the Austrians, but the

fortress of Kehl and the *tête-de-pont* of Huninguen enabled part of the French army to winter on the left bank, and to disturb Germany; they therefore resolved to take possession of those two places. On the 28th of October, 40,000 men invested them, and formed lines of countervallation before Kehl, consisting of fifteen redoubts, having the Rhine for the *appui* of the right and left, and connected with each other by intrenchments of nearly 3500 toises in extent, and completely investing the whole of the fortifications of Kehl on the right bank. The French were equally active in palisading and arming the fort and the hornworks of the Upper and Lower Rhine, and in lining all the left bank with batteries; they established themselves firmly in all the isles, especially in those of Ehrlen-Rhin and Touffue, before which latter place, at 1500 toises distance from Kehl, they constructed a priest's cap in the form of a *tête-de-pont*. The distance from this cap to the Kintzig was 1000 toises. They established an intrenched camp of 1000 toises in extent perpendicularly to the Rhine, and a *tête-de-pont* at the Isle of Ehrlen-Rhin. It was 500 toises from Kehl down the Rhine to the mouth of the Kintzig. These works were guarded by sixteen battalions, which relieved each other every twenty-four hours.

Notwithstanding these formidable defensive

preparations, Prince Charles persisted in besieging a place which he could only blockade on one bank, and could not separate from Strasburg and all France. On the 21st of November, he opened trenches against the works of the Kintzig. On the 22d of November at day-break, Desaix made a sortie at the head of 16,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry from the intrenched camp of Kehl, forced the lines of countervallation, and got possession of the village of Sunheim, situate a league from the Rhine, and in the rear of the enemy's camp. But the force he commanded was too inconsiderable; he was obliged to return into his works after having destroyed several redoubts of the line of countervallation, spiked fifteen pieces of cannon, taken six, and made 1500 prisoners. On the 28th of November the enemy at once unmasked all his batteries. The approaches against the works of the Kintzig had been only a false attack, the principal one being directed against the priest's cap before the Isle of Touffue, and against the Isle of Ehrlen-Rhin. The enemy's plan was to destroy the bridges over the Rhine. On the 6th of December he got possession of the Isle of Touffue and the priest's cap; on the 9th he was master of all the exterior of the intrenchments, and stationed himself in the old church of Kehl. On the 18th he got possession of all the right of the French intrench-

ments and the redoubt of *Trou-de-Loup*. On the 3d of January he was master of the whole Isle of Ehrlen-Rhin. On the 6th he attacked the horn-work of the Upper Rhine, destroyed the bridges; and on the 10th of January entered Kehl by capitulation. The French evacuated that fort, and carried all that belonged to them to the Strasburg side of the river. The losses on both sides were very considerable, the consumption of ammunition immense. The French artillery was superior on account of the great number of batteries which had been constructed on the left bank. Both armies suffered greatly from the frosts of November, December, and January.

In the mean time the Prince of Furstemberg had remained opposite Huninguen with thirteen battalions. The right of the Army of the Rhine, under the command of Ferino, had remained in that place. General Abbatucci commanded in the *tête-de-pont*, and as fast as the enemy made preparations and showed his intention of besieging the *tête-de-pont*, this young officer took every necessary step to prepare for the most vigorous defence. The enemy's batteries were ready on the 25th of November. He attacked the *tête-de-pont* with a brisk cannonade; the bridge was broken on the 29th. On the 30th of November the Austrians made an assault with 6000 men; the action was hot, and obstinately maintained.

The enemy was repulsed, leaving one third of his men on the field, or in the hands of the French. Young Abbatucci, a General aged twenty-four, made a sortie at the head of the garrison in order to drive the Austrians from a lunette in which they attempted to make a lodgement; he succeeded, but was mortally wounded. The result of this assault caused the suspension of the siege; but on the 19th of January, after the taking of Kehl, the enemy opened the trenches again; and on the 19th of February, the garrison capitulated, and repassed the Rhine. The success of these two operations enabled Prince Charles to take up his winter quarters along the left bank in Brisgaw and the country of Baden, and to detach powerful reinforcements to the army which was assembling behind the Piave, and of which he took the command in February. This army was intended to avenge Beaulieu, Wurmser, and Alvinzi, and to reconquer Mantua, Lombardy, and Italy.

XI.

Observation I.—The unfortunate result of this campaign is to be ascribed to the plan of operations adopted by the Government. The object of this invasion of Germany was, 1st, to make a diversion to hinder the Cabinet of Vienna from drawing new detachments from its army of the

Rhine to reinforce its army of Italy; 2dly, to detach the princes of the Germanic body from the Emperor, subdue the Princes of Baden, Wurtemburg, and Bavaria, and strengthen the confederation by the neutrality of Prussia, and by the alliance of Saxony and the Northern princes, who had not yet acceded to it; 3dly, to support the war in Germany, and draw contributions and horses from that country, in order to furnish the infantry, cavalry, and artillery with all necessaries, and to employ the resources of the Republic itself in creating an army of reserve; 4thly, to get possession of the fortresses of Ehrenbreitstein, Mentz, Manheim, and Philipsburg, to secure the frontiers of the Rhine, and render the troops blockading those places disposable for the conclusion of that campaign and for the following one; 5thly, to secure the winter quarters of the French troops in Germany, and their positions, by taking possession of Ingolstadt and Ulm, in order to make a combined attack on the hereditary states both from Italy and Germany, after the taking of Mantua in the spring of 1797.

For these purposes there were two things requisite; 1st, to blockade the fortresses of Ehrenbreitstein and Philipsburg strictly, and to besiege Mentz and Manheim; 2dly, to cover the sieges and blockades by a powerful army, which should carry the war into the midst of Germany, and

threaten the hereditary states. This army should have been formed of four corps, each composed of three divisions of infantry, several brigades of chasseurs and hussars, and a reserve of heavy cavalry, making together from 140 to 150,000 men.

The army of observation on the Rhine ought to have consisted of three corps, of seven divisions of infantry, and several brigades of cavalry, making 60,000 men in all; with its first corps, of two divisions, it should have guarded Holland and Dusseldorf and blockaded Ehrenbreitstein; with its second corps, three divisions strong, it should have besieged Mentz; and with its third corps, of two divisions, it should have blockaded Philipsburg and Manheim, and guarded Kehl and the *tête-de-pont* of Huninguen. The general total of the two armies would thus have been from 200, to 210,000 men. Now these troops existed: the Armies of the Rhine and Sambre and Meuse, at the beginning of the campaign, were 160,000 strong; the Army of Holland 30,000; from la Vendée and the interior of France 20,000 men might have been drawn, who were no longer necessary there; total 210,000.

The trenches ought to have been opened before Mentz the day after the blockading of the place; June, July, August and September would have been sufficient for taking it, and it is even possi-

ble that there would have been time enough to take Manheim with the same besieging train. The fortresses of Ehrenbreitstein and Philipsburg would not have been able to resist a nine months' blockade, and would have capitulated during the winter. The junction of the Grand Army ought to have been effected under the walls of Strasburg, by the left bank of the Rhine, in the course of February, March, and April, by masked movements. Much might have been expected from so considerable an army, supposing it to have passed the Rhine unexpectedly, and advanced rapidly in all directions, crushing the troops dispersed for the purpose of defending the river; the enemy's armies would have abandoned the Rhine, and concentrated themselves on the Danube. The French army would have occupied Ulm; from that point, as a centre of operations, it should have manœuvred in Wurtemberg, on the Warnitz, on the Lech, and in Bavaria, having only one line of operations on Kehl, New Brisach, and Huninguen. It would have overwhelmed every thing by its masses, and taken up its winter quarters on the frontiers of the Austrian monarchy, after having disarmed and subdued the princes of the Germanic body.

The plan adopted at Paris was conceived in a different spirit: 1st, the places were neither blockaded nor besieged, but only observed from

a distance; 2dly, two armies, commanded by two generals independent on each other, entered Germany by two lines of operations directly opposed; they marched at random, without concert or communication; they were repulsed without having been defeated in any pitched battle. All this arose from the erroneous military principles which then prevailed. It had been observed that in the campaigns of 1794, in which the enemy was master of the places of Condé, Valenciennes, Landrecy, and Quesnoy, the French had failed in several direct attacks on the centre, and had succeeded when they divided their army into those of the North and of the Sambre and Meuse, directing the former, that of Pichegru, on the enemy's right, by Menin, along the sea-coast, and the other, that of Jourdan, on his left by the Sambre. The result of that plan of operations had been the conquest of Belgium; the enemy had been driven beyond the Roer and the Rhine; and shortly after the Flemish fortresses had successively capitulated.

But the principles which had been derived from these observations were erroneous. The success of that campaign, far from being attributable to the plan of operations, took place, on the contrary, in spite of the defects of the plan, and solely through the great superiority of

the troops which the Republic had on that frontier; so that, although divided into two separate armies, each of the republican armies was nearly equal in strength to that of the Austrians. At the battle of Fleurus, General Clairfaith had an army as numerous as that of General Jourdan, but that of Jourdan was but a portion of the troops which France had in the North, and Clairfaith had assembled the greater part of his forces; had he maintained the battle to the last and proved victor, he would have afterwards beaten Pichegru, and notwithstanding the great number of French battalions, the French would have been overthrown in consequence of the defects of the plan. If instead of having two armies, one on the right and the other on the left, the whole French army had been united on the Sambre, at the fields of Fleurus, leaving a corps of observation on Dunkirk, Jourdan's army, being twice as strong as Clairfaith's, would have met with no resistance, would have outflanked the left of the enemy like a torrent, and cut off his retreat to the Rhine; the success would have been certain and decisive. But the disadvantages resulting from such military principles became much more dangerous in a war of invasion in a foreign country. The two French armies had, in 1794, their flanks supported as follows; one of them on the places of Charle-

mont, Givet, and Philipville, the other on the fortress of Dunkirk and sea; and their other wings were supported either on fortresses or on part of the French territory. The communication between the two armies was impeded by the central position of the enemy, but it was carried on a little more in the rear. In the campaign of 1796, the left, the right, and the rears of the two armies were all equally unsupported: in Flanders the two armies were regulated every twenty-four hours by orders from Paris. In 1796 no central direction was possible, and every operation ought to have emanated from a single commander-in-chief; but there were two. It may therefore be fairly said that in 1794 the false principles of the plan of the campaign prevented the French from gaining decisive advantages, and that in 1796 they were the occasion of the loss and disasters of the Armies of the Sambre and Meuse and of the Rhine and Moselle.

The Republic was desirous of peace, and of having the frontier of the Rhine for its boundary. We had no right to require this frontier as long as the enemy occupied Mentz. It was, therefore, necessary to besiege Mentz, which place is the more dangerous to besiege as it stands on the left bank. An army which is marching to the conquest of a country has its two wings sup-

ported on neutral countries or great natural obstacles, such as large rivers or chains of mountains, or else it has only one wing, or none at all; in the first case it has only to take care that its front is not broken, in the second it ought to make the wing which is supported its *appui*, in the third case it should keep its different corps well supported on its centre, and never separate from them; for if a difficulty arises from having two flanks unsupported, the disadvantage is doubled by having four, tripled by having six, quadrupled by having eight; that is to say, by dividing into two, three, or four different bodies. The line of operations of an army may, in the first case, *appuy* indifferently on the left or right side; in the second case it ought to *appuy* on the wing supported; in the third it ought to be perpendicular on the middle of the army's line of march. At all events it is necessary to have, at every five or six marches, a fortified place or intrenched position, on the line of operations, to collect magazines of provisions and stores in, to organize convoys and make a centre of motion, a determined point to shorten the line of operations. Ulm is the first natural pivot of the invasion of Germany; this place, situate on the Danube, affords to those who occupy it facilities for manœuvring on both banks. It is an unique point for containing extensive depôts on the greatest

river of Europe, a river which washes the walls of Ingolstadt, Ratisbon, Passau, and Vienna: on the French side this place is at the outlet of the Black Mountains.

Observation II.—(JOURDAN).—1st. At the opening of the campaign the General of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse manœuvred at once on both banks of the Rhine, with his left separated by that river from his centre and his right. If Kleber had been attacked by 30,000 men instead of 15,000, at Altenkirchen, on the 7th of June, he would have been in a perilous situation. On the 1st of June the whole army should have joined at Dusseldorf and marched on the Sieg, the Lahn, and the Rhine, and there taken up a good position on the heights and intrenched it, and waited there until the Army of the Rhine had crossed to the right bank of the Rhine.

2dly. The arrival of the Archduke on the Rhine, with a detachment, did not oblige General Jourdan to dislocate his army: he might at first have maintained his ground on the Lahn, by retrenching himself in a good position, and if he was resolved to come nearer his depôts, he ought, in doing so, to have kept all his army in junction on the right bank of the Rhine; his attitude would thus have overawed the enemy, who would not have ventured to weaken their

force while before him, by detaching twenty-four battalions to act against the Army of the Rhine and Moselle.

3dly. In the beginning of July the Army of the Sambre and Meuse again march forward. The passage of the river effected by the Army of the Rhine, had compelled the Archduke to hasten to the Upper Rhine; he had only left Wartensleben 36,000 men, who ought to have been annihilated; but the principle of those days was to march in every direction as if to beat the covers. The enemy's rear-guard being only followed by equal forces, and not being at the same time even outflanked on its right or left, or broken in the centre, was never compromised, and occasioned as much loss as it sustained.

4thly. From the Mein, the General of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse moved on Schweinfurth and Bamberg, his left being supported on the mountains of Saxony, (which country had just acceded to the Prussian neutrality, and its contingent had consequently left the Austrian army,) and his right unsupported. By this movement he increased the space which separated him from the Army of the Rhine, because he receded from the Danube, whilst the latter army was passing to the right bank of that river. Each army acted exactly in the contrary manner to that in which it ought to have manœuvred: the former rested

on its right and the latter on its left, whilst the latter should have rested on the right and the former on the left, in order to join in a compact mass.

5thly. The Army of the Sambre and Meuse passed the Rednitz at Bamberg, on the 8th of August, marched on Nuremberg and Lauf, and thence, making a turn to the left, moved on the Naab by Sulzbach and Amberg; thus exposing the right flank, during a march of thirty leagues, to the debouchés of Bohemia, and the left flank to those of the Danube, of which the enemy was master, as he still occupied Bavaria, the right bank of the Lech, and the left bank of the Warnitz; the army was therefore in column, forming a narrow strip thirty leagues in length, and surrounded on all sides by enemies. Thus, if the march of thirty leagues from Frankfort to Bamberg was contrary to the object which ought to have been kept in view, the junction of the two armies, the march from Bamberg to Amberg was rash, and evidently endangered the existence of the army. This part of Bavaria, on the right bank of the Rednitz, is a country full of defiles, formed by the first hills of the mountains of Bohemia, a difficult and barren country, and having no communication but the road from Nuremberg to Amberg. To cover this road, Jourdan sent Bernadotte's division to Neumarck, ten leagues

from him, to menace Ratisbon. The Army of the Sambre and Meuse ought to have proceeded from Frankfort along the left bank of the Mein, advanced on Mergenthein, secured its right flank by joining the left of the Army of the Rhine, and then, wheeling on its right, to have brought its left on Ratisbon. On reaching Wurtzburg it was still in time to form its right line on Nuremberg; its general should have marched by the Neumarck road and approached Ratisbon; at all events he should have manœuvred in such a manner as to make his retreat, if it should become necessary, on the left of the Rhine by going up the Rednitz, and by no means down that river.

6thly. The General of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse received advices, at one and the same time, that Prince Charles was marching against him, that he had defeated Bernadotte, that he was master of Lauf and Nuremberg, and that all the communications of his own army were cut off. This was because his line of operations was bad, and because he was manœuvring in opposition to all the rules of war.

7thly. But Bernadotte being defeated, what could the General-in-chief do in the false position in which he was placed? He should have forced the passage of the Naab before the arrival of the Archduke on Amberg, advanced on Ratis-

bon, from which place he was but a few leagues distant, and there effected his junction with the Army of the Rhine. The first vigorous movement would have obliged Prince Charles to concentrate his forces, and to call in all his detachments, which would have cleared up and dissipated that imaginary storm, which was always increasing, because the French general constantly gave way to it. The Austrians are remarkably expert in spreading false reports, and in promulgating erroneous notions amongst the inhabitants; they are great masters of the art of creating alarm in the rear of an army; but if you draw the sword of Rinaldo from its scabbard, the enchantment is instantly dissolved.

8thly.—1st. At the battle of Wurtzburg Jourdan injudiciously left a fourth of his troops at Schweinfurth; Lefebvre's division, in addition to the force he had, would have secured him the victory. 2dly. If he had set out from that town at two o'clock in the morning of the 2d of September, he would have arrived on the field of battle at ten o'clock; and had he rushed headlong upon the enemy, he would have overwhelmed the twenty battalions of Hotze and Starray, taken Wurtzburg, and made Marceau join him there. The Archduke had dispersed his forces in an unskilful manner, and could not operate their junction until a very late hour on the

3d; but although Jourdan arrived by noon on the 2d, he gave the Archduke eighteen hours to rally his army, who had 45,000 men in line by nine o'clock in the morning of the 3d.—3dly. Jourdan occupied on the field thrice as much ground as he ought to have done; he was obliged to form his troops in one line only, and, intrepid as they were, there was every probability that they would be broken.

9thly. The course of the Lahn from Coblentz to Giessen, is twenty-four leagues; that river is thirty leagues from Dusseldorf. If Jourdan had assembled all his divisions on his extreme left at Wetzlar, he would have defeated his enemy and repulsed him to the Mein, and shortly after to the Danube. His forces were greatly superior after the junction of Marceau's corps and the division from Holland. He mentioned this intention, but he lost the time in planning it in which he should have carried it into effect. His army formed a cordon along the Lahn; his line was broken at Limburg by the retreat of Marceau's corps; he then made his columns fall back precipitately on Altenkirchen. 2dly. At that place he was still in time to resume offensive operations, and retrieve every thing, but he was deficient in resolution. 3dly. When he ordered the retreat, he ought at least to have made it, if he considered it in-

dispensable, with all his army in junction, as far as the intrenched camp of Dusseldorf; for whilst it remained in mass on the right bank of the Rhine, the Archduke could not have detached any of his forces, because he would constantly have had to apprehend an offensive movement by so important an army. But all was lost when Jourdan disjointed his army at Altenkirchen, and the left alone continued its movement on Dusseldorf whilst the rest repassed the Rhine, as if the left bank and the Hundsdruck had any thing to fear: it was the Army of the Rhine and Moselle, which was then in the heart of Germany, that the Archduke was aiming at. Then it was that the Army of the Rhine and Moselle was abandoned.

10thly. The conduct of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, reinforced by the troops from Holland, during October, November, December, and January, is inexplicable.

Observation III.—(MOREAU.) The passage of the Rhine took place on the 24th of June; it ought to have been effected between the 1st and 4th of that month, at the moment when the Army of the Sambre and Meuse was beginning to move. On the 24th of June, the day of the passage, the first troops reached the right bank at three in the morning; the bridge might have been finished by noon, and the whole army

might have passed and been formed in line before day-break on the 25th. The bridge was not completed until the 25th at noon, which was twenty-four hours too late. Such operations as the passage of a river like the Rhine are so delicate, that the troops ought not to remain so long exposed without communication.

2dly. On the 26th the Army of the Rhine had only 40,000 men on the right bank; Saint-Cyr, with 20,000 men, remained in the Palatinate on the left bank, and Laborde with 10,000 on the Upper Rhine. The three corps and the reserve, forming the whole of the army, 60,000 strong, ought to have been on the right bank by noon on the 26th at latest, on their march to surprise and overwhelm the enemy's divisions dispersed along the river. On the 27th of June the army ought to have entered Rastadt, on the 30th Sforzheim, after insulating Philipsburg and Manheim, and cut off the enemy from Necker, where it ought to have arrived from the 1st to the 4th of July. The General would thus have gained fifteen days, and spared his troops several unimportant actions; in lieu of which he would have gained several brilliant victories, which would have rendered his adversary, then so inferior in strength, still weaker; and this before Prince Charles could have effected his return from the banks of the Lahn. The inde-

cision of the French general gave the enemy's commander time to collect his army at Etlingen, three marches from Kehl, thirteen days after the passage of the Rhine. What could the French general have to fear for the territory of the Republic, when he commenced offensive operations with 70,000 men?

3dly. After the passage of the Rhine, and previously to effecting his junction with the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, this General detaches his right, forming nearly one-third of his army, (20,000 men) under Ferino, who marches up the bank of the Rhine, crosses the Black Mountains, and proceeds to the Lake of Constance, whilst the centre and the left march on the Necker; the army being thus cut into two parts, separated by the Wurtemberg Alps, the mountains of the Black Forest, and the Danube, whilst, on the contrary, General Starray, who was opposed to Ferino, after having disputed the debouchés of the Black Mountains, centralises his forces on the Necker, and joins the left of Prince Charles's army: two-thirds of the Army of the Rhine arrive on the Necker, 50,000 strong, and having before them the majority of the enemy's troops. Jourdan, on the Mein, and Ferino, on the Lake of Constance, had only very inferior forces before them. Thus, in this march, the French formed three separate corps,

having nothing in common amongst them, with three lines of operations, and six flanks, five of which were unsupported. The flanks being the weakest part, should be supported; and if that cannot be done, we should have as few of them as possible.

4thly. The march of the Army of the Rhine on Stutgard, across the Wurtemberg Alps, is consistent with the spirit of this war; but its General should have had Ulm occupied, a place so important that it is impossible, without possessing it, to conduct the war on the basin of the Danube, which extends from the mountains of the Tyrol and Switzerland to those of Thuringia and Saxony. He ought to have rested his right on the Danube, and in that case, on his arrival at Neresheim, he would not have found himself unsupported. But although turned at the battle of Neresheim both on his right and left, and without any central support, he maintained the honour of the French arms, and evinced coolness and perseverance.

5thly. After the battle of Neresheim he ought to have proceeded by forced marches to the Warnitz and the Altmulh, to have joined Jourdan, fixed his head-quarters at Ratisbon, fortified that point, which, next to Ulm, was of the most importance to him, and manœuvred on both banks. The junction of the two armies might

have been effected on the 15th and 16th of August; the success of the campaign would have been decided. Instead of this he did every thing his enemy could have wished; he remained twelve days inactive at the most critical period of the campaign; resolved, at length, to pass the Danube and the Lech; after which he again remained sixteen days inactive; one would have thought he did not know that there was a French army on his left. It was not until the 10th of September, a month after the battle of Neresheim, and when the Army of the Sambre and Meuse was already on the Lahn, eighty leagues from him, that he resolved to detach Desaix's division on the left bank of the Danube to obtain intelligence of Jourdan. On the 19th of September he commenced his retreat and repassed the Lech; the Army of the Sambre and Meuse was then *hors de combat* on the left bank of the Rhine, and he had all the enemy's forces to contend with. He remained thus thirty-two days in presence of General Latour, whose forces were not above half equal to his own, without attacking him, giving battle, and overwhelming him; on the contrary, he did him no harm whatever. The only important affair in this campaign was the battle of Biberach, which arose from the necessity there was for the army to secure its retreat; a battle which would have had more important

results, if operations had been continued, the following day, by the pursuit of General Latour with part of the army, whilst the rest manœuvred to open the debouchés of the Black Mountains. It was in this retreat that the importance of Ulm, that key of the Danube, was felt.

6thly. On arriving at Freyburg and Vieux Brisach on the 14th of October, there were two courses to choose between; either to repass the Rhine the same day, and give the army an opportunity of resting, in order to combine with the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, or to march immediately against Prince Charles to take advantage of his not being yet in force, drive him beyond the Renchen and the Murg, and prevent his junction with Latour; the French would have maintained their ground in the country of Baden and in Brisgaw. Instead of that, the French general remained in position on Freyburg, allowing Prince Charles to rally all his detachments; and what is more extraordinary still, after detaching a third of his army under General Desaix to the right bank of the Rhine, he still persisted in the same irresolution, exposing the other two-thirds to total destruction. This error was important; the army re-entered France in disorder, and like an army vanquished and beaten, an attitude in which, previously to the 20th, it did not stand, being proud of the victory of Biberach;

nor would it have had this appearance if it had returned sooner.

7thly. A peculiar circumstance of this campaign is, that the French generals, notwithstanding their errors, sustained no material loss, and always had the opportunity of retrieving every thing. Moreau, after the battle of Biberach, was still master of the fortune of the campaign. He had only to have marched on Rothweil, crushed Petrasch and Nauendorf, who had not altogether 15,000 men; after which he should have marched against the Archduke, who was at the mouth of the Rench with less than 9000 men. Even on the 15th of October, when Moreau had arrived in the valley of the Rhine, he might still have retrieved his affairs by marching rapidly up to Kehl; he would thus have driven the Archduke from the Rench, and prevented his junction with Nauendorf's and Latour's corps; and as he would have then been in communication with the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, he would unquestionably have induced that army to advance. Lastly, he might still have rectified his mistakes even during the siege of his *têtes-de-pont*. Had he debouched by the intrenched camp of Kehl with 50,000 men, he might have overwhelmed General Latour's besieging army, which did not, at most, exceed 35,000

men, and might still have taken up his winter quarters on the Danube.

Observation IV.—1st. The French and Austrian armies were equal in numbers, but the Archduke had 20,000 cavalry more than his enemy. This advantage would have been decisive with any other nation, but the Germans do not know how to avail themselves of their cavalry; they are afraid to hazard it, they estimate it above its real value, and spare it too much. The horse artillery is the complement of the cavalry service: 20,000 horse and 120 pieces of light artillery are equal to 60,000 infantry with 120 pieces of cannon. In countries consisting of extensive plains, such as Egypt, or of deserts, such as Poland, it would be difficult to say which would eventually have the advantage; 2000 cavalry with twelve pieces of light artillery are therefore equal to 6000 infantry with six pieces of cannon. In line of battle these divisions occupy a line of 500 toises, twelve infantry or four horsemen per toise. A cannon-shot, which should kill all that stands on the ground having a frontage of one toise, would therefore kill twelve foot soldiers, or four horsemen and four horses. The loss of twelve foot soldiers is much more considerable than that of four horsemen and four horses, because it is a loss of eight men against one of four horses. The

equipments of four horsemen and their horses are not equal in value to those of twelve foot-soldiers; thus even in a financial point of view, the loss of the infantry is more costly than that of the cavalry. If the Archduke had commanded the troops of a nation accustomed to employ the cavalry boldly, and had had officers trained to encourage them and lead them to victory, it would have been impossible for a French army to penetrate into Germany with an inferiority of 20,000 cavalry. This will seem clear, when it is considered what Napoleon effected with cavalry against the Russian and Prussian infantry, at Vauchamp, Nangis, &c.

2dly. In June, when the Archduke heard that the French army had passed the Rhine at Kehl, he marched from the banks of the Lahn to the aid of General Latour; he left General Wartensleben with 36,000 men on the Lower Rhine, and 26,000 men in the intrenched camp of Hechfshein before Mentz. The Archduke ought only to have left 8000 men in garrison at Mentz with some thousands of convalescents, and only 25,000 men with Wartensleben, and should then have proceeded with 60,000 men, to the aid of his army of the Upper Rhine; he would then have been able to assemble from 90 to 100,000 men upon the Alb. Who could then have resisted him?

On the 9th of July he would have beaten Desaix, driven him to the left bank of the Rhine, and gained possession of Kehl and the bridge of the Rhine. He had nothing to fear from the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, because it was disjoined; but even if it had resumed offensive operations, and arrived on the Mein between the 10th and 15th of July, how would that have effected him, if he had then been master of Kehl, and Moreau's army had been driven into Alsace?

3dly. Had he collected in a single camp on his right, the 50,000 men he had on the Alb, and debouched in three columns on the Murg on the 9th of July, he would have turned Desaix on his right and left, and broken him in the centre; he would have routed him, driven him into Alsace, and gained possession of the bridge of Kehl. Saint-Cyr, cut off from the Rhine, would have been repulsed to the Necker, and Ferino on Huminguen. When two armies are in line against each other, and one of them has, like the French army, to effect its retreat by a bridge, whilst the other, like the Austrian army, can retreat on all points of the semi-circumference, the latter has every advantage, and every opportunity of making daring attempts, striking grand blows, manœuvring on the flanks of the enemy; it holds all the aces, and has only to play them.

4thly. The Archduke ought to have armed and victualled Ulm, that key of the Danube, and thrown a good garrison into it.

5thly. The battle of Neresheim was his only remaining resource to prevent the junction of the two French armies on the Altmulh; had he been victorious, he would have driven the Army of the Rhine and Moselle into the Wurtemberg Alps and on the Necker, and the principal army being defeated, that of the Sambre and Meuse, which was only secondary, would have been compelled to retreat on the Mein. At the battle of Neresheim the French army was scattered over a line of eight leagues, in a difficult country, without any *appui* for its flanks; the Archduke was master of the whole course of the Danube; his attacks ought to have been wholly made by the left; he should have taken a line of battle parallel to the Danube: his retreat was secured on Ulm, and the bridges of Guntzburg and Dillingen; had he manœuvred thus, he would have gained a great victory. The French would have paid dearly for their folly in not supporting their right on the Danube, and not having had Ulm occupied by Ferino.

6thly. Being unsuccessful at the battle of Neresheim, the Archduke relinquished all opposition to the junction of the French armies; had

he still wished to prevent it, he would have operated his retreat by the Warnitz and the Altmulh, maintaining himself on the left bank of the Danube; leaving 30,000 men under General Latour behind the Warnitz, he would have gained the five or six marches he wanted for advancing against Jourdan; instead of that, he passed the Danube, the Warnitz, and the Altmulh. Wartensleben manœuvred during the whole month of August to get away from the Danube and cover Bohemia. Nothing thenceforth opposed the junction of the two French armies.

7thly. In passing the Danube and the Lech, after the battle of Neresheim, the Archduke had no other object in view, whatever may have been asserted, than to cover Bavaria. His position was delicate: the Army of the Rhine and Moselle consisted of 60,000 men; that of the Sambre and Meuse of 50,000; this made, therefore, 110,000 men, whom he might consider as assembled before Ratisbon, and occupying positions on both sides of the Danube; he had but 90,000 men to oppose them with. The battle of Neresheim had made his situation worse: it had been advantageous to the French. His confidence was restored when he found that Moreau, who had remained several days inactive, showed the greatest hesitation, marched on Donawerth, countermarched on Aichstett, and did not even send

out scouts on the Altmülh; in short, that the French generals were manœuvring as if they had been mutually ignorant of the existence of another French army in Germany; that the 400 Hungarian hussars, who were observing the Altmülh, were still there, and sending parties to the very gates of Nuremberg and on the Warnitz. It was then that he conceived the idea of his fine movement, passed the Danube with 28,000 men on the 17th of August, and advanced against the Army of the Sambre and Meuse. It is related that when he spoke on the subject to General Latour, whom he left with 30,000 men on the Lech, that general, alarmed at the danger which this small corps was about to incur, made some observations to him: "How would it be "possible for him," he said, "to make head "against a victorious French army of twice his "strength?" To which the Prince replied: "Of "what importance will Moreau's arriving before "Vienna be, if I beat Jourdan's army in the "mean time?" He was right, but he should have encouraged the general by posting him in advance of Ratisbon, with orders to place himself on the left bank of the Danube; Moreau would not, in that case, have been able to make any attempt on the left bank.

8thly. The Archduke did not attack Bernadotte at Neumarck until the 22d of August; that is to

say, five days after the passage of the Danube; he attacked him with little vigour, and did him no harm; it was a fine thought ill executed. Bernadotte ought to have been surrounded and attacked twenty-four hours after the passage of the Danube, with such impetuosity and superiority of force that his total defeat must have been the result.

9thly. He marched on Amberg on the 24th of August, but only with a few troops; he employed the greater part of his 28,000 men on secondary objects; he ought only to have sent a few squadrons to follow Bernadotte, and to have fallen furiously, with his whole corps, on the rear of Jourdan's corps; he might thus have decided the campaign on the banks of the Naab.

10thly. On the 20th of September, when Jourdan disjoined his army, and repassed to the left bank of the Rhine, the Archduke ought to have advanced on Ulm with 40,000 men, ordered General Latour to pass to the left bank of the Danube at the bridge of Ingolstadt, and joined him by forced marches. He would have reached Ulm at the same time as the French army, which would then have had to make head against 70,000 men; and its retreat would then have become difficult indeed. But instead of that, the Archduke brought only 12,000 men to the Upper Rhine, leaving a great number of troops on the

Lower Rhine with General Werneck to no purpose. He also misemployed part of these 12,000 men in secondary objects, so that he arrived before Kehl with only 8 or 9000 men.

11thly. He ought to have ordered Latour, Frœlich, and Nadasti, to manœuvre on the left bank of the Danube, outflanking the retreating army; they would have been in position there to receive Petrasch and all the detachments.

12thly. In this campaign the Archduke manœuvred on good principles, but timidly, like a man who perceives, but has not studied them. He struck no decisive blow; and up to the last moment, as we have already noticed, the French generals might always have retrieved their affairs; whereas the Archduke ought to have decided the campaign in the action of the Murg.

Observation V.—At the end of December, the French armies had had two months' rest; they were re-organized, recruited, perfectly recovered, and superior to the two Austrian armies opposed to them: nevertheless, Prince Charles ventured at once to open the trenches before the *têtes-de-pont* of Kehl and Huninguen in their presence. If the whole Army of the Rhine, reinforced by a detachment from that of the Sambre and Meuse, had debouched by Kehl or by Huninguen, it might have attacked Prince Charles's camps at daybreak with twice his force, carried all his lines

of countervallation, taken the whole of his artillery, parks, and magazines, and gained a brilliant victory, which would have compensated for the disasters of the campaign, restored the honour of the French arms, placed Germany in a hazardous situation, and allowed the French to winter on the right bank of the Rhine. If the French army had only been composed of new-levied troops, raw and untrained soldiers, a supposition precisely contrary to the fact, the French general could not, certainly, have ventured to attempt the raising of sieges by a battle; but in that case, having more arms, more means, and a more advantageous position than the enemy, he ought to have heaped works on works, and batteries on batteries; to have approached by lines of counter-attack, supported by the positions of the left bank and by the isles; and then even these sieges must have proved ruinous to the enemy, occasioned the destruction of his equipments, military stores, and troops, and obliged him, through weariness, to go into winter-quarters.

These two sieges do not show Prince Charles's prudence, but are extremely glorious to his army, and prove its bravery and excellent spirit; they have always been considered by military men as events little honourable to the French armies. The possession of the two *têtes-de-pont* was, in fact, very important to France; the

Rhine is a great obstacle; it obliged the enemy to abandon the whole valley of the Rhine, as far as the Black Mountains, to the French army, which would have been advantageous at once, both in a military and financial point of view. Apprehensions for Germany would not have allowed the Austrians to carry so many troops into Italy. The French officers have alleged, by way of excuse, that the government left them exposed to the greatest privations, that the pay was in arrear, that they were ill fed, and that the engineers and artillery had no money to supply their occasions. But these reasons have not been thought satisfactory; these privations only tend to prove, that it was necessary to confound the enemy by a clap of thunder and a decisive battle in which all chances would have been in favour of the French. There was more than sufficient space for an army of 50,000 men to deploy in the isles and in the ground comprised between the Priest's-cap and the Kintzig.

The Austrian officers who have wished to justify Prince Charles's imprudence and inconsiderateness in commencing these sieges, have stated that he was aware of the discouragement which existed in the French armies, of the astonishment which the result of the campaign had excited in the leaders, and that it was chiefly on their irresolute conduct that he calculated for

conducting so dangerous an enterprise to a fortunate issue, which he considered necessary for the success of his intended campaign in Italy. Others have said that these sieges were undertaken by order of the Court of Vienna and against his opinion, which is possible.

CHAPTER XII.

BATTLE OF ARCOLE.

I. Marshal Alvinzi arrives in Italy at the head of a third army. —II. Good condition of the French army; all the nations of Italy confident of its success. — III. Battle of the Brenta, (Nov. 5); Vaubois evacuates the Tyrol in disorder.—IV. Battle of Caldiero, (Nov. 12).—V. Murmurs and various sentiments of the French soldiers. — VI. Nocturnal march of the army on Ronco, where the troops pass the Adige over a bridge of boats, (Nov. 14.); the army re-enters Verona in triumph, by the Venetian gate, on the right bank, (Nov. 18).

I.

All the couriers who reached Vienna with news of Prince Charles's successes, were followed by couriers from Wurmser, bringing accounts of his disasters. The court passed the whole month of September in these alternations of joy and sorrow. The satisfaction derived from its triumphs, did not compensate for the consternation excited by its defeats. Germany was saved, but Italy was lost: the army which

guarded that frontier had disappeared. Its numerous staff, its old marshal, and a remnant of troops, had only been able to find temporary safety by shutting themselves up in Mantua, which place, reduced to the last extremity, in want of every thing, and ravaged by the autumnal fevers, would soon be compelled to open its gates to the conqueror. The Aulic Council felt the necessity of making extraordinary efforts: it assembled two armies; the first in the Frioul, the other in the Tyrol; appointed Marshal Alvinzi to command them, and ordered him to march to save Mantua and deliver Wurmser.

II.

The influence of the proceedings of the Armies of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine was calculated to be speedily felt in Italy. If those two armies should not maintain themselves on the right bank of the Rhine, it was of the utmost importance that they should send strong detachments to reinforce the Army of Italy. The Directory promised much, but performed little; they sent, however, twelve battalions, drafted from the Army of la Vendée, who reached Milan in the course of September and October; care was taken to make them march in twelve columns. The notion was spread abroad that each of these columns was a regiment, and had its full comple-

ment of men, which would have been a very considerable reinforcement. It is true that the French soldiers did not need encouragement; they were full of confidence in their chief and in their own superiority; they were well paid, clothed, and fed; the artillery was fine and numerous; the cavalry well mounted. The Italians of every state had connected themselves with the interest of the army on which their liberty and independence depended; they were as much convinced of the superiority of the French over the German soldiers, as of that of the general who had vanquished Beaulieu and Wurmser, over Marshal Alvinzi. Public opinion had undergone a great change since the preceding month of July. At that time, when Wurmser's approach was announced, all Italy expected his triumph; at present no one doubted that of the French army. The public spirit of the Transpadan States, of Bologna, Modena, and Reggio, was such that they might be depended on for repulsing the Pope's army themselves, if it should enter their territories according to the threats held out.

III.

In the beginning of October Marshal Alvinzi was still with his army before the Isonzo; but at the end of that month, he removed his head-quarters to Conegliano, behind the Piave. Massena,

stationed at Bassano, was watching his movements. Davidowich had assembled a corps d'armée of 18,000 men in the Tyrol, inclosing the Tyrolese militia. The General of division Vaubois covered Trent, occupying the Avisio with a corps of 12,000 men. Augereau's division, the reserve of cavalry, and the head-quarters of the French army, were at Verona. Alvinzi's plan was to effect his junction with Davidowich in Verona, and to march thence on Mantua. On the 1st of November he threw two bridges across the Piave, and marched in three columns towards the Brenta. Massena, threatening to attack him, compelled him to deploy his whole army; and when he had ascertained that it amounted to upwards of 40,000 men, he raised his camp of Bassano, repassed the Brenta, and approached Vicenza, where Napoleon joined him with Augereau's division and his reserve; and on the 6th, at day-break, advanced to give battle to Alvinzi, who had followed Massena's movement. He had fixed his head-quarters at Fonte Niva; his van, under General Liptay, on the right bank of the Brenta, at Carmignano, in advance of his left, which was commanded by General Provera. His right, under the command of Quasdanowich, was in position between Bassano and Vicenza. General Metrouski commanded a corps of observation in the gorges of the Brenta, and General Hohenzol-

lern commanded his reserve. Massena attacked at dawn of day, and after an action of several hours drove back the van, Quasdanowich, Liptay, and Provera's division, to the left bank of the river, killing a great number of men, and making many prisoners. Napoleon advanced against Quasdanowich at the head of Augereau's division, and drove him from Lenove upon Bassano. It was four o'clock in the afternoon; he considered the passage of the bridge and the taking of the town on this day as of the greatest importance; but Hohenzollern having come up, he ordered his brigade of reserve to advance for the purpose of seconding the attack of the bridge; a battalion of 900 Croats, which had been cut off, had thrown themselves into a village on the high road; as soon as the head of the reserve appeared to cross the village, it was received with a very brisk fire; it became necessary to bring up howitzers. The village was taken, and the Croats shot; but a delay of two hours had taken place, and the troops did not reach the bridge until night; they were obliged to postpone the forcing of this passage until the following day.

Vaubois had received orders to attack the enemy's positions on the right bank of the Avisio. On the 1st of November, he attacked those of Saint-Michael and Sogonzano. The enemy were

in considerable force, and defended themselves with the greatest intrepidity. Vaubois was not altogether successful, nor was the attempt he made the following day more fortunate. At length he was himself attacked in turn, his position of the Avisio was forced, and he was obliged to abandon Trent. Having rallied his troops, he took up a position at Calliano; but Landon, manœuvring by the right bank of the Adige, with his Tyrolese, had outflanked him, and got possession of Nomi and Torbole. It appeared to be his intention to advance on Montebaldo and Rivoli. Vaubois had no longer any troops on the right bank, or any means of opposing this manœuvre, which, had it been executed by the enemy, would have endangered not only his corps but the whole of the French army. This news reached the French head-quarters at two in the morning. There was now no room for hesitation; it was indispensably necessary to hasten to Verona, now so imminently threatened, and to abandon the former plan, with every idea of making a diversion. The original scheme of the General-in-chief was, after driving Alvinzi beyond the Piave, to proceed up the defiles of the Brenta, and to cut off Davidowich. Colonel Vignoles, of the staff, a confidential officer, was sent to collect all the troops he could muster at Verona, and to march with them on la Corona

and Rivoli. He found there a battalion of the 40th, just arrived from la Vendée, and overawed the first skirmishers of the enemy, who came up to la Corona. On the following day, Joubert reached that important position, with the 4th light demi-brigade, brought from the blockade of Mantua: after this there was nothing to apprehend. At the same time Vaubois threw bridges over the Adige, crossed back to the right bank, and proceeded to occupy the position of la Corona and Rivoli in force.

From the Brenta, the French army filed through the city of Vicenza, during the whole of the 7th. The inhabitants who had witnessed the victory it had gained, could not account for this movement in retreat. Alvinzi had also com menced his retreat, at three in the morning, to pass the Piave; but he was soon informed by his light cavalry of the retrograde movement of the French army. He returned on the Brenta, and the next day passed that river to follow his antagonist's movement.

Napoleon had Vaubois' division assembled on the plain of Rivoli, and addressed them thus: "Soldiers, I am not satisfied with you; you "have shown neither discipline, perseverance, "nor bravery; no position could rally you; you "abandoned yourselves to a panic terror. You "suffered yourselves to be driven from positions

" in which a handful of brave men might have " stopped an army. Soldiers of the 39th and " 85th, you are not French soldiers. Quarter- " master-general, let it be inscribed on their " colours, *They no longer form part of the Army of* " *Italy!*" This harangue, pronounced in a severe tone, drew tears from these old soldiers: the rules of discipline could not suppress the accents of their grief: several grenadiers, who had received honorary arms, cried out, " General, we " have been calumniated; place us in the van, " and you shall see whether the 39th and 85th " belong to the Army of Italy." Having thus produced the effect he wished, Napoleon addressed a few words of consolation to them. These two regiments a few days after covered themselves with glory.

IV.

Notwithstanding the reverses which Alvinzi had sustained on the Brenta, his operations were crowned with the most brilliant success. He was master of the whole of the Tyrol, and of all the country between the Brenta and the Adige. But the most difficult task still remained, namely, to force the passage of the Adige in the face of the French army, and to effect his junction with Davidowich by marching over the bodies of the brave soldiers posted before

Verona. The road from Verona to Vicenza runs along the Adige for three leagues, as far as Villa-nuova, where it turns at right angles to the left, and runs straight to Vicenza. At Villa-nuova the little river Alpon cuts it, and after running through Arcole falls into the Adige, near Albaredo. To the left of Villa-nuova are some heights known by the name of the position of Caldiero, by occupying which Verona is covered, and it becomes easy to fall on the rear of an enemy manœuvring on the lower Adige. As soon as the defence of Montebaldo was provided for, and Vaubois' troops had regained their confidence, Napoleon determined to occupy Caldiero, as affording more chances in favour of defensive operations, and more energy to his attitude. On the 11th, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the army passed the bridges of Verona. Verdier's brigade, which was at the head, overthrew the enemy's vanguard, made several hundred prisoners, and took up a position, at night, at the foot of Caldiero. The fires of the bivouacs and the reports of spies and prisoners, left no doubt respecting Alvinzi's intentions: he meant to receive battle, and had fixed himself firmly in these fine positions, resting his left on the marsh of Arcole, and his right on Mount Olivetto and the village of Colognola. This position is good in both directions. He had covered himself by some

redoubts and formidable batteries. At day-break the enemy's line was perceived: his left was impregnable; his right seemed ill supported. Massena received orders to march with his division to take advantage of this defect by occupying a hill which outflanked the enemy's right, and which he had neglected to occupy. Brigadier General Launay intrepidly climbed the acclivity at the head of a corps of skirmishers; but, having advanced too far, the division which was to support him could not come up with him in time, being stopped by a ravine, and he was repulsed and taken prisoner. The enemy, now apprised of their error, immediately rectified their position; and it was no longer possible to attack them with any hope of success. In the mean time the whole line engaged, and the fire was maintained throughout the day. The rain fell in torrents; the ground was so completely soaked that the French artillery could make no movement, whilst that of the Austrians, being in position and advantageously placed, produced its full effect. The enemy made several attempts to attack in his turn, but was repulsed with loss. The two armies bivouacked in their respective positions. It continued to rain all night so heavily that the General-in-chief judged it expedient to return into his camp before Verona. The loss in this affair was equal on both sides;

the enemy, with reason, claimed the victory; his advanced posts approached Saint-Michael's, and the situation of the French was become truly hazardous.

V.

Vaubois had suffered considerable loss; he had not now above 8000 men left. The other two divisions, after having fought valiantly on the Brenta, and failed in their operation on Caldiero, did not now amount to more than 13,000 men under arms. The idea of the superior strength of the enemy pervaded every mind. Vaubois' soldiers, in excuse for their retreat, declared that the enemy were three to one against them. The enemy had also suffered loss, no doubt, but he had gained great advantages. He had counted the small number of the French at his ease; and accordingly he had no longer any doubt of the deliverance of Mantua, or of the conquest of Italy. In his delirium of confidence, he had a great number of scaling-ladders made, and loudly threatened to take Verona by storm. The garrison of Mantua had awakened from its lethargy, and made frequent sorties, incessantly harassing the besiegers, who amounted only to 8 or 9000 men, and had to restrain a garrison of 25,000, out of which number, however, there were 10 or 12,000 sick. The French were no

" diers of Italy patiently endure the insults and " provocations of these slaves ?"

When it became known at Brescia, Bergamo, Milan, Cremona, Lodi, Pavia, and Bologna, that the army had sustained a check, the wounded and sick left the hospitals, before they were well cured, to resume their stations in the ranks; the wounds of many of these brave men were still bleeding. This affecting sight filled the mind with the most lively emotion.

VI.

At length, on the 14th of November, at night-fall, the camp of Verona got under arms: three columns began their march in the deepest silence, crossed the city, passed the Adige by the three bridges, and formed on the right bank. The hour of departure, the direction taken, which was that of a retreat, the silence observed in the order of the day, contrary to the invariable custom of announcing that an engagement is to take place, the state of affairs, every thing, in short, indicated that the army was retreating. The first step in retreat would necessarily be followed by the raising of the siege of Mantua, and foreboded the loss of Italy. Those amongst the inhabitants who placed the hopes of their future lot in the victories of the French, followed with anxious and aching hearts the movements of

this army, which was depriving them of every hope. But the army, instead of keeping the Peschiera road, suddenly turned to the left, marched along the Adige, and arrived before day-light at Ronco, where Andreossy was completing a bridge. By the first rays of the sun, the troops were astonished to find themselves, by merely facing to the left, on the opposite shore. The officers and soldiers who had traversed this country before, when in pursuit of Wurmser, now began to guess the General's intention: he intended to turn Caldiero, which he had not been able to carry by an attack in front: not being able with 13,000 men to withstand 40,000 in the plain, he was removing his field of battle to roads surrounded by vast marshes, where numbers would be unavailing, but where the courage of the heads of the columns would decide every thing. The hopes of victory now animated every heart, and every man vowed to surpass himself in order to second so fine and daring a plan. Kilmaine had remained in Verona with 1500 men of all arms, with the gates closed, and all communication strictly prohibited; the enemy was therefore completely ignorant of this movement. The bridge of Ronco was constructed on the right of the Alpon, about a quarter of a league from its mouth; which situation has been censured by ill-informed

military men. In fact; if the bridge had been carried to the left bank opposite Alberedo; 1st, the army would have had to debouch on a vast plain, the very thing which the General wished to avoid; 2dly, Alvinzi, who occupied the heights of Caldiero, might have covered the march of a column which he would have directed on Verona, by stationing troops on the right bank of the Alpon: he would have forced Verona, feebly guarded as it was, and would have effected his junction with the Army of the Tyrol; the division of Rivoli, taken between two fires, would have been obliged to retreat on Peschiera, and the whole army would have been strangely compromised: Whereas, by constructing the bridge to the right of the Alpon, the invaluable advantages were secured, 1st, of drawing the enemy into three roads crossing an immense marsh; 2dly, of being in communication with Verona, by the dyke which runs up the Adige and passes by the villages of Porcil and Gambione, where Alvinzi's head-quarters were, without leaving any position for the enemy to take, or any natural obstacle to cover the movement of any troops he might detach to attack Verona. Such an attack was, indeed, now impossible, for the whole French army would have taken such troops in the rear, whilst the walls of the city would have stopped them in front. Three roads branch out

from the bridge of Ronco; the first, on the left, goes up the Adige towards Verona, passes the villages of Biönde and Porcil, where it debouches in a plain; the second and centre one, leads to Villa-Nuova, and runs through the village of Arcole, crossing the Alpon by a little stone bridge; the third, on the right, runs down the Adige and leads to Albaredo. It is 3600 toises from Ronco to Porcil, 2000 from Porcil to Caldiero, and three leagues from Caldiero to Verona. It is 2200 toises from Ronco to Arcole, 3000 from the bridge of Arcole to Villa-Nuova; 100 from Ronco to the mouth of the Alpon, and 500 thence to Albaredo.

Three columns entered upon these three roads; the left one marched up the Adige as far as the extremity of the marshes, at the village of Porcil, whence the soldiers perceived the steeples of Verona; it was thenceforth impossible for the enemy to march upon that city. The centre column marched on Arcole, where the French skirmishers got as far as the bridge unperceived. Two battalions of Croats, with two pieces of cannon, had bivouacs there for the purpose of guarding the rear of the army, and watching any parties which the garrison of Legnago might send into the country; that place being only three leagues off, on the right. The ground between Arcole and the Adige was not guarded; Alvinzi

had contented himself with ordering patroles of hussars, who thrice every day visited the dykes of the marshes on the side of the Adige. The road from Ronco to Arcole meets the Alpon 1200 toises from Ronco; it then runs along the right bank of that little rivulet for 10,000 toises, as far as the stone bridge which turns to the right, at right angles, and leads into the village of Arcole. The Croats were bivouacked with their right supported on the village and their left towards the mouth of the rivulet, with the dyke in their front, separated from them by the stream; by firing in front, they took the column, the head of which was near Arcole, in flank; the soldiers fell back precipitately as far as the point where the road ceases to expose the flank to the left bank. Augereau, indignant at this retrograde movement of his van, rushed upon the bridge at the head of two battalions of grenadiers; but, being received by a brisk flank-fire, he was driven back on his division. Alvinzi, being informed of this attack, could not at first comprehend, but at day-break he was enabled to observe the movement of the French from the neighbouring steeples. His reconnoitring parties of hussars were received with discharges of musquetry on all the dykes, and pursued by the cavalry; he then plainly saw that the French had passed the Adige and were in his rear. It seemed to him

absurd to suppose that a whole army could thus have been thrown into impassable marshes; he thought it must be some light troops which had moved in this direction to alarm him, and to mask a real attack by troops which would debouch by the Verona road. But his reconnoitring parties having brought him intelligence that all was quiet towards Verona, he thought it important to drive these light troops from the marshes. He therefore directed a division, commanded by Metrouski, on the dyke of Arcole, and another on the left dyke, commanded by Provera. Towards nine o'clock in the morning they attacked with impetuosity. Massena, who was intrusted with the left dyke, having allowed the enemy to get fairly upon the dyke, made a desperate charge, broke his column, repulsed him with great loss, and took a number of prisoners. The same thing happened on the dyke of Arcole. As soon as the enemy had passed the elbow of the road, he was charged and routed by Augereau, leaving prisoners and cannon in the victor's hands: the marsh was covered with dead. It became of the utmost importance to gain possession of Arcole, for, by debouching thence on the enemy's rear, we should have seized the bridge of Villa-Nuova over the Alpon, which was his only retreat, and established ourselves there before it could be occupied against us; but Arcole withstood seve-

ral attacks. Napoleon determined to try a last effort in person; he seized a flag, rushed on the bridge, and there planted it; the column he commanded had reached the middle of the bridge, when the flanking fire and the arrival of a division of the enemy frustrated the attack; the grenadiers at the head of the column, finding themselves abandoned by the rear, hesitated, but being hurried away in the flight, they persisted in keeping possession of their General; they seized him by his arms and by his clothes, and dragged him along with them amidst the dead, the dying, and the smoke; he was precipitated into a morass, in which he sunk up to the middle, surrounded by the enemy. The grenadiers perceived that their General was in danger; a cry was heard of "*Forward, soldiers, to save the General!*" These brave men immediately turned back, ran upon the enemy, drove him beyond the bridge, and Napoleon was saved. This was the day of military devotedness. Lannes, who had been wounded at Governolo, had hastened from Milan; he was still suffering; he threw himself between the enemy and Napoleon, covering him with his body, and received three wounds, determined never to abandon him. Muiron, Napoleon's aide-de-camp, was killed in covering his General with his own body. Heroic and affecting death! Belliard and Vignoles were wounded in

rallying the troops forward. The brave General Robert was killed, he was a soldier who never shrunk from the enemy's fire.

General Guieux passed the Adige at the ferry of Albaredo with a brigade. Arcole was taken in the rear; but in the mean time Alvinzi, having ascertained the real state of affairs, had become fully sensible of the danger of his position; he had abandoned Caldiero precipitately, destroyed his batteries, and made all his parks and reserves repass the bridge. From the top of the steeple of Ronco the French had the mortification to see this booty escape them; and it was only by witnessing the precipitate movements of the enemy that the whole extent and consequences of Napoleon's plan could be comprehended. Every one then saw what might be the results of so profound and daring a combination. The enemy's army was escaping from destruction by a hasty retreat; General Guieux was not able to march on Arcole by the left bank of the Alpon until near four o'clock: the village was carried without striking a blow; but it was now unimportant, being six hours too late; the enemy had resumed his natural position. Arcole was now only an intermediate post between the fronts of the two armies, whereas in the morning it had been in the rear of the enemy. The day was, however, crowned with

important results. Caldiero was evacuated; Verona was no longer in danger; two divisions of Alvinzi's army had been defeated with considerable loss; numerous columns of prisoners, and a great number of trophies, filed off through the camp, and filled the officers and soldiers with enthusiasm; the troops regained their spirits, and the confidence of victory.

In the mean time Davidowich with the corps of the Tyrol had attacked and taken la Corona; he occupied Rivoli. Vaubois occupied the heights of Bussolengo; Kilmaine, relieved from all apprehensions for the left bank by the evacuation of Caldiero, had directed his attention to the walls of Verona and the right bank; but if Davidowich should march on Vaubois, and force him to throw himself on Mantua, he would oblige the French to raise the blockade of that city, and cut off the retreat of the head-quarters and the army which were at Ronco. It is thirteen leagues from Rivoli to Mantua, and ten from Ronco to that city, by very bad roads; it was therefore necessary to be ready, by daylight, to support Vaubois, protect the blockade of Mantua and the communications of the army, and beat Davidowich, who had advanced in the course of the day. In order to succeed in this plan, it was necessary to calculate the hours. The General-in-chief, uncertain what might have

passed during the day, thought it best to suppose that every thing had been unfortunate on Vaubois' side; that he had been forced, and had taken up a position between Roverbella and Castel-Nuovo. He caused Arcole, which had cost so much blood, to be evacuated; made the army fall back on the right bank of the Adige, leaving on the left bank only one brigade and a few pieces of cannon, and ordered the soldiers to prepare their mess in this position. If the enemy had marched on Rivoli, the bridge over the Adige must have been raised, and the army must have disappeared before Alvinzi, and reached Vaubois in time to assist him. He left bivouacs at Arcole with lighted fires kept up by piquets of the grand guard, in order that Alvinzi should perceive nothing. At four in the morning the army got under arms; but at the same time one of Vaubois' officers brought word that he was at six o'clock the preceding evening still at Bussolengo, and that Davidowich had not moved. That general had commanded one of Wurmser's corps; he remembered the lesson he had received, and was not forward to compromise himself. Alvinzi, however, being informed of the retrograde march of the French about three in the morning, had Arcole and Porcil occupied, and at day-light directed two columns on the two dykes. The firing began

about 200 toises from the bridge of Ronco, which the French crossed again in charging-time, fell on the enemy, broke them, and pursued them as far as the outlets of the morasses, which they filled with the Austrian dead. Several standards and cannon, and a number of prisoners, were the trophies of this day, on which two more Austrian divisions were defeated. In the evening the General-in-chief, from the same motives and calculations as the preceding day, made the same movements as before, concentrating all his troops on the right bank of the Adige, and leaving only a van-guard on the left bank.

Alvinzi, deceived by a spy who assured him that the French were marching on Mantua and had only left a van-guard at Ronco, debouched from his camp before dawn. At five in the morning, it was known at the French head-quarters that Davidowich had made no movement, and that Vaubois was still in the same positions; the army again crossed the bridge; the heads of the columns of the two armies met half way up the dykes; the action was obstinate, and for a moment doubtful, the 75th being broken; the balls reached the bridge. The General placed the 32d in ambush, lying on their faces, in a little wood of willows, along the dyke, near the head of the bridge; they rose at the

proper moment, fired a volley, charged bayonets, and overthrew into the morass a close column of 3000 Croats, who all perished there. Massena, on the left, experienced some vicissitudes; but he marched at the head of his troops, with his hat at the end of his sword by way of a standard, and made a horrible carnage of the division opposed to him. In the afternoon the General-in-chief conceived that the decisive moment had at length arrived; for if Vaubois had been defeated this day by Davidowich, he would have been obliged to proceed the next night to his aid and to that of Mantua. Alvinzi would then advance on Verona, and would carry off the honour and benefit of victory; and all the advantages gained during these last three days would be lost: whereas by repulsing Alvinzi beyond Villa-Nuova, he would be enabled to march to the assistance of Vaubois, by Verona. He had the prisoners carefully counted, and recapitulated the losses of the enemy, by which means he convinced himself that the Austrian force had been diminished by upwards of 25,000 men, in the course of these three days; so that henceforth, his number in the field would not exceed those of the French by much more than a third. He ordered the army to march out of the morasses, and to attack the enemy in the plain. The events of these three days

had so materially altered the characters of the two armies, that victory was certain. The army passed the bridge constructed at the mouth of the Alpon: Elliot, aide-de-camp to the General-in-chief, had been charged to construct a second; he was killed there. At two o'clock in the afternoon the French army was formed in line, with its left on Arcole, and its right in the direction of Porto Legnago. The enemy was in front, with his right resting on the Alpon and his left on some marshes; he occupied both sides of the Vicenza road. Adjutant-general Lorset had marched from Legnago with 6 or 700 men, four pieces of cannon, and 200 horse, to turn the marshes on which the enemy supported his left. Towards three o'clock, when this detachment was advancing, the cannonade being brisk throughout the line, and the skirmishers engaged, Major Hercule was ordered to proceed with twenty-five guides and four trumpets across the reeds, and to charge the extreme left of the enemy when the garrison of Legnago should begin to cannonade them in the rear. That officer executed the movement in an able manner, and contributed greatly to the success of the day; the line was broken, the enemy commenced his retreat. The Austrian general had placed 6 or 7000 men in echelon in his rear, to secure his parks and his

retreat; he had not more troops than the French on the field of battle; he was closely pursued all the evening, and had a great number of men taken prisoners. The army passed the night in its position.

Notwithstanding the victories of these three days, it was matter of speculation amongst the generals and superior officers, what orders the General-in-chief would give for the next day; they thought that he would be content with having dispersed the enemy, and would not enter the plains of the Vicentine, but return to Verona by the left bank of the Adige, to march thence against Davidowich and occupy Caldiero, which had been the first object of his manœuvre. But the enemy's loss had been so severe, during these three days, both in men and confidence, that he was no longer formidable in the plain; at day-light it was perceived that he had retreated on Vicenza; the army pursued him, but, after reaching Villa-Nuova the cavalry alone continued the pursuit, the infantry waiting for reports of the stand which should be made by his rear-guard.

The General-in-chief entered the convent of St. Boniface, the church of which had served as an hospital; between 4 and 500 wounded had been crowded into it, the greater part of them were dead; a cadaverous smell issued

from the place: Napoleon was retiring, struck with horror, when he heard himself called by his name. Two unfortunate soldiers had been three days amongst the dead, without having had their wounds dressed; they despaired of relief, but were recalled to life at the sight of their General. Every assistance was afforded them.

Having ascertained by the reports that the enemy was in the utmost confusion, was making no stand in any direction, and that his rear-guard had already got beyond Montebello, Napoleon faced to the left, and proceeded to Verona to attack the Army of the Tyrol. The scouts captured a staff-officer, sent by Davidowich to Alvinzi; he came from the mountains, and supposed himself in the midst of his friends. It was found by his despatches that the enemy had had no communications for three days, and that Davidowich was ignorant of all that had taken place. In the three days' engagements at Arcole, Alvinzi had lost 18,000 men, of whom 6000 were taken prisoners, four standards, and eighteen pieces of cannon.

The French army re-entered Verona in triumph by the Venice gate, three days after having quitted that city almost clandestinely by the Milan gate. It would be difficult to conceive the astonishment and enthusiasm of the inhabitants; the most declared enemies of the French could

not suppress their admiration, and added their homage to that of the patriots. The army, however, made no stay there, but passed the Adige and advanced on Davidowich, who had attacked Bussolengo on the 17th, and driven Vaubois on Castel-Nuovo. Massena marched thither, joined Vaubois, and attacked Rivoli. Augereau marched on Dolce, on the left bank of the Adige, took 1500 men, two pontoon trains, nine pieces of cannon, and a great quantity of baggage.

But these grand results were not obtained without loss. The army stood more than ever in need of repose; it was not expedient for it to enter the Tyrol and spread itself so far as Trent. It was to be expected that Mantua would open its gates before the Austrian general could form a new army: the garrison of that place had been reduced to half rations; desertion from it had become frequent; the hospitals were crowded to excess: every thing announced a speedy surrender: the mortality was dreadful, and diseases daily swept off more men than would have sufficed to win a great battle.

CHAPTER XIII.

NEGOTIATIONS IN 1796.

I. With the Republic of Genoa.—II. With the King of Sardinia.—III. With the Duke of Parma.—IV. With the Duke of Modena.—V. With the Court of Rome.—VI. With the Grand Duke of Tuscany.—VII. With the King of Naples.—VIII. With the Emperor of Germany.—IX. Congress of Lombardy. Cispadan Republic.

I.

THE minority of the aristocracy which governed the Republic of Genoa, the majority of the third-estate, and the whole population of the Riviera di Ponente, were friendly to the French ideas. The city of Genoa was the only city of that state of any strength; it was defended by double walls with bastions, a great quantity of artillery, 6000 soldiers of the line, and 6000 national guards. At the first signal of the Senate 30,000 men of the inferior corporations, such as those of the colliers and porters, and the peasants of the valleys of Polcevera, Beragno, and Fontana Bona, were ready to take up arms in defence of the prince. It would have required

an army of 40,000 men, a besieging-train, and two months' works, to have gained possession of this capital. In 1794, 1795, and at the beginning of 1796, the Austro-Sardinian army covered Genoa on the North, and communicated with that city by the Bocchetta; the French army covered it on the West, and communicated with it by the Corniche di Savona. Genoa, thus placed between the two belligerent armies, could with equal facility receive aid from either, and held the balance between them; had she declared for either, that one would have acquired a great advantage: under these circumstances Genoa possessed great weight in the scale of Italian affairs. The Senate was sensible of all the delicacy of this position, and of all the strength it acquired thereby; it availed itself of this strength to preserve its neutrality, and constantly disregarded the offers as well as the threats of the coalition. The commerce of the city increased, and brought immense wealth into the Republic. But the Port of Genoa had been violated by the English squadron; the catastrophe of the frigate la Modeste had made a powerful impression on the minds of the French; the Convention had dissembled, but only waited for a favourable opportunity to exact a memorable reparation. Several of the noble families most attached to France had been banished, which was another

insult that the French government had to avenge. After the battle of Loano, in the winter of 1796, the Directory was the more inclined to think the moment favourable, because the extreme poverty of its Army of Italy made it attach great importance to an extraordinary aid of five or six millions. Negotiations on the subject had commenced, when Napoleon arrived to take the command of the army; he disapproved of this mean policy, which could never have succeeded, and must necessarily have had the effect of exasperating and disgusting the important population of this capital. "We must," said he, "either scale the ramparts, fix ourselves there "by a vigorous *coup de main*, and destroy the "aristocracy; or respect its independence, and "above all, leave it in possession of its money." A few days after, the enemy's armies having been driven beyond the Po, and the King of Sardinia having laid down his arms, the Republic of Genoa was at the mercy of France. The Directory would have established democracy there, but the French armies were already too far advanced. The presence of a corps of 15,000 French under the walls of Genoa, and perhaps their stay there for several weeks, would have been necessary to ensure the success of such a revolution.

Nothing was now talked of but the march of Wurmser, who was then crossing Germany

and entering the Tyrol. From that time it became necessary to concentrate the army on the Adige, first for the purpose of defeating Wurmser, and afterwards on account of the manœuvres in the Tyrol, and Alvinzi's movements to extricate Wurmser when blockaded in Mantua. The army had, moreover, nothing to fear from the Genoese; their rulers were divided amongst themselves, and the people were favourable to us.

Girola, the Emperor's minister, taking advantage of the removal of the army, and being secretly favoured by the feudatory families, had kindled an insurrection in the Imperial Fiefs, and formed bands of Piedmontese deserters, of vagabonds thrown out of employment by the disbanding of the Piedmontese light troops, and of Austrian prisoners, who, having been ill guarded by the French, had escaped on their route. These bands infested the whole of the Apennines, and the rear of the army. In the course of June it became of urgent importance to put an end to this state of affairs; a detachment of 1200 men, and the presence of the General-in-chief at Tortona, proved sufficient to restore order and tranquillity. Napoleon then gave instructions to the French minister at Genoa to set negotiations on foot for the purpose of increasing our influence in the government, as far as that could be done without rendering the presence of an army necessary.

He required, 1st, the expulsion of the Austrian minister Girola; 2dly, that of the feudatory families, conformably to one of the statutes of the Republic; and, 3dly, the recall of the banished families.

These negotiations were much protracted. In the mean time five French merchantmen were captured under the Genoese batteries, which did not attempt to protect them. The Senate, alarmed at the menaces of the French agents, sent the senator Vincente Spinola, who was much in favour with the French, to Paris, where, after some negotiation, he signed, on the 6th of October, 1796, a convention with Charles Lacroix, the Minister of exterior relations. All the causes of complaints which France had against Genoa were consigned to oblivion; the Senate paid a contribution of four millions, and recalled the persons banished. This event would have afforded an opportunity, which ought to have been seized, of forming an offensive and defensive alliance with this Republic, adding to the Genoese territory the Imperial Fiefs and Massa di Carara, and requiring a contingent of 4200 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 200 artillery. But notwithstanding its utility, this system of alliance with oligarchs was repugnant to the feelings of the democrats of Paris. This convention, however, restored tranquillity, which con-

tinued up to the time of the convention of Montebello in 1797; and as long as the French army remained in Germany there was no reason to complain of the conduct of the people of Genoa.

II.

The armistice of Cherasco had insulated the Austrian army, and enabled the French army to drive it out of Italy, to invest Mantua, and to occupy the line of the Adige. The peace concluded at Paris in the succeeding month of May placed all the fortresses of Piedmont, except Turin, in the power of France. The King of Sardinia thus found himself at the disposal of the Republic. His army was reduced to an effective force of 20,000 men; his paper money threatened both individuals and the state with ruin; his subjects were discontented and divided; even the French ideas had a few partisans. Some politicians wished to revolutionize Piedmont, in order to get rid of all anxiety with respect to the rear of the army, and to increase our means of annoying Austria; but it was impossible to overturn the throne of Sardinia, without direct interference by means of an imposing force; and the scenes which were passing before Mantua were sufficient to occupy all the troops of the Republic in Italy; besides, the revolution in Piedmont might draw on a civil war; in which case it

would become necessary to leave in Piedmont, in order to overawe the people, more French troops than we could obtain of Piedmontese. In case of retreat, the populace, which would have been thrown into a ferment, would inevitably be guilty of excesses. Besides, might not the Kings of Spain and Prussia become alarmed, at seeing the Republic, from its hatred to monarchs, overthrow with its own hands a prince with whom it had concluded peace only a few days before? These considerations led Napoleon to the same result by an opposite road; that of an offensive and defensive treaty of alliance with the King of Sardinia. This plan combined all advantages, and was liable to no objection. In the first place, this treaty was, in itself, a proclamation which would keep the discontented in awe, who would no longer confide in the protestations of the democrats of the army, and their promises of the assistance of France; the country would therefore remain in tranquillity. 2dly. A division of fine well-disciplined veteran Piedmontese troops, consisting of 10,000 men, would reinforce the French army and afford new chances of success. 3dly. The example of the Court of Turin would have a beneficial influence on the Venetians, and contribute to determine them to seek, in an alliance with France, a guarantee for the integrity of their territory and the maintenance of their constitu-

tion; and yet the Piedmontese troops, being joined to the French army, would imbibe its spirit, and attach themselves to the general who had led them to victory; at all events they would be hostages placed in the midst of the army as a security for the disposition of the people of Piedmont towards it; and if the King could not maintain himself, placed as he was between the democratic republics of Liguria, Lombardy, and France, his fall would be the result of the nature of things, and not of a political act calculated to excite the resentment of other kings in alliance with France. "The alliance of France "with Sardinia," said Napoleon, "is like that of "a giant embracing a pigmy; if he stifles him, "it is against his will, and merely owing to the "extreme difference of their organs."

The Directory was not willing to comprehend the wisdom and profundity of this policy; it authorized the opening of negotiations, but threw obstacles in the way of their conclusion. M. Poussielgues, secretary of legation at Genoa, had conferences at Turin during several months; he found the Court disposed to form an alliance with the Republic, but evinced little diplomatic skill in suffering himself to be drawn into concessions which were evidently extravagant. He promised Lombardy to the King of Sardinia. Now it was totally out of the question to think

of increasing the territories of that prince: nor should hopes have been held out to him that were not to be realized: he was a sufficient gainer by a treaty which guaranteed the integrity of his kingdom.

When Mantua opened its gates, and Napoleon marched on Tolentino to dictate the terms of peace to the Holy See, and place himself in a situation to march on Vienna, he perceived the importance of bringing the affairs of Piedmont to a conclusion, and authorized General Clarke to negotiate, with M. de Saint-Marsan, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, which was signed at Bologna on the 1st of March 1797. The King received from the Republic the guarantee of his estates; he furnished to the French army a contingent of 8000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and twenty pieces of cannon. Having no doubt of the ratification of a treaty ordered by the General-in-chief, the Court of Turin hastened to assemble its contingent, which would have joined the army in Carinthia, but the Directory hesitated to ratify this treaty, and the contingent remained in Piedmont, in cantonments near Novarre, during the whole campaign of 1797.

III.

The policy proper to be observed towards the Infant Duke of Parma was prescribed by our

relations with Spain; in the first instance an armistice was granted him on the 9th of May, 1796, and a few months after he signed, at Paris, his peace with the Republic; but the French ministry did not know how to accomplish the object which the General-in-chief had in view. The successes of the Army of Italy had induced the King of Spain to conclude a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with the Republic, in August 1792; in consequence of which it would have been easy to prevail on the court of Madrid to send a division of 10,000 men to the Po, to guard the Infant Duke of Parma, and by means of the lure of an increase of territory for that prince, to allow that division to march under the French colours. Its presence would have overawed Rome and Naples, and would have contributed in no small degree towards the success of the military operations. The alliance with Spain having determined the English to evacuate the Mediterranean, the French and Spanish squadrons were masters of that sea, which facilitated the movements of the Spanish troops into Italy. The sight of a Spanish division in the ranks of the French army, would have had a beneficial influence on the decision of the Senate, with respect to an alliance with France, and reinforced the army with 10,000 Sclavonians.

IV.

The armistice of Milan of the 20th of May had terminated hostilities with the Duke of Modena; the French army was not numerous, the country it occupied was immense, and to detach two or three battalions for any secondary object would have been blameable. The armistice with Modena placed all the resources of that duchy at the disposal of the army, and did not require the employment of any troops to maintain public tranquillity. The commander d'Est, invested with the duke's powers, commenced negotiations at Paris for a definitive peace: the French ministry prudently took care not to expedite its conclusion. The Duke, who was entirely devoted to the Austrians, had retired to Venice, and the Regency, which governed his states, had passed several convoys of provisions into Mantua, during the raising of the blockade, in the beginning of August and latter part of September. As soon as the General-in-chief was informed of this direct infringement of the armistice, he complained to the Regency, who in vain attempted to justify themselves under colour of certain ancient treaties. Under these circumstances, however, a detachment from the garrison of Mantua, which had passed the Po at Borgo-forte, was cut off; they marched to Reggio on the 20th of October,

intending to proceed into Tuscany; the inhabitants of Reggio shut the gates of the town. The detachment took refuge in the fort of Monte Cherigio, where the patriots surrounded it, and forced it to lay down arms. Two of the inhabitants of Reggio were killed in this petty encounter, and were the first Italians who sealed the liberty of their country with their blood! The prisoners being conducted to Milan by a detachment of the national guard of Reggio, were there received in triumph by the congress of Lombardy, the national guard of Milan, and the General-in-chief. Several civic feasts were given on this occasion, which contributed to heighten the enthusiasm of the Italians. Reggio proclaimed its liberty; the people of Modena wished to follow the example, but were restrained by the garrison: in this state of affairs there was no choice. The General-in-chief declared that the armistice of Milan had been violated by the conduct of the Regency in revictualling Mantua; he caused the three duchies of Reggio, Modena, and Mirandola to be occupied by his troops, and on the 8th of October, by virtue of his right of conquest, proclaimed their independence. This resolution improved the situation of the army, by substituting, for a malevolent regency, a provisional government wholly devoted to the French cause. National guards, consisting of warm

patriots, were raised and armed in all the towns of the three duchies.

V.

Hostilities having ceased with Rome, by the armistice of Bologna of the 23d of June 1796, that Court sent Monsignor Petrarchi to Paris. After spending several weeks in conferences, that minister sent to his Court the terms of peace proposed by the Directory. The assembly of Cardinals was of opinion that they contained matters contrary to the faith, and were inadmissible. Monsignor Petrarchi was recalled. In September the negotiations were renewed at Florence; the commissioners from government to the army were furnished with the powers of the Directory. At one of the first conferences, they presented to Monsignor Galeppi, the Pope's plenipotentiary, a treaty in sixty articles, as a *sine quâ non*, declaring that they could alter nothing in it. This was also judged, at Rome, to contain matters contrary to the faith; Monsignor Galeppi was recalled, and the negotiations were broken off on the 25th of September. The Court of Rome, no longer doubting but that the French government had resolved on its destruction, abandoned itself to despair, and determined to ally itself exclusively with the Court of Vienna. It began by suspending the armistice of Bologna; it had still sixteen

millions to pay, which were on their way to Bologna, where they were to be delivered over to the treasury of the army. These convoys of money returned to Rome, where their re-entrance was a triumph. Monsignor Albani set out for Vienna on the 6th of October, to solicit the support of that court; the Roman Princes offered patriotic gifts, and raised regiments. The Pope dispersed proclamations to kindle a holy war in case the territory of the sacred see should be attacked. All these efforts of the Court of Rome were considered capable of producing an army of about 10,000 men, the worst troops possible; but this court relied on the King of Naples, who secretly engaged to support it with an army of 30,000 men; and although the enmity and bad faith of the Cabinet of the two Sicilies were known to the Vatican, its aid was invoked: "All means seem good to "them, in their delirium," wrote the minister Cacault; "they would cling to red-hot iron." This state of affairs had a pernicious effect on all Italy.

Napoleon had no need of this increase of difficulties; he was already menaced by Alvinzi, whose troops assembled in the Tyrol and on the Piave. He reproached the French ministry with having left him ignorant of negotiations which he alone was able to direct. Had he been ap-

pointed to conduct them, as ought to have been the case, he would have delayed the opening of them for two or three weeks, in order to have received 16,000,000 due from the holy see, by virtue of the armistice of Bologna. He would not have suffered spiritual and temporal affairs to be mingled in the treaty, because when once the latter, which were the most essential, were settled, the delay of a few months in coming to an arrangement with respect to the former was of no consequence; but the mischief was done. The government acknowledged this, and invested him with the authority necessary to remedy it, if possible. The object was to gain time to calm the agitation of the passions, to restore confidence, and to prevent the effects of the alarm excited in the Vatican. He directed M. Cacault, the French agent at Rome, to disavow confidentially all the spiritual part of the negotiations of Paris and Florence; to intimate that he was intrusted with the negotiation; and that neither the Directory nor the commissioners had any thing more to do with it, but himself alone. These overtures produced a good effect. To make a greater impression, the General went to Ferrara, on the 21st of October, alighted at the house of Cardinal Mattei, archbishop of that city, and had several conferences with him; he convinced him of his pacific intentions, and got him

to set off for Rome to carry words of peace directly to the Pope. A few days after, the battle of Arcole put an end to all the hopes which had been raised in Italy by Alvinzi's army. Napoleon judged this a favourable moment for concluding the affairs of Rome: he proceeded to Bologna with 1500 French and 4000 Cispadans and Lombards, threatening to march on Rome; but the Court of Rome this time despised his threats; it was in correspondence with its minister at Vienna for the purpose of treating, and knew that two new and powerful armies were advancing into Italy. The cardinal and the Austrian minister at Rome said openly, "The Pope "will evacuate Rome, if necessary; for the far- "ther the French general removes from the "Adige, the nearer we shall approach our deli- "verance." In fact, a few days after, Napoleon, being informed of Alvinzi's movements, repassed the Po, and proceeded with all possible speed to Verona. But the battle of Rivoli, in the month of January 1797, destroyed the hopes of the enemies of France for ever. Mantua shortly after opened its gates; the moment for punishing Rome had now arrived; a small Gallo-Italian army marched on the Apennines. All disputes between France and the Court of Rome were at length ended by the treaty of Tolentino, as will be seen in Chapter XV.

VI.

The Grand Duke of Tuscany was the first prince in Europe who acknowledged the Republic. When the army invaded Italy, he was at peace with France; his states, situated beyond the Apennines, had no influence on the theatre of the war. Although a French brigade advanced on Leghorn, after Mantua was invested, it was only to drive out the English traders, and facilitate the deliverance of Corsica; in other respects the independence of the states of Tuscany was not infringed. The garrison of Leghorn never amounted to more than 1800 men. It was, no doubt, a sacrifice, to employ three battalions on a secondary object, but the 57th demi-brigade, which had suffered severely and needed repose, was at first put on this duty. Manfredini, the Grand Duke's first minister, exerted much talent and activity in removing the obstacles which might have been prejudicial to his master, who was, on that occasion, indebted to him for the preservation of his states. Three or four conventions of little importance were signed between the French general and the Marquis of Manfredini; by the last, signed at Bologna, Leghorn was evacuated by the French garrison; on this occasion the Grand Duke poured two millions into the chest

of the army to liquidate old accounts. At the treaty of Campo Formio, this prince preserved the integrity of his states. He had suffered some alarm, but no damage, during the war of Italy; care was taken to do him no injury, as well from respect for existing treaties, as from a desire to mitigate the animosity entertained by the house of Lorraine against the Republic, and to detach it from the English.

VII.

When the French army had arrived on the Adige, and Middle and Lower Italy were thereby cut off from Germany, Prince Pignatelli came to head-quarters, to demand an armistice for the King of Naples, which he obtained; it was signed on the 5th of June 1796. The Neapolitan division of 2400 horse, which formed part of Beaulieu's army, went into cantonments round Brescia, in the midst of the French army. A Neapolitan plenipotentiary went to Paris to negotiate and sign a definitive treaty with the Republic. The conclusion of this treaty was impeded by the ill-timed chicanery practised at Paris, and also through the system of bad faith constantly pursued at the Court of the two Sicilies. The Directory ought to have thought themselves extremely fortunate in disarming the King of Naples, a prince who had 60,000 men under

arms, and could have spared from 25 to 30,000 to march on the Po. Napoleon incessantly urged the conclusion of this treaty. The Ministry of exterior relations at Paris wanted a contribution of some millions, which the Court of Naples very reasonably refused to pay; but in the course of September, when it became known that the alliance between Spain and France and the deliverance of Corsica from the English yoke had determined the Cabinet of St. James's to recall its squadrons from the Mediterranean, which left the command of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic to the Toulon fleets, the Court of Naples was alarmed, and subscribed to all that the Directory required; peace was signed on the 8th of October. But the hatred and insincerity of this cabinet, and its disregard of its signature and treaties were such, that, long after the peace, it took a pleasure in alarming Italy by movements of troops on her frontiers, and offensive demonstrations, as if war had actually existed. It would be difficult to describe the indignation excited by this want of all decency and contempt of all human engagements, which eventually brought on the ruin of that cabinet.

VIII.

The French government charged Napoleon in the beginning of September, when the Armies of

the Rhine and Sambre and Meuse were still in Germany, to write to the Emperor, that unless he would consent to peace, he would destroy his naval establishments at Fiume and Trieste. There was no advantage to be expected from so unbecoming a step. At a later period, when the Armies of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine had been forced to retreat into France, and the *têtes-de-pont* of Kehl and Huninguen were besieged, Moreau proposed an armistice, which the Archduke refused, declaring that he claimed the possession of the two *têtes-de-pont;* but as Marshal Wurmser, with nearly 30,000 Austrians, was blockaded in Mantua, and Alvinzi's efforts to relieve him had failed at Arcole, the Directory conceived hopes of getting the principle of a general armistice acknowledged, by which France should preserve Huninguen and Kehl, and Austria Mantua. General Clarke consequently received the necessary powers for proceeding to Vienna to propose this general armistice, which was to last till June 1797. The sieges of Kehl and Huninguen were to be raised, and Mantua placed *in statu quo.* Austrian and French commissioners were daily to send the provisions necessary for the troops and inhabitants into the place. General Clarke arrived at Milan on the 1st of December, to make arrangements with the General-in-chief, who was instructed to adopt all necessary means for

procuring this plenipotentiary the passports for which he had occasion. Napoleon said to him, It is easy to force the enemy to raise the sieges of Kehl and Huninguen; the Archduke has only 40,000 men before Kehl; Moreau must march out of his intrenched camp at break of day with 60,000 men, beat the Archduke, take his parks, and destroy all his works; that moreover Kehl and the *tête-de-pont* of Huninguen were not equivalent to Mantua; that it would be impossible to prove the number of inhabitants, men, women, and children, or even that of the garrison; that Marshal Wurmser, by reducing every body to half allowance, would save in six months wherewithal to subsist six months longer; that if the armistice was intended to pave the way for negotiations for peace, that was a new reason for not proposing it whilst Mantua was in the power of Austria; that it was, therefore, necessary to gain a victory under the walls of Kehl, and to wait for the surrender of Mantua; after which an armistice and peace might be offered. But the orders of government were positive. General Clarke wrote to the Emperor, and sent him a letter from the Directory, in consequence of which, Baron Vincent, aide-de-camp to the Emperor, and General Clarke, met on the 3d of January at Vicenza, where they had two conferences. Baron Vincent declared that the Emperor could not

receive at Vienna a plenipotentiary from the Republic, which he did not acknowledge; that he could not, moreover, separate from his allies; and lastly, that if the French minister had any communication to make, he might apply to M. Giraldi, the Austrian minister at Turin. Thus, fortunately, this disastrous idea of an armistice was eluded by the enemy. The French minister had scarcely reached the Adige on his return, when Alvinzi began to manœuvre to raise the blockade of Mantua, which occasioned the battles of Rivoli and la Favorite, as may be seen in Chapter XIV.

Nevertheless, the Cabinet of the Luxembourg chose to see in this answer of Baron Vincent's, although it does not appear wherefore, a door opened to negotiation; and in the course of January 1797, the Directory sent instructions to General Clarke for the peace he was authorized to sign, on condition, 1st, that the Emperor should renounce Belgium and the Luxembourg country; 2dly, that he should ratify the cession of Liege to the Republic, and some other little acquisitions that had been made; 3dly, that he should promise his influence to give the Stadtholder an indemnity in Germany; 4thly, that the Republic should restore to Austria all her Italian dominions. These conditions were not approved of by Napoleon, who thought that

the Republic had a right to require the limits of the Rhine and a state in Italy to support the French influence, and keep the Republic of Genoa, the King of Sardinia, and the Pope dependent on France; for Italy could never be looked upon as in the situation it stood in before the war. If the French should ever again pass the Alps without having kept a powerful auxiliary there, the aristocracies of Genoa and Venice, and the King of Sardinia, would unite still more closely with Austria by indissoluble ties, influenced by the necessity of securing their internal existence against democratical and popular ideas. Venice, who for a century had possessed no influence in the balance of Europe, now enlightened by experience and the danger she had recently incurred, would collect energy, treasures, and armies to reinforce the Emperor, and to repress ideas of liberty and independence in the terra-firma. Pontiffs, kings, and nobles, would combine to defend their privileges, and prevent modern ideas from passing the Alps.

Three months after, Napoleon signed preliminaries of peace, on the conditions of the limits of the Rhine; that is to say, with the fortress of Mentz, and an additional population of 1,500,000 souls to the Republic, beyond what the Directory demanded, and the existence of one or two democratical republics in Italy, communicating with

Switzerland, barring all Italy, from North to South, from the Alps to the Po, surrounding the King of Sardinia, and covering Middle and Lower Italy, along the line of the Po. In case of necessity the French armies, debouching by Genoa, Parma, Modena, and Bologna, would at once reach the Piave, after turning the Mincio, Mantua, and the Adige. This Republic, with 3,000,000 of inhabitants, would secure the influence of the French over the 3,000,000 of inhabitants of the kingdom of Sardinia, and the 3,000,000 belonging to the States of the Church and to Tuscany, and even over the kingdom of Naples.

IX.

The line of conduct to be observed towards the people of Lombardy was a matter of delicacy; France had determined to conclude peace the moment the Emperor would renounce Belgium and the Luxembourg; and restore Lombardy to him at that price. No engagement, therefore, could be contracted, no guarantee given contrary to these secret arrangements of the cabinet. On the other hand, the country had to support all the expenses of the army, which not only absorbed its revenues, but occasioned additional burthens of greater or less amount, according to the longer or shorter stay of the troops in par-

ticular places. In France the indirect taxes had been suppressed; the system of contributions was very insufficient; the treasury was independent; every thing was conducted in a disorderly, corrupt, and unskilful manner; every branch of the public service was left unprovided for; it became necessary to send contributions from Italy; very important sums to assist the Army of the Rhine, the Toulon and Brest fleets, and even the establishments at Paris. In Italy, however, it became essential to counterbalance the influence of the Austrian party, composed of the nobility, and of a part of the clergy, on which the influence of Rome was exerted with more or less success. Napoleon supported the party that aimed at the independence of Italy, but without committing himself; and, notwithstanding the critical state of the times, he captivated the opinion of the majority of these people. He not only paid great respect to religion, but he omitted nothing that was calculated to conciliate the minds of the clergy. He knew when and how to use the talisman, the magic word of liberty, and, above all, of national independence, which from the days of Rome had never ceased to be dear to the Italians. He intrusted the administration of the provinces, towns, and communes, to the inhabitants, choosing the most eligible men and those who enjoyed the greatest popularity;

and he confided the police to the national guards, who, throughout Italy, were raised in imitation of those of France, under the Italian colours, red, white, and green. Milan had been of the Guelph party, and this was still the general disposition of the minds of the people. The patriots daily increased in number, the French ideas made rapid progress, and the public spirit was such that after Wurmser's destruction, the General-in-chief authorized the Congress of Lombardy to levy a legion of 3000 men. In the course of November, the Polish generals Zayoncheck and Dombrowski, arrived from Poland, with a great number of their officers, to offer their services to Italy; upon which the congress was authorized to raise a Polish legion of 3000 men. These troops were never brought into the field to oppose the Austrians in line; but they served to maintain public tranquillity, and to keep the Pope's army in check. When difficulties afterwards arose, which induced the French general to proclaim the Cispadan republic, the Congress of Lombardy was much alarmed; but it was satisfactorily explained that the difference was occasioned by a difference of circumstances. The army's line of operations did not pass through the Cispadan territory; and, in short, it was not difficult to convince the most enlightened persons, that even had it been true that this

was connected with the wish of the French government not to form engagements which the fortune of war might possibly prevent it from fulfilling, that ought not to alarm them; for after all, it was very evident that the fate of the French party in Italy depended on the chances of battles; that, moreover, this guarantee which France thenceforth gave to the Cispadan republic was equally favourable to them; because, should it one day happen that the course of events should oblige France to consent to the return of the Austrians into Lombardy the Cispadan republic would then be a refuge for the Lombards, and an altar on which the sacred fire of Italian liberty would be preserved from extinction.

Reggio, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara, situate on the right bank of the Po, composed the whole extent of the country from the Adriatic to the states of Parma, by which they were joined to the Republic of Genoa, and by the latter to France. If there was an apprehension of the necessity of restoring Lombardy to Austria, in order to facilitate peace, the importance of maintaining a democratical republic on the right bank of the Po, against which the house of Austria could bring forward no right or claim, was the more clearly perceived.

These four states existed several months in

independence, under the government of their municipal authorities: a junta of general safety, composed of the Capraras, &c. was organized to concert defensive measures, and keep the disaffected in awe. A congress composed of a hundred deputies assembled at Modena in the course of November; the colours of Lombardy were displayed as the Italian colours; some fundamental principles of government were resolved on; that is to say, the suppression of the feudal system, equality, and the rights of man. These small republics formed a confederacy for common defence, and taxed themselves to raise an Italian legion 3000 strong. The congress was composed of persons of all conditions; cardinals, nobles, merchants, lawyers, and men of letters. Their ideas expanded insensibly; the press was free, and at length, at the commencement of January 1797, after some resistance, local prejudices were overcome, and these people united in a single state, entitled the Cispadan republic, of which Bologna was declared the capital; and a representative constitution was adopted. The effect of this step was felt in Rome. The organization and spirit of these new republicans were an effectual barrier against the principles propagated by the holy see, and against the troops it was assembling in Romagna. The Congress of Lombardy formed an alliance

with the Cispadan republic, which at this period fixed the attention of all the people of Italy. Of all the Italian cities, Bologna is that which has constantly shown the greatest energy, and the most considerable share of real information. In February 1797, after the peace of Tolentino, Romagna, having been ceded by the Pope, was naturally reunited to the Cispadan republic, which augmented its population to near two millions of souls.

Such was the state of Italy at the end of the year 1796 and in the spring of 1797, when the French army resolved to pass the Julian Alps, and to march on Vienna.

CHAPTER XIV.

BATTLE OF RIVOLI.

I. Affair of Rome.—II. Situation of the Austrian army.—III. Situation of the French army.—IV. Plan of operations adopted by the Court of Vienna.—V. Action of St. Michel, (Jan. 12.)—VI. Battle of Rivoli, (Jan. 14)—VII. Passage of the Adige by General Provera; and his march on Mantua, (Jan. 14.)—VIII. Battle of la Favorite, (Jan. 16.)—IX. Capitulation of Mantua, (Feb. 2).

I.

THE animosity of the Senate of Venice against the French cause increased daily; but a two-fold dread fettered its enmity: the presence of the victorious army, and the mental agitation that pervaded most of its towns on the terra-firma. However, it raised levies of Sclavonians; new battalions successively arrived in the Lagunes. The two parties were now face to face, in all the towns of the terra-firma. The castles of Verona and Brescia were occupied by French troops. Some commotions which had happened at Bergamo showed the necessity of occupying

the citadel. General Baraguey d'Hilliers took possession of it. This precaution, according to Napoleon's hopes of the speedy surrender of Mantua, seemed sufficient. He did not wish to engage the Senate in discussions which would have led to new difficulties, previously to the fall of that place. Thus both parties were still dissembling.

The negotiations with Rome were broken off; experience had proved that nothing could be obtained of that court but by the presence of force. It was requisite to put an end to this state of uncertainty, which kept up a ferment in Italy. Before the arrival of the new Austrian armies, 3000 French and 4000 Italians passed the Po and entered Bologna on the 6th of January; the General-in-chief had arrived there from Milan. Manfredini, first minister to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, hastened thither to attend to the interest of that prince, and returned to Florence convinced that the French were marching on Rome. The Vatican did not become the dupe of these menaces, being acquainted with the plans adopted at Vienna, and in hopes of their success. The Austrian minister encouraged the Court of Rome. Nothing, he said, could be more favourable to their views than to draw the French into the heart of Italy: the Pope must even quit Rome, if necessary;

the defeat of the French on the Adige would thereby be rendered the more inevitable; it was on the banks of the Tiber that the fate of Italy was to be decided!

II.

In fact, Alvinzi was daily receiving considerable reinforcements; the Paduan, Trevisan, and Bassanese countries were covered with his troops. Austria had employed the two months which had elapsed since the battle of Arcole, in bringing into the Frioul divisions drafted from the banks of the Rhine, where the French armies were in winter-quarters. A national impulse had been given to the whole monarchy. Several battalions of excellent sharp-shooters were raised in the Tyrol. They were easily persuaded that it was incumbent on them to defend their territory and reconquer Italy, which country was so essential to the prosperity of their mountains. The successes of Austria in Germany, in the last campaign, and her defeats in Italy, had both, in different ways, animated the public spirit of her subjects. The great towns offered battalions of volunteers: Vienna raised four battalions, who received from the Empress colours embroidered with her own hands: they lost them, but not before they had defended them with honour. At the beginning of January

1797, the Austrian army of Italy consisted of eight divisions of infantry, of equal strength, to which were attached several brigades of light cavalry, and a division of cavalry of reserve; making in all from 65 to 70,000 fighting men (sixty-four battalions and thirty squadrons), and 6000 Tyrolese, besides 24,000 men of the garrison of Mantua; making a total of from 96 to 100,000 men.

III.

The French army had been reinforced since the battle of Arcole by two demi-brigades of infantry from the coast of Provence, of which the 57th formed part, and by a regiment of cavalry; in all 7000 men; which compensated for the loss sustained at Arcole and in the blockade of Mantua. It was formed in five divisions: Joubert commanded one of them, and occupied Monte Baldo, Rivoli, and Bussolengo; Rey, with a less numerous division, was in reserve at Dezenzano; Massena was at Verona, with a vanguard at Saint-Michel; Augereau at Legnago, with a vanguard at Bevilacqua; Serrurier was blockading Mantua. These five divisions amounted to 45,000 men, under arms, of whom only 30,000 belonged to the Army of Observation. Joubert had covered la Corona with intrenchments; Verona, Legnago, Peschiera, and

Pizzighettone, were in a good state of defence; the citadels of Brescia and Bergamo, the fort of Fuentes, the citadel of Ferrara, and fort Urbino, were likewise occupied by the French, whose gun-boats also rendered them masters of the four lakes of Garda, Como, Lugano, and Maggiore.

IV.

Wurmser had attacked by three debouchés, that is to say, by the road of the Chiesa, by Monte Baldo, and the valley of the Adige. His columns were to join at Mantua. A few months after, Alvinzi had entered Italy with two armies, one advancing by the Tyrol, the other by the Piave, the Brenta, and the Adige; they were to join at Verona. The Court of Vienna adopted this time a new plan, connected with the operations of Rome, and ordered two grand attacks to be made, the principal one by Monte Baldo, the second on the Lower Adige by the plains of the Paduan country; they were to be independent of each other. The two corps-d'armée were to unite before Mantua. The principal one was to debouch by the Tyrol; if it defeated the French army, it would arrive under the walls of Mantua, and would there find the corps which would have reached that place by crossing the Adige. If the principal attack

should fail, and the second should succeed, the siege of Mantua would still be raised and the place victualled; this corps-d'armée would then throw itself into the Serraglio, and establish its communications with Rome; Wurmser would take the command of the army which was forming in Romagna, with his 5000 cavalry, his staff, and his numerous train of field-pieces. The great number of generals, officers, and dismounted cavalry, who were in Mantua, would serve to discipline the Pope's army, and form a diversion, which would compel the French to have two armies also, one on the right and the other on the left bank of the Po. A very intelligent secret agent sent from Vienna to Mantua, was arrested by a sentinel as he was passing the last post of the blockading army. He was forced to give up his despatches, although he had swallowed them; they were inclosed in a ball of sealing-wax, and consisted of a small letter written in very minute characters, and signed by the Emperor Francis. He informed Wurmser that he would be relieved without delay; at all events, he ordered him not to capitulate, but rather to evacuate the place, pass the Po, proceed into the Pope's territories, and there take the command of the army of the Holy See.

V.

Pursuant to the plan adopted by the Court of Vienna, Alvinzi commanded the principal attack, at the head of 5000 men, and advanced his head-quarters from Bassano to Roveredo; General Provera took the command of the corps-d'armée destined to act on the Lower Adige, which was formed of three divisions, and 20,000 strong. He fixed his head-quarters at Padua. On the 12th of January his left division, commanded by Bayalitsch, took up a position at Caldiero; and Hohenzollern, with the vanguard, at Montagnana. On the 12th, Hohenzollern marched on Bevil-acqua, where he found the French vanguard commanded by the brave General Duphot, who, after a slight resistance, retreated behind the Adige, passing the bridges of Porto Legnago. Bayalitsch's division attacked Saint-Michel: it consisted of eight battalions and six squadrons. Massena marched to the aid of his vanguard; the Austrians were broken, and hotly pursued as far as Caldiero, leaving 900 prisoners.

The General-in-chief having been informed, at Bologna, by the agents from Venice, of the movement of the Austrian army on Padua, had ordered the Italian troops to encamp on the frontiers of the Transpadan country, to keep the Pope's army in check; and had directed the

3000 French from Bologna on Ferrara, where they had passed the Po at Ponte di Lagoscuro. He himself had crossed that river at Borgo-Forte, and proceeded to head-quarters at Roverbella. He arrived at Verona during the action of Saint-Michel. In the evening he ordered Massena to withdraw his whole division behind Verona in the course of the night. The enemy was in operation; it was therefore necessary to keep all the troops beyond the defile, that they might be able to march without delay to whatever point the true attack should be made on. During the night he received from Legnago a report that the Austrian army was in movement on the Lower Adige, that its general staff was there, and that two pontoon trains had been seen. General Duphot's report left no doubt as to the numerous forces deployed before him; he had seen above 12,000 men, and supposed that they were only the first line. Joubert sent word from la Corona, that he had been attacked during the whole of the 12th, but that he had kept the enemy in check and repulsed him: and this seemed to confirm the opinion that the true attack was on the Lower Adige.

VI.

The enemy had not yet unmasked his plans, and the moment for adopting a decisive course

had not yet arrived. The troops held themselves in readiness for a nocturnal march. The division encamped at Dezenzano proceeded on the 13th to Castel-Nuovo, to wait for fresh orders. The news from the Chiesa was satisfactory as to that point. It rained very heavily; at ten o'clock the troops were under arms, but Napoleon had not yet determined in what direction he should move them; whether they were to march up or down the banks of the Adige. At ten in the evening the reports from Monte Baldo and the Lower Adige arrived. Joubert intimated that on the 13th, at nine o'clock in the morning, the enemy had deployed numerous forces; that he had fought all day; that his position was very much confined; that he had been fortunate enough to maintain his ground; but that, at two in the afternoon, perceiving that he was outflanked on his left, by the march of an Austrian division along the lake of Garda, which threatened to place itself between him and Peschiera, and on the right by another division, which had marched along the left bank of the Adige, constructed a bridge near Dolce, a league from Rivoli, passed the river, and was filing along the left bank, past the foot of Monte Magnone, to carry the level of Rivoli, he had considered it indispensably necessary to send a brigade to secure this important level, the key of the whole posi-

tion; and that at four o'clock he had likewise judged it necessary to follow this movement in retreat, in order to reach the level of Rivoli by daylight; that he should be obliged to evacuate his position in the night, and retreat on the Lower Adige, unless he received orders to the contrary. Provera had lined the left bank with troops, and a fire of musquetry was kept up on each side. The enemy's plan was now unmasked. It was evident that he was operating with two corps; the principal one on Monte Baldo, and a minor one on the Lower Adige. Augereau's division appeared sufficient to dispute the passage of the river with Provera, and defend it against him; but on the Monte Baldo side the danger was imminent; there was not a moment to lose, for the enemy was about to effect a junction with his artillery and cavalry, by taking possession of the level of Rivoli, and if he could be attacked before he could get possession of that important point, he would be obliged to fight without artillery or cavalry. All the troops were therefore put in march to reach Rivoli by day-break; the General-in-chief proceeded to the same point, and arrived there at two in the morning.

The weather had cleared up; the moon shone brilliantly; the General ascended several heights, and observed the lines of the enemy's fires, which

filled the whole country between the Adige and the lake of Garda, and reddened the atmosphere. He clearly distinguished five camps, each composed of a column, which had commenced their movements the preceding day. From the fires of the bivouacs he calculated that there must be from 40 to 45,000 men. The French could not bring more than 22,000 men into action on this field; this was a great disproportion; but then the French had the advantage of sixty pieces of cannon and several regiments of cavalry. It seemed evident from the positions of the five bivouacs of the enemy, that Alvinzi would not attack before ten in the morning. The first column, that of Luzignan, on the right, was at a great distance; its intention seemed to be to get behind the level of Rivoli in order to surround it; it could not reach its destination before ten o'clock. The second column, that of Liptay, seemed to intend to attack the position on the left of the level. The third, that of Koblos, was spread along the foot of Monte Magnone, in the direction of Saint-Mark's chapel. The fourth column was composed of fourteen battalions, and of the artillery, cavalry, and baggage of the army; it had passed the Adige at Dolce, having marched down the right bank to the foot of Monte Magnone: it was now opposite Osteria della Dugana, in echelons near the hamlet of Incanole, at the foot of the

level of Rivoli: it was to debouch by this road, and thus Alvinzi would have united his infantry, artillery, and cavalry. The fifth column, under Wukassowich, was on the left bank of the Adige, opposite the Venetian Chiesa.

Upon this general view Napoleon formed his plan. He ordered Joubert, who had evacuated Saint-Mark's chapel on Monte Magnone, and who now occupied the level of Rivoli only with a rear-guard, to resume the offensive forthwith, to regain possession of the chapel without waiting for daylight, and to repulse the fourth column, under D'Ocskay, as far as possible. Ten Croats, having been informed of the evacuation of Saint-Mark's by a prisoner, had just entered the chapel, when Joubert sent General Vial up to it, about four o'clock in the morning, and retook it. The firing began with a regiment of Croats, and successively with the whole of d'Ocskay's column, which by daylight was repulsed as far as the middle of the ridge of Monte Magnone. The third Austrian column, that of Koblos, then hastened its march, and reached the heights on the left of the level of Rivoli a little before nine o'clock, but without artillery. The 14th and 85th French demi-brigades, which were in line in this position, had each a battery. The 14th, which occupied the right, repulsed the enemy's attacks; the 85th was outflanked and broken.

The General-in-chief hastened to Massena's division, which, having marched all night, was taking a little rest in the village of Rivoli, led it against the enemy, and in less than half an hour this column was beaten and put to flight at half past ten. Liptay's column hastened to the aid of that of Koblos. Quasdanowich, who was at the bottom of the valley, perceived that Joubert had left no troops at Saint-Mark's chapel, that he had advanced in pursuit of Ocskay, and that the firing approached the level of Rivoli; he therefore considered the opportunity favourable for debouching. He detached three battalions to climb the heights up to the chapel, and two to protect the passage of his cavalry and artillery. The victory depended on the success of this enterprise, but its execution was very difficult; it was an absolute escalade. Joubert ordered three battalions to run back, who reached the chapel before those of the enemy, and repulsed them to the bottom of the valley. The French battery of fifteen pieces of cannon, placed at the level of Rivoli, overwhelmed all who offered to debouch with grape-shot. Colonel Leclerc charged with 300 horse in platoons, and Major Lasalle, farther on, with 200 hussars; the intrepidity of these charges decided the success of the day; the enemy was overthrown into the ravine; all who had debouched, infantry, cavalry,

and artillery, were taken. Half the army, consisting of the columns of Quasdanowich and Wukassowich, not having been able to debouch, became useless and afforded no assistance. In the mean time, the first column, that of Luzignan, was coming up to its appointed position; it had fallen in with the French reserve of Dezenzano, composed of the 57th and 58th, in position at Orza, and left one of its brigades to keep them in check. The other brigade, 5000 strong, deployed on the heights of Pipolo, on both sides of the Verona road, behind the level of Rivoli, supporting its right on the Adige. These troops had no artillery; they thought they had turned the French army; but it was too late; scarcely had they arrived on the height when they witnessed the rout of Ocskay, Koblos, and Liptay; they then foresaw the fate which awaited them, and which they had no means of avoiding. They were first cannonaded by fifteen twelve-pounders of the reserve, for a quarter of an hour, and immediately afterwards attacked and entirely taken. The second brigade of this column, which had been left in the rear to oppose the reserve of Dezenzano, then began to retreat; it was pursued and dispersed, and the greater part killed or taken. It was two o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy was every where defeated, and dreadfully cut up. Joubert advanced with such rapidity

that at one moment it was supposed that the whole of Alvinzi's army was taken. La Scaliera was the only retreat open to the enemy; but their general, aware of the danger he stood in, faced about with a reserve, checked Joubert, and even made him give ground a little. The battle was won; the French had taken the twelve pieces of cannon which debouched by Incanole, several colours and 7000 prisoners. Two detachments of the 18th and 32d which were joining the army, had fallen in with Luzignan's division whilst it was cutting off the Verona road. They spread a report in the rear that the French army was surrounded and lost. This day the General-in-chief was several times surrounded by the enemy; he had several horses killed. General Chabot occupied Verona with a few men.

VII.

On the same day, Provera constructed a bridge at Anghiari, near Legnago, passed the river and marched on Mantua; leaving a reserve to guard his bridges. Augereau could not attack them until the 15th; he then had an engagement, which lasted several hours, killed or took all the guard, and burned the pontoons. It is difficult to prevent an enemy who is provided with pontoons from passing a river, when the object of the army defending the passage is to cover a siege; the

latter should have taken measures for reaching an intermediate position between the river which it defends and the place it covers, before the enemy. As soon as Provera had passed the Adige, Augereau should have directed his march on the Molinella, where he would have arrived before Provera. Napoleon being informed, on the 14th, at two o'clock in the afternoon, in the midst of the battle of Rivoli, that Provera was constructing a bridge at Anghiari, immediately foresaw what was about to take place. He left the task of pursuing Alvinzi on the following day to Massena, Murat, and Joubert, and instantly marched with four regiments to station himself before Mantua. He had thirteen leagues to march. He entered Roverbella as Provera arrived before Saint-Georges. Hohenzollern with the vanguard had presented himself on the 16th, at break of day, at the gate of Saint-Georges, at the head of a regiment wearing white cloaks; he knew that this suburb was merely covered by a simple line of countervallation, and was in hopes to surprise it. Miolis, who commanded there, had no guard except towards the city; he knew that a French division was on the Adige, and thought the enemy far distant. Hohenzollern's hussars resembled those of the first French hussar regiment. But an old serjeant of the garrison of Saint-Georges, who was gathering

wood about two hundred yards from the walls, observed this cavalry; he conceived doubts which he communicated to a drummer who accompanied him; it seemed to them that the white cloaks were too new for Berchini's regiment. In this uncertainty these brave fellows threw themselves into Saint-Georges, crying To arms, and shut the barrier: Hohenzollern galloped up, but he was too late; he was recognized, and fired upon with grape. The troops speedily manned the parapets. At noon Provera surrounded the place. The brave Miolis, with 1500 men, defended himself all day, and thus gave time for the succours from Rivoli to arrive.

VIII.

Provera communicated with Mantua by means of a bark which crossed the lake, and concerted operations for the ensuing day. On the 16th, as soon as it was day, Wurmser made a sortie with the garrison, and took up a position at la Favorite. At one o'clock in the morning, Napoleon stationed General Victor, with the four regiments he had brought with him, between la Favorite and Saint-Georges, to prevent the garrison of Mantua from joining the succouring army. Serrurier, at the head of the troops of the blockade, attacked the garrison; Victor's division attacked the army of succour; it was in this

battle that the 57th earned the title of *Terrible*. They attacked the Austrian line, and overthrew all who attempted to resist; by two o'clock in the afternoon the garrison was driven back into the place, and Provera capitulated and laid down his arms. A number of standards, much baggage, several parks, 6000 prisoners, amongst whom were several generals, fell into the victor's power. In the mean time a rear guard, which Provera had left at la Molinella, was attacked by General Point of Augereau's division, defeated and taken. Of all Provera's troops, only 2000 men who remained beyond the Adige, escaped; all the rest were taken or killed. This action was called the Battle of la Favorite, from the name of a palace belonging to the dukes of Mantua, situate near the field of battle.

On the Pazzone side, Joubert chased Alvinzi throughout the 15th, and reached the Scaliera (ladder-path) di Brentino so rapidly, that 5000 men were intercepted and taken. Murat, with two battalions of light troops, embarked on the lake of Garda, and turned la Corona; it was with difficulty that Alvinzi escaped. Joubert marched on Trent, occupied the old positions of the Avisio, and made 1000 prisoners in different reconnoisances. General Augereau marched to Castel Franco, and thence to Treviso; he was also obliged to engage in several slight affairs.

Massena occupied Bassano, and placed his advanced posts on the Piave; he made 1200 prisoners in two actions fought with his vanguard.

The Austrian troops retreated across the Piave. All the passes of the Tyrol were blocked up by the snow, which was the greatest difficulty Joubert had to surmount. The French infantry triumphed over all obstacles. Joubert entered Trent, and occupied the Italian Tyrol. All the Austrian sick were taken, as well as considerable stores. The army occupied the same positions as before the battle of Arcole. The trophies acquired in the course of January in the several actions were 25,000 prisoners, twenty-four colours and standards, and sixty pieces of cannon. And lastly, the enemy's loss was at least 35,000 men.

Bessieres carried the colours to Paris. The prisoners were so numerous that they created some difficulty; many escaped in passing through Switzerland; there was a system organized for this purpose; nevertheless General Rey escorted them with 4000 men.

It was in acknowledgement of the services rendered in so many battles by General Massena, that the Emperor afterwards made him Duke of Rivoli.

IX.

The garrison of Mantua had long subsisted on half rations; the horses had been eaten. Wurmser was informed of the results of the battle of Rivoli. He had no longer any thing to hope for. He was summoned to surrender, but proudly answered that he had provisions for a twelvemonth. A few days after, however, Klenau, his first aide-de-camp, came to Serrurier's head-quarters. He protested that the garrison had still sufficient provisions for three months; but that the marshal not believing that Austria would be able to succour the place in sufficient time, his conduct would be regulated by the conditions which should be prescribed to him. Serrurier replied that he would take the orders of his General-in-chief on the subject. Napoleon went to Roverbella; he remained incognito, wrapped in his cloak, whilst the conversation between the two generals was proceeding. Klenau, employing all the customary expedients, expatiated at length on the great resources which Wurmser still possessed, and the quantities of provisions he still had in his magazines of reserve. The General-in-chief approached the table, took a pen and spent nearly half an hour in writing his decisions in the margin of Wurmser's proposals, whilst the discussion was

proceeding with Serrurier. When he had finished, "If Wurmser," said he to Klenau, "had "but provisions for eighteen or twenty days, and "talked of surrendering, he would not deserve an "honourable capitulation; but I respect the Mar- "shal's age, his bravery, and misfortunes. Here "are the conditions I grant him if he opens his "gates to-morrow. If he delays a fortnight, a "month, or two, he shall still have the same "conditions; he may therefore hold out to his "last morsel of bread. I am about to set out "instantly to pass the Po, and I shall march on "Rome. You know my intentions; go and com- "municate them to your general." Klenau, who had been quite at a loss to understand the first words, soon comprehended who it was that addressed him. He examined the decisions, the perusal of which filled him with gratitude for such generous and unexpected treatment. Dissimulation was now useless; he acknowledged that they had not provisions for more than three days. Wurmser sent to request the French General, as he was to cross the Po, to pass it at Mantua, which would save much circuitous travelling over bad roads, but all arrangements were already made. Wurmser wrote to him to express his gratitude, and a few days after despatched an aide-de-camp to him at Bologna, to apprise him of a conspiracy to poison him, which was to be

carried into effect in Romagna, and to give him the necessary information to preserve himself from the attempt. This notice proved useful. General Serrurier presided at the ceremony of the surrender of Mantua, and saw the old marshal and all the staff of his army file off before him: Napoleon was by that time in Romagna. The indifference with which he withdrew himself from the very flattering spectacle of a Marshal of great reputation, Generalissimo of the Austrian forces in Italy, delivering up his sword at the head of his staff, was remarked throughout Europe. The garrison of Mantua still amounted to 20,000 men, of whom 12,000 were fit for service; there were thirty generals, eighty commissaries and agents of all descriptions, and Wurmser's grand staff. In the three blockades since the month of June, 27,500 soldiers had died in the hospitals or been killed in the different sorties.

Joubert, who was born in the department of the Aisne, (formerly Bresse,) had studied for the bar; the Revolution induced him to adopt the profession of arms. He served in the Army of Italy, and was successively made a brigadier-general, and general of division. He was tall and thin, and seemed naturally of a weak constitution; but he had strengthened his frame amidst fatigues, camps, and mountain warfare. He was intrepid, vigilant, and active. In November 1796, he was

made a general of division, to succeed Vaubois. He had the command of the corps of the Tyrol. It will be seen that he acquired honour in the campaigns of Germany. He was much attached to Napoleon, who sent him to the Directory, in November 1797, with the colours taken by the Army of Italy. In 1799 he engaged in the intrigues of Paris, and was appointed General-in-chief of the Army of Italy, after the defeat of Moreau. He then married the daughter of the senator Semonville. He fell gloriously at the battle of Novi. He was still young, and had not acquired all the experience necessary. His talents were such that he might have attained great military renown.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME OF MEMOIRS.

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
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